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CHAPTER 13 
CREATIVITY: 
Hypnagogia has been related to the creative process 
in varying ways by a number of writers. Maury (1857, p. 
164) spoke of "the spontaneous generation of ideas in hypna- 
gogia, and Gurney (1885) of "an immense amount of high 
creative work". Greenwood (1894) remarked that in hypnago- 
gia all the mental faculties are "lifted into a higher 
range of freedom". Crichton-Browne (1895) speaking of 
dreamy mental states in general compared them with the 
"flights of genius". Myers (1903) talked of "a general 
heightening of faculty" in hypnagogia. Arnold-Forster 
(1921, p. 149) noted that "at such moments the answer to 
some difficult question... may flash into the mind". Sartre 
(1978, p. 47) referred to hypnagogic mentation as "an ent- 
irely new way of thinking". A quotation from Novalis 
(Begouin 1939, p. 210) reads: "To dream and altogether not 
to dream. This synthesis is the operation of the genius, 
by which both activities are mutually reinforced". 
Varendonck (1921) reported that he had conceived his 
most original contributions to science just before falling 
asleep. Problem solving in hypnagogia has also been repor- 
ted by Kekule (Japp 1878), W. Scott (Beveridge 1950, pp. 
73-74), Poincare (1913), Stanford (1977), Edison (Bernd 
1978), Hadamard, Einstein, Brindley (Koestler 1981, pp. 
116-117,183,211). To these must be added the 'informa- 
tional' cases referred to in the chapter on 'Psi', that 
is, cases where the subject has a sudden solution to a pro- 
blem or is 'warned' about an impending danger. 
Marsh (1906) found that most artistic and literary 
creative people were at their best in early morning and 
late evening, and Green et al (1970) and Green and Green 
(1978) pointed out that many outstanding creative indivi- 
duals have reported that their greatest insights were asso- 
ciated with reverie and hypnagogic imagery. Poems (Miller 
1906; Prince 1952; Moss 1970; Coleridge: Koestler 1981), 
stories for novels (Caldwell: Stearn 1973), and whole 
novels (Leader 1973: cited by Panati 1975) have been 
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conceived in the hypnagogic-hypnopompic state. M. Twain, 
E. A. Poe, R. L. Stevenson (Hollingworth 1911), L. Carroll 
(Panati 1975), Max Ernst (1952), Wagner and Bradbury 
(McKellar 1957) and C. Lamb and T. de Quincey (McKellar 
1979b) are known to have used hypnagogic imagery as source 
material. Melville (1961) in his 'Moby Dick' describes 
a tactile hypnagogic experience as occurring to Ishmael, 
one of the characters in the novel (see Schneck 1977 for 
discussion). Emily Bronte also describes hypnagogic imag- 
ery in 'Wuthering Heights', and Charlotte Bronte in 'Vill- 
ette' describes what she calls an opium vision which she 
personally experienced not as a result of taking opium - 
she denied ever having taken any - but as the outcome of 
having thought about it on numerous occasions before sleep: 
"The vision itself", McKellar (1963, p. 141), reports, "emer- 
ged on one occasion after waking up in the morning". 
Brahms (Abell 1964, pp. 19-21), Puccini and Wagner 
(Gowan 1976) described hypnagogiclike trances as states 
wherein they had created their famous compositions. Keats 
probably had similar experiences judging by his 'Ode to 
a Nightingale' which opens with the description of "a 
drowsy numbness" and closes with the lines: 
Was it a vision, or a waking dream? 
Fled is that music: - do I wake or sleep? 
The same may also be said of the Spanish poet Be"cquer who, 
in one of his poems, wrote: "I did not sleep but wandered 
in that limbo where objects change shape, the mysterious 
tracts that separate waking from sleep" (quoted by Lewin 
1969, p. 116). Of the modern painters, besides Ernst 
already referred to, Dali is well known for his use of a 
method of hypnagogic relaxation as a means of both relax- 
ation and inspiration. His paintings are full of hypna- 
gogic imagery and one of them bears the title: "Dream 
caused by the flight of a bee around a pomegranate one 
second before waking up". Similarly, Oster (1966) has pro- 
duced a number of paintings based on his hypnagogic 
phosphenes. 
Edison is said to have made extensive use of hypna- 
gogia as a means of arriving at new ideas. Bernd (1978) 
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reports that 
Edison used to work very hard in his research - at 
beta, the faster brain wave frequencies. Then when 
he would reach a 'sticking point' he would take one 
of his famous 'cat naps'. He would doze off in his 
favourite chair, holding steel balls in the palms of 
his hands. As he would fall asleep - driting into 
alpha - his arms would relax and lower, letting the 
balls fall into pans on the floor. The noise would 
wake Edison, and very often he would awaken with an 
idea to continue with his project. 
(Bernd 1978, pp. 28-29). 
Bernd follows the above report with the question: "what 
might this genius have done if he had known how to use 
alpha levels consciously without falling asleep to get 
there? " (p. 29). Attempts to answer such a question have 
involved the relating of creativity to alphoid brain waves 
and hypnagogia. Elmer Green and his co-workers A. Green 
and D. Walters have directed their attention specifically 
to this problem. 
Using autogenic feedback techniques, they have set 
out "to study the general processes, conditions, and con- 
tents of consciousness during a state of deep reverie. 
This combination of reverie and awareness seems to be an 
essential (though maybe not sufficient) ingredient of crea- 
tivity" (Green, Green and Walters 1970, p. 21). They drew 
attention to the following considerations: 
(a) the existence of a link or relationship between 
alpha-and-theta-rhythms in the brain wave and reverie- 
and-hypnagogic-imagery, and to (b) the existence of 
a link or relationship between reverie-and-hypnagogic- 
imagery and creativity. It can be inferred from the 
above juxtaposition that the areas of alpha-and-theta- 
rhythms and creativity may indeed overlap, and that 
training in the production and control of alpha-and- 
theta-rhythms may make possible an enhancement of 
creativity in individuals whose potential is yet 
unrealized. 
(Green et al 1970, pp. 11-12). 
Earlier on they speak of "hypnagogic-like imagery" as the 
"sine qua non of creativity for many outstanding people" 
(p. 10). They define "reverie" as "a state of inward-turned 
abstract attention or internal scanning" (p. 10, note 3) 
and explain their use of the qualifying term "hypnagogic- 
like" instead of hypnagogic "because our subjects were 
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trying to remain awake rather than go to sleep" (p. 12, note 
6). 
In pilot studies with "a professor of physics, a 
psychiatrist, and a psychologist, all of whom are uniquely 
individualistic, creative, and successful in their respec- 
tive vocations" (p. 12, note 4). Green and his co-workers 
reported that their subjects demonstrated "an unusually 
high percentage of 6-8/ Hertz waves in their EEG records 
during periods of deep reverie" (p. 12). Two of them showed 
long trains of theta waves in conjunction with hypnagogic- 
like imagery "which they said was customary in their inter- 
nal scanning experience" whilst the third managed to lower 
his alpha rhythm to 8.3 Hertz "during 1-minute trials and 
reported this as a preliminary mind-quieting imageless 
stage in moving toward a deeper state of reverie" (p. 12). 
In what follows I shall examine the general concept 
of creativity and point out what are thought to be the nec- 
essary and sufficient conditions for creative activity. 
I shall present cases of inspiration and creativity occur- 
ring in the hypnagogic-hypnopompic state and argue that 
the latter contains some, and sometimes all, of the nece- 
ssary and sufficient conditions for the emergence of crea- 
tivity. I shall also relate schizophrenia to creativity 
and argue that the state of hypnagogia is their natural 
meeting place, so to speak, and that the study of the lat- 
ter can throw light on both of the former. I shall main- 
tain that the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
creativity to be discussed are functions of the loosening 
of ego boundaries which is a defining feature of hypnagogia. 
The literature on creativity may be roughly divided 
into the following areas characterized by different res- 
earch orientations: 
(1): Personality traits, abilities, and attitudes identified 
314 
in creative individuals (e. g., Meier 1939; Wilson et al 
1953; Angyal 1956; Barron 1958,1963; Lowenfeld 1958; 
Whiting 1958; Hilgard 1959; Fromm 1959; Rogers 1959; 
Guilford 1959,1962; Maslow 1968; Drevdahl and Cattell 
1958; Mooney 1956; Mooney and Razik 1967; Abdel-Salan 1963). 
(2): Research into the creative process per se. This may 
be divided into sub-groups again characterized by theore- 
tical orientations suggested by evidential reports. Hallman 
(1967) has identified three such areas. They are: 
(2a): Creativity as a series of chronological stages (e. g. 
Dewey 1910; Wallas 1926; Rossman 1931; Poincare 1913; 
Montmasson 1931; Patrick 1937; Spender 1946; Hutchinson 
1939,1949; Ghiselin 1952; Vinacke 1952; Hadamard 1954; 
Arnold 1959). This view is exemplified by Wallas's (1926) 
preparation, incubation, inspiration, evaluation stages. 
(2b): Creativity as "an interchange of energy among vertical 
layers of psychological systems", e. g., "as the primary 
and secondary processes, the autistic and the reality adju- 
sted, unconscious mechanisms and unconscious deliberation, 
free and bound energies, gestalt-free and articulating ten- 
dencies" (Hallman 1967, p. 17). Besides Freud (1959), other 
proponents of such view include Schneider 1950; Ehrenzweig 
1953; Maslow 1959; Murray 1959). 
(2c): Creativity as types of thinking which are distinct 
from non-creative ones. Thus, creative mentation is inte- 
grating, synthesizing, relational, fusing of disparate 
elements. Hallman (1967, p. 18) summarizes examples of this 
view: "Spearman (1931) refers to creative thinking as the 
education of correlates; Vinacke (1952), as imagination 
rather than voluntary, rational operations; Bartlett (1958) 
as divergent autistic thinking as distinguished from closed 
systems. Bruner's book On Knowing (1962) makes the same 
distinction". 
(3): Training for creativity, e. g., by 'synetics' (e. g., 
Gordon 1961), 'brain-storming' (e. g., Parnes 1962; Osborn 
1963). 
(4): Studying creativity through hypnosis (e. g., Krippner 
1964; MacKinnon 1964). 
(5): Creativity in education (e. g., Mearns 1925; Getzels 
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and Jackson 1962; MacKinnon 1962; Torrance 1962; Parnes 
1963; Cattel 1968). 
Hallman (1967) has identified five criteria for crea- 
tivity: (a) connectedness, (ß) nonrationality, (y) origi- 
nality, (b) openness, (E) self-actualization. These he 
considers to be the necessary and sufficient conditions 
of creativity. I shall examine them below and argue that, 
with certain qualifications in respect to (y) and (C) these 
features are present in hypnagogia. 
Connectedness and 'actualized' metaphors: 
The criterion of connectedness, which, as Hallman 
points out, employs the category of relation as a principle 
of explanation and isolates the relation of similitude 
as its basic feature, has been proposed by a number of 
workers who described it variously as combinatorial acti- 
vity (Bruner 1962), fusion (McKellar 1957), unexpected con- 
nections resulting from unconscious symbolic activity 
(Kubie 1958), compositional activity whose outcome is a 
new object, experience or image (Murray 1959), new config- 
urations (Ghiselin 1952; Arnold 1959). 
Hallman (p. 19) argues that "connectedness comprises 
relationships which are neither symmetrical nor transitive; 
that is, the newly created connections as wholes are not 
equivalent to the parts being connected. Neither side of 
the equation validly implies the other, for the relation- 
ship is neither inferential nor causal; rather, it is meta- 
phoric and transformational". 
The feature of connectedness in creativity is to be 
found in all areas of human activity: perceptual, intell- 
ectual, imaginative. 
In respect to hypnagogia it is encountered as the 
fusion of (i) relatively relevant components to form a com- 
posite, as in Galton's (1883) and Katz's (1948) photographs 
and (ii) apparently disparate elements belonging to ent- 
irely different matrices. The mechanisms of this activity 
may be present in the waking state as "contrary imagina- 
tions" or divergent thinking (Hudson 1968) but the quality 
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of fusions in hypnagogia is considered unique (Leroy 1933; 
Rapaport 1967a). 
In regards to (i) there are the numerous reports of 
hypnagogic experiences which contain unrecognizable images 
whose parts are, nonetheless, recognized as belonging to 
past perceptual or imaginative experiences, as being 'like' 
something already experienced but with added dimensions; 
that is, in agreement with Hallman, "the newly created con- 
nections as wholes are not equivalent to the parts being 
connected". A case in point here is that of Miller's 
(1906). 
She relates how one night she experienced and wrote 
a hypnagogic drama she called "Chiwantopel". Lying in bed 
with closed eyes, she writes, "[I] had the sensation that 
I was waiting for something to happen. Then I felt a great 
relaxation and I remained as impassive as possible" (p. 48). 
There followed the familiar hypnagogic mosaic of "lines, 
sparks and spirals of light... [and]... a kaleidoscopic 
and fragmented review of recent trivial events. Then came 
the impression that something was about to be communicated 
to me". There appeared the figure of an Inca, complete 
with head-dress, who bore the name of "Chi-wan-to-pel", 
which Miller heard spelled out syllable by syllable. Round 
this character raged a battle and the cries of "wa-ma, wa- 
ma" were heard. There followed other scenes, and the little 
drama ended with Chiwantopel's dying monologue which was 
delivered in English except for the last words which were: 
"Ja-ni-wa-ma, Ja-ni-wa-ma" and stood for "You will under- 
stand" (p. 50). 
Miller attempts to explain her experiences by refer- 
ence to previous wakeful ones which she believes probably 
provided the various elements that eventually came together 
(fused, combined) in hypnagogia and unfolded as a new, 
self-contained drama. Although she does not attempt to 
explain the genesis of the Inca-like neologisms "wa-ma" 
and "Ja-ni-wa-ma" she suggests that"Chi-wan-to-pel" 
may have been subconsciously constructed along the lines 
of "Po-po-cat-a-pel" a central American volcano whose name 
she was familiar with. Other elements were also condensed 
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and rearranged unconsciously before emerging in their new 
form during her hypnagogic experience. But, more impor- 
tant, she explains that during the days before this exper- 
ience she "had been searching for inspiration, for an orig- 
inal idea" (p. 51) and that this "mosaic" was the outcome 
of distant and recent experiences brought together by this 
need. Interestingly, Miller's explanations of this and 
other of her hypnagogic experiences were given out as an 
argument against possible spiritualistic interpretations 
of such events. This, and the presence of neologisms, 
clearly point both to the close relationship that may be 
seen as existing between psi, schizophrenia, and creativity 
and to the fact that hypnagogia constitutes the meeting 
place, or the general frame of mind, wherein such states 
may naturally make their appearance. 
Koestler (1981, p. 167) suggests that Coleridge's 
"Kubla Khan" originated "in an intense day-dream or hypna- 
gogic state... some intermediary kind of 'waking dream'". 
Coleridge himself noted that 
Ideas and images exist in the twilight realms of con- 
sciousness, that shadowy half-being, that state of 
nascent existence in the twilight of imagination and 
just on the vestibule of consciousness, a confluence 
of our recollections through which we establish a 
centre, as it were, a sort of nucleus in [this) reser- 
voir of the soul. 
(cited by Gerard 1946, p. 481). 
Moreover, Coleridge (1952, pp. 84-85) also stated that prior 
to having the Kubla Khan experience "in which all the ima- 
ges rose up before him as things", he had been reading 
'Purcha's Pilgrimage' where Khan Kubla's palace and stately 
garden were described. Thus, to borrow Lowes's words in 
analysing another of Coleridge's poems, 'The Ancient Mari- 
ner', on this hypnagogic occasion "facts which sank at int- 
ervals out of conscious recollection drew together beneath 
the surface through almost chemical affinities of common 
elements.... Beneath the poem lie... innumerable blendings 
and fusings of impressions, brought about below the level 
of conscious mental processes" (cited by Gerard 1946, p. 
481). 
An experience similar to Miller's and Coleridge's but 
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occurring at the hypnopompic end is also described by one 
of Prince's (1952) subjects. She writes: 
I woke suddenly some time between three and four in 
the morning. I was perfectly wide awake and conscious 
of my surroundings but for a short time - perhaps two 
or three minutes -I could not move, and I saw this 
vision which I recognized as such. 
(Prince 1952, p. 204). 
The vision which was "extraordinarily clear" depicted a 
tender love scene between a man and a woman set against 
"a sort of rosy atmosphere". The subject notes that she 
did not experience any emotion at the moment of seeing the 
vision and that she wrote it down, in verse, at once. In 
the next morning she read over what she had written and 
"was amazed at the language and the rhythm". She presented 
the poem to Prince exactly as it was written. Again, as 
in Miller's case, the subject notes: 
For two or three days previously I had been trying 
to write some verses, and had been reading a good deal 
of poetry. I had been thinking in rhythm. I had also 
been under considerable nervous and emotional strain 
for some little time in reference to the facts por- 
trayed in the verse. 
(Prince 1952, p. 206). 
Einstein's basic insight into the relativity of Time 
came to him early one morning as he got out of bed. And, 
as Koestler (1981, p. 183) remarks, that sudden moment of 
truth had been preceded by ten years of contemplation on 
the subject. Likewise Hadamard's (1954) long and intense 
thinking culminated in a hypnopompic illumination. He 
writes: 
One phenomenon is certain and I can vouch for its abs- 
olute certainty: the sudden and immediate appearance 
of a solution at the very moment of sudden awakening. 
On being very abruptly awakened by an external noise, 
a solution long searched for appeared to me at once 
without the slightest instant of reflection on my 
part - the fact was remarkable enough to have struck 
me unforgettably - and in quite a different direc- 
tion from any of those which I had previously tried 
to follow. 
(Hadamard: quoted by Koestler 1981, pp. 116- 
7). 
In a similar manner, Lamberton (Newbold 1897, pp. 11- 
13) achieved the solution of a problem that had "bogged" 
him after two weeks of intense analytic thinking over it. 
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Having put aside the problem for a week, he woke up one 
morning with its solution projected in front of him. He 
wrote: 
On opening my eyes on the morning in question, I saw 
projected upon this blackboard surface a complete 
figure, containing not only the lines given by the pro- 
blem, but also a number of auxiliary lines, and just 
such lines as without further thought solved the pro- 
blem at once. 
(quoted by Newbold 1897, p. 12) 
Moreover, he noted that "the solution was entirely geomet- 
rical, whereas I had been labouring for it analytically 
without ever drawing or attempting to draw a single figure". 
Likewise, Cocteau (1952, p. 82) saw hypnopompically what 
he later turned into his play 'The Knights of the Round 
Table'. "One morning", he writes, "after having slept 
poorly, I woke with a start and witnessed, as from a seat 
in a theater, three acts which brought to life an epoch 
and characters about which I had no documentary informa- 
tion and which I regarded moreover as forbidding". Poincare 
describes his discovery of Fuchsian functions as follows: 
For fifteen days I strove to prove that there could 
not be any functions like those I have since called 
Fuchsian functions. I was then very ignorant; every 
day I seated myself at my work table, stayed an hour 
or two, tried a great number of combinations and 
reached no results. One evening, contrary to my cus- 
tom, I drank black coffee and could not sleep. Ideas 
rose in crowds; I felt them collide until pairs, int- 
erlocked, so to speak, making a stable combination. 
By the next morning I had established the existence 
of a class of Fuchsian functions, those which come 
from the hypergeometric series; I had only to write 
out the results, which took but a few hours. 
(Poincare 1978, p. 81). 
But perhaps the most celebrated case of creativity 
in hypnagogia, one that led to a discovery which has been 
called "the most brilliant piece of prediction to be found 
in the whole range of organic chemistry" (Koestler 1981, 
p. 118) is that reported to the German Chemical Society in 
1890 by Kekule. He recounts how one evening he dozed on 
a London bus and saw atoms gambolling before his eyes and 
spent part of that night making sketches of these forms. 
Some years later a similar event led to the discovery of 
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the ring of the benzene molecule. He relates: 
I was sitting, writing at my text-book; but the work 
did not progress; my thoughts were elsewhere. I tur- 
ned my chair to the fire and dozed. Again the atoms 
were gambolling before my eyes. This time the smaller 
groups kept modestly in the background. My mental 
eyes, rendered more acute by repeated visions of the 
kind, could now distinguish larger structures, of man- 
ifold conformation: long rows, sometimes more closely 
fitted together; all twining and twisting in snake- 
like motion. But look! What was that? One of the 
snakes had seized hold of its own tail, and the form 
whirled mockingly before my eyes. As if by a flash 
of lightning I awoke; and this time also I spent the 
rest of the night working out the consequences of the 
hypothesis. 
(quoted by Japp 1898, p. 100). 
As McKellar (1963, p. 134) rightly points out, "the illum- 
ination occurred in his hypnagogic mental life because his 
mind was stored with the relevant facts from past percep- 
tual experience". However, it is just as important to note 
that it was under the special conditions prevailing in 
hypnagogia that a number of perceptual experiences were 
brought together and became relevant within a particular 
framework. Moroever, the facts from past experiences 
emerged in the hypnagogic vision in a symbolic form, that 
is, the snake-like formations represented molecular struc- 
tures. Interestingly, in this type of example can be seen 
in operation a mechanism somewhat opposite to that observed 
by Silberer in his autosymbolic phenomena. That is, 
instead of conceptual activity becoming symbolically repre- 
sented in visual imagery, the emergence of the latter gives 
rise to a concept, viz., that some organic compounds, e. g., 
the benzene molecule, are closed chains or rings. 
This character of transferring from concept to imagery 
and vice versa is, in fact, an aspect of a wider feature 
of hypnagogia that encompasses synaesthetic activity where 
imagery of one sense modality transforms itself into, or 
gives rise to, imagery of another sense modality. It is 
also seen as a transfer from one conceptual frame of refer- 
ence to another. Indeed, synaesthetic transformations 
are themselves transferences across FsOR. 
This form of activity is often described in papers 
on creativity as the subject's employment of metaphor. 
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The creative use of metaphor is that which enhances, or 
presents in a new light, a certain state of affairs. 
Aristotle (1969) in his 'Poetics' writing on the use of 
language stated that "by far the greatest thing is to be 
a master of metaphor" and that such mastery is " an indica- 
tion of genius, since the ability to forge a good metaphor 
shows that the poet has an intuitive perception of the 
similarity in dissimilars" (1459a), that is, the poet is 
capable of shifting imagery and concepts across FsOR. He 
also argued that it is a great thing for a creative poet 
to use unusual word order, "as well as compounds and 
strange words, in the proper way". 
It might, of course, be argued that the crossing of 
FsOR, and the employment of unusual word order, compounds 
and strange words in hypnagogia are not executed "in the 
proper way", that they occur out of context and they are 
irrelevant. But, as I have already argued, and shall pre- 
sently augment that argument, this is not always the case. 
Moreover, given the appropriate attention to the hypnagogic 
imagery, it may never by the case. 
In hypnagogia, metaphors are actualities. Metaphors 
used in everyday life and in the arts are called by 
McKellar (1963, p. 144) "synaesthetic descriptions". In 
hypnagogia, although they may be seen by the waking mind 
as symbols or representations, they are often, experienced 
as actualities, that is, they are taken on their face 
value. This is strongly reminiscent of Nietzsche's des- 
cription of the creative process in which "one loses all 
perception of what is imagery and simile" (1952, p. 203), 
and Coleridge's Kubla Khan experience "in which all the 
images rose up before him as things" (1952, pp. 84-5). It 
is only by oscillating in and out of hypnagogia, thus all- 
owing the waking mind some room for judgement, or by lear- 
ning to remain passive-receptive in hypnagogia that one 
can appreciate the metaphoric aspect of the imagery of the 
state. But these metaphor-actualities occurring as they 
do in hypnagogia render the state unique in acting as the 
general condition wherein artistic and scientific creat- 
ivity as well as schizophrenic and primitive-regressive , 
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mentation emerge. Thus, we find Kretschmer(1934) writing 
on artistic creativity: 
Such creative products of the artistic imagination 
tend to emerge from a psychic twilight, a state of 
lessened consciousness and diminished attentivity to 
external stimuli. Further, the condition is one of 
'absent-mindedness' with hypnoidal over-concentration 
on a single focus, providing an entirely passive exp- 
erience, frequently of a visual character, divorced 
from the categories of space and time, and reason and 
will. 
(Kretschmer: quoted by Koestler 1981, p. 325) 
Under the same or very similar conditions of child- 
like absorption, a schizophrenic patient of his related 
how, whilst in a transitional state between normality and 
abnormality, on reading a philosophical work by Kant "the 
abstract thoughts are continuously converted into imagery" 
which, divorced from space and time and reason and will, 
is "arbitrary as in an experimental picture or a dream". 
Kretschmer further remarks that the language of primitive 
people is "like the unfolding of a picture strip, where 
each word expresses a pictorial image, regardless as to 
whether the picture signifies an object, an action, or a 
quality". Koestler (1981, p. 322) concurs that "pictorial 
thinking is an earlier and more primitive form of menta- 
tion than conceptual thinking - in the evolution of the 
individual as in that of the species. The language of 
children is 'picturesque' - again in the literal sense of 
the word". 
And yet it is this 'primitive' and 'regressive' type of 
mentation that very often creative individuals resort to 
in order to experience (perceive-conceive) and understand 
their own ideas. Einstein (1952, p. 43), for instance, says 
that "the psychical entities which seem to serve as ele- 
ments in thought are certain signs and more or less clear 
images which can be 'voluntarily' reproduced and combined". 
Bartlett (1932, p. 226) stated that the "image method rem- 
ains the method of brilliant discovery", Richardson (1969, 
p. 12) linked vivid imagery in adults with creativity, 
Paivio (1971,1974) suggested that the stage of illumin- 
ation or discovery is characterized by concrete imagery. 
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McClelland (1964, p. 141) remarked that "scientists ... 
still live to a moderate degree in the world of witches, 
gnomes, fairies and ogres", and Schaefer (1975) concluded 
that "anecdotal reports... indicate that there is at least 
a partially controlled lowering of ego controls so that 
fantastic and primitive associations arise to the 
consciousness". 
Einstein's statement does not seem to me at all dis- 
similar either to that by Kretschmer describing primitive 
thinking as a picture-strip in which pictures signify ob- 
jects, actions and qualities or to reports by hypnagogists 
whose experiences may constitute quasi-perceptual repres- 
entations of abstract concepts, functions, actions, rela- 
tionships, etc. (see, e. g., Silberer 1965; Slight 1924; 
van Dusen 1972,1975). Moreover, Schaefer's comments fit 
exactly a deliberately induced-sustained hypnagogia. 
As already argued, hypnagogia can be prolonged and 
its imagery, to a certain extent, manipulated if the sub- 
ject learns to poise himself in a passive-receptive mode 
and enter into a conversational-empathic relationship with 
the imagery. In such cases, where the imagery is fascina- 
tedly attended to, there is often also an accompaniment of 
a sense of significance. It is of interest to compare this 
with what Wallas (1926) says about the stage of illumina- 
tion in the creative process (Wallas's stages will be dis- 
cussed further later in this chapter): 
I find it convenient to use the term 'intimation' for 
that moment in the illumination stage when our fringe 
consciousness of an association train is in the stage 
of rising consciousness which indicates that the fully 
conscious flash of success is coming.... If this 
feeling of intimation lasts for an appreciable time, 
and is either sufficiently conscious or can by effort 
of attention be made sufficiently conscious, it is 
obvious that our will can be brought directly to bear 
on it. We can at least attempt to inhibit, or pro- 
long or divert the brain activity which intimation 
shows to be going on. And, if intimation accompanies 
a rising train of association which the brain accepts, 
so to speak, as plausible, but would not without the 
effort of attention automatically push to the 'flash' 
of conscious success, we can attempt to hold on to 
such a train on the chance that it may succeed. 
(Wallas 1978, p. 97) 
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Wallas's state of intimation may perhaps become clearer 
and its relationship to the hypnagogic 'fringe' conscious- 
ness more obvious if we bear in mind what has been said 
above, namely, that both in hypnagogia and in creativity 
there is present, and in a literal sense, what might be 
called an activity of imaginal perception, that is, an 
experience of vivid, life-like imagery. Walkup (1965, p. 
36) has noted that "creative individuals appear to have 
stumbled onto and then developed to a high degree of per- 
fection an unusual ability to visualize mentally - almost 
hallucinate - in the areas in which they are creative". 
He uses the word 'visualize, "to include the mental syn- 
thesizing of many sensory experiences, not just ocular exp- 
eriences" (p. 37). In analysing the nature of 'seeing' in 
the field of scientific creativity, he writes: 
It is almost a feeling like the object being visual- 
ized. One can feel the pressure of contacting objects 
or the erosion of material by friction, or the flow 
of heat from one point to another, or the swing of 
the oscillating electrical circuit, or the bending of 
light as it passes from one medium to another, or the 
appropriateness of a well-designed structure to hold 
a maximum load, with every part equally strained in 
the process, or the eternal bouncing about of the 
molecules of gas, or the almost physical transfer of 
energy from the gasoline, through the motor, trans- 
mission, and to the driving wheels of the automobile. 
It is as though one's kinesthetic sensing mechanisms 
were associated with the physical object and that he 
thus sensed directly what was going on in the external 
system. 
(Walkup 1965, p. 39). 
Similarly, Farady 'saw' electromagnetic lines of force, 
and Einstein (1952, p. 43) referring to the "elements in 
thought" mentioned above says that in his case these were 
"of visual and some of muscular type" and that "the play 
with the mentioned elements is aimed to be analogous to 
certain logical connections one is searching for". Thus, 
even logical connections may be experienced as forms of 
imagery. As Richardson (1969, p. 124) also notes, "it is 
not merely a physical object that can be represented in 
visual imagery but almost any subtlety of logical relation- 
ships". Indeed, in Bugelski's (1970) review it is argued 
that meanings depend on images. However, it is not my 
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aim here to argue for the status of imagery in general but 
(a) to put into relief the paradox that highly intellectual 
individuals engaged in abstract mental activities resort 
to 'primitive' imagery to solve their problems, and (b) 
to further my argument that most, if not all, of the con- 
ditions of creativity are present in hypnagogia. 
The paradox referred to above might not be thought 
as being present in hypnagogia since the state is consid- 
ered in general to be regressive anyway and so the occur- 
rence of vivid imagery in it might not be regarded as con- 
tradictory. However, if Wallas's description of the state 
of "intimation" in creativity means anything this condition 
is not dissimilar to that obtained in hypnagogia. This 
implies that at least some essential aspects of creativity 
are necessarily regressive in character. More significant, 
hypnagogia as a breeding ground for metaphors, analogies, 
and vivid imagery is, or must be, conducive to creativity. 
Moreover, hypnagogia may render more obvious certain impor- 
tant mental processes, such as the use of imagery present 
in scientific creative activity. More to the point, the 
vivid hypnagogic concretization of imagery may not necess- 
arily be 'primitive' or 'regressive'. 
If in the ordinary waking state we think of a generic 
or abstract concept we generally (excepting those endowed 
with a tendency to extreme concretization verging on the 
pathological, e. g., Luria's 1975 Shereshevski) engage in 
some form of imaging - visualizing, verbalizing, etc. - 
in which the relevant concept is vaguely represented. How- 
ever, if we try to become more clear and precise in our 
conceptualization we find that the concept begins to 
acquire spatial qualities and that concurrently, as the 
concept is shaping up, we engage in internal kinesthetic 
activities in relation to the concept - as if one is men- 
tally giving birth, sculpturing, or moulding inside oneself 
in a pliant medium. In ordinary wakefulness abstract con- 
cepts may have a typically impressionistic quality about 
them (e. g., Titchener 1909; Koffka 1912; Binet 1921; 
Arnheim 1969) but when concentrated on they display unique 
imaginal qualities which go beyond the sum total of the 
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particular cases they may represent. They also invariably 
involve the kinesthetic participation of the subject: they, 
in a specific sense, become 'subjectified'. (It might be 
of some interest to note that the Greek words for under- 
standing - xaTaXaµßävw, &vt Xaµß6Xvoµau - literally mean 
to seize, occupy, take possession, make one's own). 
We have already seen in earlier chapters that this 
is in fact the case with hypnagogic imagery, that is, hyp- 
nagogic imagery, due partly to the subject's absorption, 
becomes 'subjectif ied', linked empathically and kinesthet- 
ically to the subject. We have also seen that some images 
look like objects perceived during the day, or on earlier 
occasions, and that they are not exact reproductions of 
actual perceptions but rather "idealized" images of them 
(e. g., Hanawalt 1954). It might thus be argued that some 
hypnagogic images are none less than generic concepts and 
that these, and probably all, concepts, are not only repre- 
sentable in imagery types but also, in the last analysis, 
they must be experienced as such. This contention is fur- 
ther supported by the fact that even mathematical and phil- 
osophical thinking is expressed in some kind of shifting 
inner tension, i. e., kinesthetically. 
In this way hypnagogia may throw light on the mechan- 
ism of a normal mental activity and suggest an explanation, 
and perhaps a resolution, of the apparent paradox of the 
use of 'primitive' types of imagery (visual-kinesthetic) 
in intellectual tasks. This is essentially achieved be- 
cause of the specific state of consciousness the hypnagogist 
finds himself in, a state which in many respects resembles 
the one an individual finds himself in when engaged in an 
act of creation. But, although 'idealization' or the pro- 
cess of arriving at a generic concept is a normal and ordi- 
nary process, the indication afforded by hypnagogia of both 
how it is arrived at and how it looks and feels points to 
a much wider underlying process of fusion and condensation 
that stems out of the root phenomenon of the LEB of the 
subject in both hypnagogia and the creative act. 
We have seen in earlier chapters how the LEB showed 
itself at one level of hypnagogia as drifting, falling, 
swelling, shrinking, etc., at another level as the 
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facilitation of over-inclusiveness in conceptualization 
and the fusing of a number of apparently unrelated FsOR. 
At yet another and deeper level it was seen as the relaxing 
of the logical dampers normally applied on the waking 
everyday reality. 
It is significant that similar observations have also 
been made about the nature of creativity. We saw earlier 
that creativity consists mainly in the making of combin- 
ations of elements that have not been made before. Poincare 
(1978, p. 80) further says that "Among chosen combinations 
the most fertile will often be those formed of elements 
drawn from domains which are far apart". In a similar vein 
Mednick (1962, p. 228) states that "creative individuals 
must have access to improbable associative responses". 
Cropley (1978) also argues that 
Clearly the more a person treats data which look to 
have nothing to do with each other as though they are 
related, the more likely he is to make data combin- 
ations which are unusual (i. e., to think creatively). 
The kind of person who codes in this broad way is ref- 
erred to as a wide categorizer, while the opposite 
kind of person is called a narrow categorizer.... 
willingness to treat data whose connexion with each 
other is not immediately apparent as roughly equiva- 
lent would be particularly favourable to the appear- 
ance of creativity. Creative thinking thus looks to 
be related to width of categorizing. 
(Cropley 1978, pp. 120-1). 
Now, it will be recalled from earlier arguments that 
the equivalence of apparently unrelated data and concepts 
is not uncommon in hypnagogia (e. g., Froeschels 1946,1949; 
Mintz 1948). Froeschels (1949), for instance, drew atten- 
tion to the fact that in hypnagogia tenuously related ideas, 
concepts, functions, situations, etc., become not merely 
related but identified, that vague similarity turns into 
sameness. This tendency to relate and equate not only 
different concepts but also entirely unrelated matrices 
is a feature both of hypnagogia and of creativity. As 
Jones (1948) pointed out, "in science the process of dis- 
covery and invention consists of freeing the tendency to 
'note identity in difference'" (Milner 1981, pp. 161-2). 
The actual state of consciousness in which such relation- 
ships and equations are effected is probably very similar 
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to that in which metaphors and analogies are experienced 
as actualities in hypnagogia. Indeed, if we consider an 
analogy in itself as a concept then the experiencing of 
such a concept as an actual event or thing and not as some- 
thing analogous to something else becomes the same as exp- 
eriencing the original idea about which the analogy is 
made. This is clearly the case in hypnagogia, as pointed 
out earlier: metaphors and analogies are experienced as 
actualities. It might be argued that this is not the case 
in creativity, that in the latter analogies are seen as 
such and as nothing more. However, this is debatable. 
Apart from Cropley's and my own argument above there are 
the introspective reports of individuals which strongly sug- 
gest that creative persons often experience analogies and 
metaphors as things, i. e., as actualities. 
Significantly, such imaginal events may move in either 
of two different directions and bring together FsOR which 
are not obviously related. Thus, in Silberer's autosymb- 
olic phenomena an abstract concept belonging to its own 
particular FOR is first transformed into imagery and exp- 
erienced as such, i. e., as a new thing in a different FOR, 
and then it is identified with the concept it represents. 
In Kekule's example the procedure is reversed: there is 
first the vision of the snake biting its tail, in itself 
an imaginal actuality, then comes the transfer to a diff- 
erent matrix, viz., that of chemistry. In an earlier exam- 
ple we saw how Slight (1924), while in a hypnopompic state, 
thought of a particular woman he knew who represented a 
certain character type and who then turned into another 
woman he also knew. While still in the hypnopompic state 
he then realised that the identification of these two women 
resulted from the analogy afforded by certain character 
traits shared by both. But, importantly, he did not imme- 
diately see the resemblance; on the contrary, he began by 
identifying or completely equating the one with the other 
(see also Schneck 1968 for a similar case). The same is 
often the case with creativity, as can be seen from Wallas's 
(1926), Kretschmer's (1934) and Walkup's (1965) quotations 
above. From these quotations it is clear that sometimes 
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the metaphors 'seen' by many scientists are not only liter- 
ally seen and felt but they also turn out to be identical 
with what they are supposed to be metaphors of. For ins- 
tance, Faraday's electromagnetic fields composed of lines 
of force are precisely that, as can be seen in Kirlian 
photographs (see e. g., Panati 1975). Incidentally, such 
observations have important epistemological implications 
as they tend to suggest that a great deal of mental 'seeing' 
is more of a literal experience than a metaphor taken from 
visual perception as some writers seem to believe (e. g., 
Ryle 1976, and the school of philosophical behaviourism). 
The imaginally actualized metaphors in creativity form 
only one side of the balancing act that results in the 
creative act, the other side being the recognition that 
the metaphor brings together two or more FsOR. In the case 
of Kekule, for instance, the hypnagogic vision of a snake 
biting its tail would not have acquired the importance 
attached to it had not Kekule seen it as an analogy within 
the framework of organic chemistry. Hypnagogia is full 
of such metaphors and symbols. It has already been argued 
in earlier chapters that when the hypnagogist accepts hyp- 
nagogia and enters into an empathic relationship with his 
imagery (a 'conversation', as van Dusen has put it) hypna- 
gogia may then convey to his consciousness ideas, concepts, 
relationships, etc., in symbolic form which are recognized 
as such, i. e., as symbols. It is often the case, however, 
that these symbols are 'actualized' in the sujbect's mental 
space, that is, they are taken as real things, without fur- 
ther recognition of their symbolic value. Indeed, most 
of the hypnagogic imagery is of this nature. But this is 
not to say that hypnagogic images may not be seen as sym- 
bols, metaphors, etc., should the subject adopt the appro- 
priate stance towards them. In such case the subject may 
become able to discern the fusion of a number of FsOR. 
This may result in conscious witticism, genuine poetry, 
or creative insights. Freud, for one, believed that the 
essence of poetry was the condensation of several meanings 
or allusions into a word or phrase (cited by Koestler 1981, 
p. 339). Koestler further points out that in German to 
"write poetry" is to "condense" (dichten). As said above, 
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in hypnagogia condensations may not always be recognized 
as such and, if the subject is considerably absorbed, the 
imagery is taken on its face value. We saw that this was 
also the case with the condensation of concepts (e. g., 
Mintz's, 1948, example) and that this process often resulted 
in schizophrenic identification of things, functions, con- 
cepts, people, etc. (see chapter 12). Thus we have an 
intimation of hypnagogia as a state in which madness and 
creativity may come together, a point that will be deve- 
loped later in this chapter. 
Koestler (1981), along with many other writers on creat- 
ivity, proposes that the creative act is the connecting 
of previously unconnected matrices of experience. He 
calls this "the bisociative act", i. e., the associating 
of two different FsOR, and adds that in the act itself the 
subject sees both matrices at the same time. In respect 
to the latter point, hypnagogic creativity is again exem- 
plified by the Kekule case. It is not unlikely that hyp- 
nagogic imagery is replete with unrecognized solutions 
to problems. The recognition of these solutions is partly 
dependent on the degree of problem saturation a person 
subjects himself to and his readiness to appreciate sym- 
bols and metaphors encountered in hypnagogia. A main dif- 
ficulty in appreciating the hypnagogic 'language' in this 
respect is the fact that it is often expressed in oblique 
or condensed forms of metaphor and not in overt and expli- 
cit analogies. Moreover, hypnagogia operates most often 
multi-sociatively, that is, it brings together (and con- 
denses) a number of FsOR. These associations and conden- 
sations, as suggested in chapter 11, are effected sub- or 
unconsciously via mediate types of association thus resul- 
ting in imagery which is considered simply strange or 
irrelevant. 
Multi-sociation is clearly uncharacteristic of the 
logic experienced and employed in the normal waking state. 
It is typical of dream mentation, creativity, psi, schizo- 
phrenia, and mysticism all of which are related to hypna- 
gogia. The normal logic of classifying, i. e., bringing 
together and relating things or concepts according to 
331 
strong and/or permanent common properties, and Koestler's 
bi-sociation, may be considered as forms of, or even sub- 
sumed under, the wider and 'older' activity of multi- 
sociating. It is of some significance that the language 
which gave to the western world the word logic also con- 
tains the word Wpny (freen) = 'mind' (logical mind) whose 
derivative Tpevov (frehnon) means 'brake' or 'damper' 
thus suggesting that to be logical is to put the dampers 
on, to control and restrict oneself. On the other hand, 
the adjective cppcu pnr (frehneeris) means frantic, crazy, 
one whose mind is 'raised' or 'lifted' or whose logical 
dampers are raised. Moreover, to be logical implies the 
application of certain rules of logic which are flouted 
by hypnagogia, and, as we shall presently see, also by the 
process of creativity. Thus, it also implies a narrowing 
and converging type of mentation reflecting a deeper and 
far-reaching condition of tightening of ego boundaries, 
of sharply outlining an 'outer', objective world clearly 
defined and differentiated from one's ego schema, i. e., 
what constitutes one's sense of self as a separate and 
individual entity. By contrast, the LEB occurring in hyp- 
nagogia raises the dampers and facilitates multi-sociation, 
the latter taking place along normally weakly associated, 
or entirely foreign to each other, FsOR. The LEB confers 
the ability to internalize and subjectify diverse matrices 
and thus identify them with each other: it is widening and 
diverging as opposed to narrowing and converging. In this 
sense, it is also regressive, primitive and paralogical. 
I shall give an example which demonstrates clearly 
the difference between waking logic and hypnagogic logic 
and shows how in the latter many matrices may be brought 
together. The example is taken from Koestler who used it 
to demonstrate an entirely different point of argument but 
it is also suitable for my present point. Koestler 
recounts how within a certain period of time he had occa- 
sion to think of Galton a number of times and in different 
connections. First he thought of him on one of his birth- 
days because Galton had lived to the ripe old age of 
eighty-nine; this thought also recalled the name 
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'Methuselah'. On another occasion he thought of him on 
reading about a woman who had killed her malformed baby 
- because Galton had invented the word 'eugenics'; this 
also brought up the thought of Hitler and his S. S. men who 
practised eugenics. On yet another occasion he thought 
of Galton in association with 'colour-blindness' - first 
studied by Dalton which rhymes with Galton. And so forth. 
Now, all these associations are quite normal given the 
different contexts within which they occurred. The diff- 
erence with hypnagogia is that in the latter all of these 
associations mayoa= simultaneously in a condensed form app- 
earing perhaps as one visual image or a series of fast 
changing images. For instance, we may have the strange 
image of the figure of an old man with the face of a beau- 
tiful baby wearing Hitler's moustache and squinting in 
front of the painting of a lovely sunset painted by a fam- 
ous mad scientist called 'Hilton'! Indeed, as we shall 
soon see, this type of associating and condensing has been 
explored to great artistic effect by surrealist painters. 
The unconscious-nonrational: 
The criterion of nonrationality which, according to 
Hallman (1967, p. 22) "logically ... depends upon a cate- 
gory of causality as a principle of explanation" argues 
that "certain unconscious mental processes are responsible 
for the metaphoric function of fusing images into new cre- 
ations". It 
... describes the metaphoric, symbolizing processes 
which produce new connections. I refer to it as non- 
rational because the combinatorial activity occurs 
in the form of unconscious operations; it does not 
belong to the rational mind, nor is it consciously 
controlled. Rationality divides and distinguishes; 
it focuses upon differences. Metaphoric activity 
unites and relates; it flourishes upon similarities, 
and transpires among the primary processes. Non- 
rationality is not merely a condition of novelty; it 
is a cause. The relationship between such processes 
as condensation, symbolization, displacement, and 
neologisms and the production of new connections is 
a causal one. It is the very nature of unconscious 
(or preconscious) levels of the mind to function 
metaphorically. The mechanisms which constitute the 
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unconscious operations make this inevitable. Unless 
they function, no new connections can occur. Thus, 
there is an invariant relationship between the two. 
(Hallman 1967, pp. 22-23). 
Hallman further proposes that metaphors lift inferen- 
tial limitations from language and uncouple causal connec- 
tions from objects thus allowing for the emergence of new 
visions and unexpected experiences and views of the world. 
He identifies three conceptual schemes devised by various 
writers to explain the creative process all three of which 
agree on one major fact: "that segment or level of the 
creative process which is invariably associated with the 
creation of novelty is nonrational. It lies below the sur- 
face of consciousness; it resists rational analysis; it 
dissolves under logical examination" (p. 23). The first 
framework considers creativity as a series of chronologi- 
cal stages, the second as vertical levels of psychological 
functions and the third as types of mental processes. I 
shall discuss all three frameworks below. 
In respect to the first framework, Wallas (1926) pro- 
posed four stages in the creative process: preparation, 
incubation, illumination, verification. *Others who pro- 
posed the same series include Patrick (1937); Poincare 
(1913); Hadamard (1954); Arnold (1959); Montmasson (1931); 
Spender (1946); Vinacke (1952). Beveridge (1950) suggests 
a similar series. 
In regards to the occurrence of creativity in hypna- 
gogia Cade and Coxhead noted that 
hypnagogic reverie often presents to consciousness 
long-forgotten material, vividly displayed in arrange- 
ments which the conscious mind might not have thought 
of, even were all the material available in the form 
of written notes or sketches. The paradox is that 
one is most likely to get really creative solutions 
to problems in mental states where the usual thinking 
ability is virtually extinguished. 
(Cade and Coxhead 1979, p. 127). 
More specifically, in relating hypnagogia to creati- 
vity, and in particular to the four-stage theory, the sec- 
ond and third stages are of the greatest relevance. 
Indeed, hypnagogic experiences are characterized by the 
very features describing these two stages. Hallman (1967) 
334 
for instance, notes that 
The second and third stages actually produce the new 
connections, the novel relationshps, and these tran- 
spire in the form of nonrational operations. The incu- 
bation stage, for example, consists of spontaneous, 
uncontrollable events which cluster themselves seem- 
ingly in accordance with their own autonomous laws. 
It involves the relaxation of conscious thinking oper- 
ations and the inhibition of logical control. 
(Hallman 1967, pp. 23-24). 
He refers to Maslow's (1958) voluntary regression, 
Ehrenzweig's (1953) surrender of the ego, and Rogers' (1959) 
openness to experience in this respect. 
Hutchinson (1939, p. 324), reporting on the creative 
insight experienced by an Oxford mathematician, quotes: 
I knew somehow or other that something had solved 
itself at the back of my mind, but had no idea of 
the solution until my pencil almost automatically 
wrote it out. 
(Hutchinson 1939, p. 324). 
Another case, a research engineer, writes: 
In a flash I visualized a drawing of the proper design 
of the apparatus, immediately I drew out a notebook 
and, without consciousness of my surroundings, wrote 
down the answer. I knew it was right. 
(Hutchinson 1939, p. 325). 
Hutchinson (1939) referring to the stage of illumination 
as the "period or moment of insight" concludes: 
Insight... is often accompanied by a flood of ideas, 
alternative hypotheses appearing at the same time, 
many of which are difficult to make explicit owing 
to the crowded rapidity of their appearance. 
(Hutchinson 1939, p. 329). 
He further draws attention to "the almost hallucinatory 
vividness of the ideas appearing in connection wiht any 
sense department - visual, auditory, kinaesthetic" (p. 329) 
in this experience. 
The spontaneity, vividness, autonomy, rapidity of 
change and multitude of imagery and ideation with their 
multi-aspected paralogical associations, the dissociated 
or semi-dissociated state, the diminution or dissolution 
of self-consciousness and logical mentation, openness and 
regression, these are all features of the state of 
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hypnagogia. These features, as I have argued, are aspects 
or ramifications of the LEB. That this is also the case 
with creativity is here supported by Hallman's (1967, p. 
16) remark that "during the experience [i. e., the creative 
act] all boundary lines fade, distinctions blur, and the 
artist experiences himself as one with his materials and 
his vision". The same observation, as we saw earlier, is 
made of mathematical and scientific creativity. 
It might, of course, be argued that hypnagogic 'ill- 
umination' or the feeling of inspiration and certainty 
experienced in hypnagogia, is no guarantee for the valid- 
ity of the experience. Poincare, for instance, noted that 
often this feeling deceives us without being any less 
vivid, and we only find out when we seek to put on 
foot the demonstration. I have especially noticed 
this fact in regard to ideas coming to me in the mor- 
ning or evening in bed while in a semi-hypnagogic 
state. 
(Poincare 1978, pp. 83-4). 
It has been noted at various points in this paper that 
this, indeed, is the case in hypnagogia. It is, in fact, 
the pervading feature of hallucination to feel certain 
that such and such is the case in the absence of external, 
objective or logical verification. But not all false ins- 
piration and illumination is to be found in hypnagogia. 
The biographies of creative individuals abound with such 
cases. Koestler (1981, pp. 213-4) names Kepler, Darwin, 
Huxley, Planck and Einstein. The latter lost two years 
of hard work owing to a false inspiration; Huxley said 
that "the tragedies of science are the slayings of beauti- 
ful hypotheses by ugly facts" (Koestler 1981, p. 214). 
Koestler (1981, p. 212) also refers to an inquiry by the 
American chemists Platt and Barker which showed that 
"among those scientists who answered their questionnaire 
eighty-three per cent claimed frequent or occasional assi- 
stance from unconscious intuitions. But at the same time 
only seven per cent among them asserted that their intui- 
tions were always correct". But if hypnagogia is to be 
blamed and credited for false and true intuitions, and if 
the state an individual enters in his incubation and 
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illumination stages is that of hypnagogia (hypnagogia 
being thus conducive to creativity) or a hypnagogic-like 
state, then the above observations strengthen the rela- 
tionship between creativity and hypnagogia. 
Further support for this comes from some of Wallas's 
remarks. Wallas proposes that 
The incubation stage covers two different things, 
of which the first is the negative fact that during 
incubation we do not voluntarily or consciously think 
on a particular problem, and the second is the posi- 
tive fact that a series of unconscious and involun- 
tary (or preconscious and forevoluntary) mental events 
may take place during this period. 
(Wallas 1978, p. 94). 
The first aspect of the stage of incubation contains 
the important element of mental relaxation pointed out by 
practically all workers in the hypnagogic area as a necessary 
condition for its induction. Indeed, some investigators 
(e. g., Collard 1953; Myers 1957) as we have seen, have 
argued that psychophysical relaxation is sufficient for 
the emergence of hypnagogic imagery. The same is also 
claimed by Wallas in respect to the two aspects of the 
second stage, and the third stage of creativity. To this 
effect he cites cases of creative thinkers who hit on 
their most original ideas during periods of their lives 
when they were forced to relax (and often stay in bed) due 
to sudden illness. It will be recalled that the same was 
proposed in regards to hypnagogia, namely, that very often 
people are struck by the richness of their hypnagogic ima- 
gery when they are in ill-health and bedbound. In gene- 
ral, however, hypnagogia contains naturally this element 
of relaxation as a prerequisite to its induction. Whether 
the ensuing mental state and the imagery are experienced 
and remembered or not by the subject is mostly a matter 
of the degree of wakefulness retained, that is, the natu- 
ral or acquired disposition of the subject to relax, with- 
draw, and not fall asleep too quickly. Again, the same 
is proposed by Wallas regarding the second aspect of incu- 
bation (unconscious and involuntary or foreconscious and 
forevoluntary mental events), and illumination. He says 
that if the psychological process involved in these stages 
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is to enter the subject's consciousness and be controlled 
... it is necessary that that process should not only 
last for an appreciable time, but should also be, 
during that time, sufficiently conscious for the thin- 
ker to be at least aware that something is happening 
to him. On this point, the evidence seems to show 
that both the unsuccessful trains of association, 
which might have led to the 'flash' of success, and 
the final and successful train are normally either 
unconscious, or take place (with 'risings' and 'fall- 
ings' of consciousness as success seems to approach 
or retire), in that periphery or 'fringe' of cons- 
ciousness which surrounds our 'focal' consciousness 
as the sun's 'corona' surrounds the disk in full lumi- 
nosity. This 'fringe consciousness' may last up to 
the 'flash' instant, may accompany it, and in some 
cases may continue beyond it. But, just as it is 
very difficult to see the sun's corona unless the disk 
is hidden by a total eclipse, so it is very difficult 
to observe our 'fringe consciousness' at the instant 
of full illumination, or to remember the preceding 
'fringe' after full illumination has taken place. 
As William James says: 'when the conclusion is there, 
we have always forgotten most of the steps preceding 
its attainment'. 
(Wallas 1978, pp. 96-97). 
There are a number of relevant points in this quota- 
tion. If we begin with the last one, the quotation from 
James could easily have been describing the statement- 
conclusions encountered in hypnagogia. These, as we saw, 
may appear as statements, 'heard' or spoken by the subjeck 
carrying with them a feeling of concluding, that is, a 
feeling that a certain associative or logical actiivty has 
taken place below the threshold of consciousness and that 
the statement constitutes the conclusion of such activity. 
This is often suggested by the presence of a sense of sig- 
nificance regarding the statement. They are forms of con- 
densation; they may also be called 'collapsed logic' in 
both senses of the word 'collapse', that is, both in the 
sense of falling together, condensing, and in the sense 
of falling down, disintegrating. This view may shed some 
extra light on the problem of false inspiration by poin- 
ting to the two-fold activity of 'breaking up' and 'brin- 
ging together' below the threshold of consciousness 
(either unconsciously or pre-consciously) various objects, 
concepts, etc.. But, as so many writers have pointed out, 
the state of creativity relinquishes temporarily the 
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normally prevailing conscious and logical controls. "It 
is by virtue of its freedom from restraint", as Koestler 
(1981, p. 189) put it, "that the 'dreamy' way of thinking 
can benefit the creative person". In hypnagogia where the 
relinquishing of restraints takes place naturally, there 
often first occurs a disintegration of objects, concepts, 
etc., into their constituent parts followed by a new inte- 
gration. However, as in chemistry, these two steps need 
not necessarily be consequent on each other but may take 
place concurrently, in which case aspects or constituents 
of one may merge with constituents of another (or others) 
to form a new object, concept, etc. But in the absence 
of restraint the merging need not follow logical steps. 
Thus there may appear logical jumps, 'irrelevant' associ- 
ations, conclusions without (obvious) premises, i. e., 
intuitions. Koestler (1981) says that 
intuitions give the appearance of miraculous flashes, 
or short-circuits of reasoning. In fact they may be 
likened to an immersed chain, of which only the beg- 
inning and the end are visible above the surface of 
consciousness. 
(Koestler 1981, p. 211). 
This is in agreement with similar arguments I advanced in 
earlier chapters. However, it is not always the case that 
the beginning and the end of the chain are visible. In 
hypnagogia, more often than not, there is merely a posited 
statement, usually in auditory or visual form, without an 
obvious or traceable beginning, and only a sense of s ignif i- 
cance to indicate some under-the-surface activity. Such 
statements often look like solutions without problems, like 
a smile without a Cheshire cat. Should they be true int- 
uitions they may present us with the difficulty of finding 
the intermediate logical steps. They are reminiscent of 
Gauss's statement: "I have had my solutions for a long time, 
but I do not yet know how I am to arrive at them" (cited 
by Koestler 1981, p. 117). 
Wallas's description of the fringe consciousness and 
the stage of illumination in the creative process fits 
hypnagogia like a glove. We may easily recognize in the 
"fallings" and "risings" of consciousness the 
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'oscillations' of hypnagogia. The latter, due to its 
abolition of restraints rising from the LEB, provides the 
general milieu conducive to the occurrence of the "flash": 
it precedes the "flash", accompanies it, and may last bey- 
ond it, although sometimes the excitement produced by the 
"flash" tends to terminate the state (e. g., Kekule's 
case). It is also very difficult to recall the succession 
of images (visual, auditory, etc. ) and thoughts, and often 
even more difficult to observe and analyse objectively the 
mental activities during this state because of the sub- 
ject's absorption-fascination which both 'collapses' the 
gap between him and the phenomenon experienced and diss- 
olves self-consciousness. Again, we are back to the LEB 
which facilitates internalization and whose nature is 
clearly non-focal. In this respect I may quote Einstein 
who, in his letter to Hadamard, wrote: 
It seems to me that what you call full consciousness 
is a limit case which can never be fully accomplished. 
This seems to me connected with the fact called narrow- 
ness of consciousness (Enge des Bewusstseins). 
(Einstein 1952, p. 43). 
Koestler (1981) further comments that 
the existence of an intermediary region between the 
'limit case' of sharp, narrow focal awareness and the 
vast unconscious regions of the mind has been recog- 
nized for a long time. Fichte (and later Freud) called 
it the pre-conscious (das Vorbewusstsein), James 
called it the fringe; Polanyi 'subsidiary awareness'; 
the analogy with vision yielded 'peripheral awareness'; 
but since awareness is a matter of degrees, it would 
be mistaken to draw a sharp line between pre- and 
unconscious processes, between the shallows and the 
deep. What matters is the distinction between the 
single event (the percept, or concept, or word or 
muscle-action) which for a fleeting moment occupies 
the focus of attention - and the processes on the 
periphery which define the context, the purpose and 
meaning of the former. 
(Koestler 1981, p. 159). 
Nevertheless, in relating the creative process to 
hypnagogia in the present paper it is important to draw 
attention to the existence and characteristics of such 
an in-between state. As we have seen so far, the hypna- 
gogic "fringe consciousness" may furnish us with clues as 
to the workings of the creative process and may form the 
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background against which creative intuitions might emerge. 
Not only does hypnagogia provide the necessary conditions for 
the eruption or "secretion" (Housman's term referring to the 
making of poetry) of intuitions, but, being preconscious in 
nature, it also makes it possible for a subject to become 
aware of the epistemological changes occurring in himself 
during the emergence of creative insights. I say 'epistemo- 
logical changes' because the creative process in itself 
clearly contains forms of mentation foreign to the logic of wake- 
fulness and which forms of mentation may lead to, or contain 
new knowledge. Moreover, we saw in the chapter on 'Psi' that 
some writers have suggested the use of hypnagogia as a means 
of entering, without losing consciousness (and without con- 
tradiction), the realms of the unconscious. Also, Pinard 
(1957, p. 152), referring to the nature of "spontaneous 
images" spoke of them as apparently "creative not only of 
themselves but of a non-sensory world which has its own 
structural and developmental laws". But if such laws exist, 
their knowledge, or the individual's functioning within 
them, clearly requires subjective internal changes, that 
is, changes in the mode of experiencing and knowing. Such 
changes are facilitated by the LEB occurring in hypnagogia. 
Thus, hypnagogia 'forces' psychophysical relaxation onto 
the individual at the same time conferring on him a para- 
logical mode of cognizing - conditions necessary in the 
occurrence of creativity. Moreover, it will be presently 
proposed that, although it is well argued by many workers 
that the creative linkages are effected in the unconscious, 
hypnagogia may not only act as a conducive state and/or 
half-way house for creativity, but also in some cases it 
may re-present to consciousness activities that have 
already transpired in the unconscious. 
This brings me to the second and third groups of theo- 
ries subsumed under this heading. The first group, discus- 
sed above, comprised arguments supporting the view that 
creativity, or the creative process, consists of chrono- 
logical stages, viz., preparation, incubation, illumination, 
verification. In discussing this framework we saw that the 
stages of incubation and illumination which constitute 
the climax of the creative 
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act, are clearly hypnagogic in their phenomenology, and 
that hypnagogia is conducive to the emergence of insights. 
The second group of theories explains creativty as 
a relationship of vertical levels of psychological func- 
tions. In the main, these theories argue for the inter- 
play and collaboration between unconscious and conscious 
processes. As Hallman (1967) explains, they assert that 
though the actual creative process involves a shift 
in psychic levels, the shift must always occur in such 
a manner that the metaphoric fusion of elements shall 
transpire in the unconscious levels and be projected 
upwards into consciousness. 
(Hallman 1967, p. 24). 
Then, at the rational level, enter elaboration, testing, 
gestalts, socially derived approvals. 
The third group views creativity as a type of thinking 
distinct from non-creative types. It is distinguished 
from the latter by the fact that it is combinatorial and 
that this combinatorial activity is not bound by ration- 
ality. Hallman, again, summarizes this view thus: 
In every case it is the nonrational, the autistic, 
the metaphoric, the internally oriented, the sponta- 
neous and involuntary, the integrating, unbound 
energies which are active in producing new connections. 
.... These nonrational processes account for the 
seeming effortlessness and the spontaneity of creative 
activity; they explain the autonomy, the quality of 
'otherness', of being visited by a daemon or a voice. 
They account for connectedness. And they account for 
the direction which creative movement assumes. 
(Hallman 1967, pp. 24-25). 
As these two groups of theories seem to me very sim- 
ilar, I shall discuss them together. In doing this I 
shall also argue, along with Hallman, that unconscious 
mentation is nonrational. I shall defend this argument 
on two grounds: (a) on the evidence in respect to the cre- 
ative process, that is, evidence arguing for unconscious- 
nonrational activities, and (b) on the definition of the 
unconscious as given by Dreyer (1964), namely, 
the inner mental dynamic, involving processes which 
are of a different order from conscious processes, 
and as such are incapable of becoming conscious pro- 
cesses, though influencing and modifying these in all 
sorts of ways. 
(Dreyer 1964, p. 306). 
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Naturally, if unconscious mentation is nonrational, 
and since all experience must pass, in one form or another 
through consciousness if it is to be retained and talked 
about, unconscious, nonrational mental events either rem- 
ain unconscious or become 'rationalized', i. e., render 
themselves conscious and undergo classification. Thus I 
disagree with part of Drever's definition, namely, that 
unconscious processes are incapable of becoming conscious. 
Indeed, Drever's definition of the preconscious as "mater- 
ial, which, though at the moment is unconscious, is avail- 
able, and ready to become conscious" (p. 219) vitiates that 
particular part of his definition of the unconscious, and 
supports my view. I consider this point of great impor- 
tance because of the preconscious nature of hypnagogia 
which, as remarked earlier, constituting as it does a 
state in-between the unconscious and the conscious, makes 
it possible for material which might never reach consc- 
iousness directly to do so. Moreover, it provides exam- 
ples which demonstrate clearly the nonrationality of uncon- 
scious mentation - nonrationality being seen not only as 
nonreality-oriented mentation but also as noninhibitory, 
noncontrolled, and non-obviously-purposive. 
Let me substantiate these claims by referring to the 
case of Prince's (1952) subject mentioned earlier in this 
chapter. It will be recalled that this subject had a hyp- 
nopompic vision of a tender love scene which she recorded 
immediately in the form of a poem. In discussing the case 
Prince noted that: 
The script was written automatically.... The 
'thoughts' of the verse were in her 'subconscious 
mind' [Prince explains in a footnote that "by this 
is meant 'thoughts'of which she was not aware']. These 
'thoughts' (also described as 'words') were not logi- 
cally arranged or as written in the verse, but 'sort 
of tumbled together - mixed up a little'. 'They were 
not like the thoughts one thinks in composing a verse'- 
There did not seem to be any attempt at selection from 
the thoughts or words. No evidence could be elicited 
to show that the composing was done here.... In other 
words all happened as if there was a deeper underlying 
process which did the composing and from this pro- 
cess certain thoughts without logical order emerged 
to form a subconscious stream and after the composing 
was done the words of the verse emerged as coconscious 
343 
images as they were to be written. This underlying 
process then 'automatically' did the writing and the 
composing. 
(Prince 1952, p. 207). 
In her report the subject recorded that although the 
thoughts expressed in the poem were the thoughts she exp- 
erienced at the time of seeing the vision, "the language 
was entirely different from anything I had thought and the 
writing expressed the emotion which I had not consciously 
experienced in seeing the vision" (pp. 205-6). 
The important sequel to the case is that Prince, hav- 
ing hypnotized his subject, discovered that the hypnopom- 
pic vision was in fact an accurate re-presentation of a 
dream experienced immediately prior to waking up. More- 
over,. he noted that the vision "expresses the mental atti- 
tude, sentiments and emotions experienced in the dream but 
not at the time of the vision" and that "the script gives 
of the vision an interpretation which was not consciously 
in mind at the moment of writing" (p. 206). 
Now, if we assume that unrecalled dreams constitute 
unconscious mental events then we are here presented with 
a case in which the subject re-experiences hypnopompically 
such events and transfers them to conscious memory. This 
is not to argue that dreams are not recalled in other cir- 
cumstances, but that in the hypnagogic-hypnopompic state 
these are re-experienced. Moreoverwhen such events are 
re-experienced in apparently different circumstances it 
is found that the actual mental state of the subject is 
hypnagogic-like (dreamy, twilight, etc. ). It is important 
to note, however, that although this subject did not re- 
experience the dream in all its details - the mental atti- 
tude, sentiments and emotions were not present - these 
were given accurately in the poem which, moreover, was 
composed and written "automatically", i. e., in a state of 
dissociation. In the dream the subject was a participant, 
in the hypnagogic vision she was a spectator, in the poem 
the dream's added dimension, another FOR, was revealed; 
but had she not been hypnotized this added dimension might 
not have been uncovered. This suggests, once more, that 
many hypnagogic-hypnopompic phenomena that appear puzzling 
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- strange, irrelevant, illogical, crazy - may do so bec- 
ause of hidden FsOR, and that they may be thought of as 
original or creative when this frame or frames of reference 
are suddenly made known. Moreover, the state of dissocia- 
tion may provide "the quality of 'otherness', of being visi- 
ted by a daemon or a voice" that Hallman noted in respect 
to creativity. Furthermore, the nonrational character of 
the unconscious is shown here quite clearly in the fact 
that the "thoughts" and "words" which were in the subject's 
"subconscious mind" "were not logically arranged... but 
'sort of tumbled together'". 
Thus, although unconscious mentation may slip through 
into waking consciousness in one form or another, hypna- 
gogia constitutes a special and ideal state for 'catching' 
such mentation in its own process. Also, as we have seen 
in the present and earlier examples, (e. g., Mintz 1948; 
Froeschels 1946,1949), much of this mentation appears to 
be governed by rules which are nonrational and nonlogical. 
It might be argued against this that true intuitions and 
creative insights can be seen in the last analysis to be 
related logically and rationally to a recognizable and 
objective state of affairs. But this is, as it were, jus- 
tification after the event. What is of interest here is 
how the event takes place, what are the mental processes 
leading up to and during the event. And these, we find, 
are nonrational and unconscious, or preconscious, as demon- 
strated in hypnagogia. 
That the preconscious character of hypnagogia renders 
it ideal for the emergence of nonrational and otherwise 
unconscious mental processes culminating in creative in- 
sights is further supported by the claims of various wri- 
ters to the effect that creativity requires precisely such 
a character in order to manifest itself. For instance, 
Gowan (1975) argues that 
Its essence involves openness to preconscious ele- 
ments.... Creativity involves the 'gentling of the 
preconscious', since it allows the conscious mind to 
gain insights from, and to establish an intuitive rel- 
ationship with the preconscious.... Higher emergent 
aspects of creativity also appear in individuals such 
as the 'witness phenomenon', in which the individual 
witnesses an almost autonomous development of ideas 
in his own mind, often several at a time. 
(Gowan 1975, p. 313). 
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Gowan also argues that "creative production results 
from leaks (as if by osmosis through a permeable membrane) 
between the preconscious and the conscious" (p. 278) and 
that Silberer's autosymbolic phenomena "correspond closely 
to what has often been described as the work of intuitive 
insight or creative insight" (p. 124). Heard (Weil et al 
1971, p. 9) remarked that "to have truly original thought 
the mind must throw off its critical guard, its filtering 
censor. It must put itself in a state of depersonaliza- 
tion". Similarly, Barron (1963, p. 249) concludes: "it 
seems quite evident that at the very heart of the creative 
process is this ability to shatter the rule of law and 
regularity of the mind". Koestler (1981, p. 146) points 
out that one of the main themes reverberating through the 
intimate writings of many creative scientists is "the bel- 
ittling of logic and deductive reasoning (except for veri- 
f ication after the act)". And he adds: "A branch of knowl- 
edge which -operates predominantly with abstract symbols, 
whose entire rationale and credo are objectivity, verifi- 
ability, logicality, turns out to be dependent on mental 
processes which are subjective, irrational, and verifiable 
only after the event" (p. 147). Of artistic creativity he 
says: "the creative activity of the artist involves momen- 
tary regressions to earlier stages in mental evolution, 
bringing forms of mentation into play which otherwise man- 
ifest themselves only in the dream and dream-like state" 
(p. 169). Nietzsche, writing on the composition of "Thus 
Spake Zarathustra", spoke of "a feeling of being completely 
beside yourself,... One hears - one does not seek; one 
takes - one does not ask who gives; a thought suddenly 
flashes up like lightning, it comes with necessity, with- 
out faltering -I never had any choice in the matter" 
(Jung 1957, pp. 104-5). Jung, commenting on Nietzsche's 
experience of the creative process, remarked that"the rem- 
otest and most hidden associations" were called up in him, 
and that in such a state "consciousness only plays the 
role of slave to the daemon of the unconscious" which 
"inundates it with alien ideas" (p. 105). 
Returning to scientific creativity, Koestler (1981, 
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p. 169) again draws attention to the temporary relinqui- 
shing of conscious controls and the simultaneous bringing 
into activity of other types of ideation on more primi- 
tive levels of mental organization; he further argues that 
"verbal thinking, and conscious thinking in general, plays 
only a subordinate part in the decisive phase of the crea- 
tive act" (p. 208), and that during the period of incuba- 
tion there is simultaneous activity on several planes inv- 
olving unconscious processes at various levels of depth 
(p. 209). 
Summarizing the characteristic features of the pre- 
vailing mental activities in the creative process, 
Koestler says: 
The creative act, in so far as it depends on uncon- 
scious resources, presupposes a relaxing of the con- 
trols and a regression to modes of ideation which 
are indifferent to the rules of verbal logic, unper- 
turbed by contradiction, untouched by the dogmas and 
taboos of so-called common sense. At the decisive 
stage of discovery the codes of disciplined reasoning 
are suspended - as they are in the dream, the reverie, 
the manic flight of thought when the stream of idea- 
tion is free to drift by its own emotional gravity, 
as it were, in an apparently 'lawless' fashion. 
(Koestler 1981, p. 178). 
In respect to the law of contradiction in particular 
he points out that "the unconscious mind of the child and 
the primitive are indifferent to it" (p. 303). As Levy- 
Bruhl (1926) also pointed out, "In the collective repres- 
entations of primitive mentality, objects, beings, events 
can be, though in a way incomprehensible to us, both them- 
selves and something other than themselves" (quoted by 
Koestler 1981, p. 308). 
Similar arguments have been advanced throughout this 
paper in regard to the nature of hypnagogia. That is, it 
has been argued that in hypnagogia there takes place a LEB 
whereby the psychophysical schema we call individuality 
(i. e. undivided self) undergoes fundamental alterations 
which reflect throughout the organism, e. g., as body schema 
changes, synaesthesias, loosening or widening of concep- 
tualization, regression to earlier, empathic modes of fun- 
ctioning characterized by ease of identification and 
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paralogical thinking, mystical experiences. In this respect 
I consider it of importance to note another of Koestler's 
(1981, pp. 187-8) remarks, namely that "the fluid bounda- 
ries of the self as represented in the unconscious mind, 
confer on it the gift of empathy - Einfuehlung - of enter- 
ing into a kind of mental symbiosis with other selves". 
By its preconscious nature hypnagogia partakes both of 
the total unconscious and the fully conscious, oscillating 
from one to the other, translating from one code. into another. 
The acquisition of a certain control over this process may 
place a person in a very favourable situation for achieving 
the creative act. For, as Bowers and Bowers (Fromm and 
Shor 1972, p. 283) observed, creativity involves regression 
to "passively experienced fantasy and then progression to 
integration of fantasy with reality". And, to quote 
Koestler (1981, p. 317) once more: "The capacity to regress, 
more or less at will, to the games of the underground, with- 
out losing contact with the surface, seems to be the ess- 
ence of the poetic, and of any other form of creativity". 
It is, of course, not totally true, as seen from the 
evidence adduced, that regression in the creative act 
always takes place "without losing contact with the sur- 
face". For instance, much creative activity may transpire 
during sleep (of which activity there is no memory) and the 
creative insight may flash up in the subject's conscious- 
ness at the moment of awakening, as evidenced by the data 
on "informational" cases furnished in the chapter on "Psi". 
Some individuals have even learned to communicate to their 
unconscious their desires for solutions to certain problems 
which solutions are arrived at or 'given' in a state of 
hypnagogia. Garrett, for instance, says: "I give my consc- 
iousness the task of finding the answer while I sleep, and 
in the morning at the threshold of awakening, I find the 
information I sought". Similarly, Walter Scott wrote to 
a friend saying: "It was always when I first opened my eyes 
that the desired ideas thronged upon me" (Beveridge 1950, 
p. 74). Interestingly, in great many cases of this kind we 
find the subject thinking about the problem as he falls 
asleep, thus transferring his desire for a solution to his 
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unconscious via the hypnagogic fringe consciousness and 
receiving an answer at the preconscious hypnopompic end. 
At the beginning of this chapter reference was also made 
to Edison's (Bernd 1978) use of hypnagogia to arrive at 
new inventions. 
Although it is not argued here that nonconscious- 
nonrational mental processes are to account for the whole 
of the creative act, it is maintained that the nonrational 
element is paramount in this area. Even where conscious, 
wakeful thinking is involved (excepting the time of veri- 
fication), nonrational, regressive tendencies are apparent. 
This can be seen, for instance, in those theories that argue 
either for the divergent nature of creativity or for a more 
balanced divergent-convergent interchange (e. g., Guilford 
1950; McKellar 1963). McKellar (1963, p. 129) proposes that 
"what we are likely to assess as 'originality' depends 
upon the interplay of processes of different kinds rather 
than upon one single, specific kind of thinking". However, 
as McKellar himself seems to have suggested in an earlier 
publication (McKellar 1957), the autistic, regressive, non- 
rational and non-reality-oriented kind of mentation is at 
least one half, so to speak, of the creative act. In fact, 
the literature shows that in most instances it contributes 
far more than its rational counterpart. 
Apart from the clear hypnagogic cases where we find 
the elements of effortlessness, spontaneity, autonomy, and 
"otherness", which, as Hallman remarked, are accounted for 
by the nonrational processes, (e. g., Miller 1906; Prince 
1952), some interesting hypnagogic-like instances may be 
included here which, too, are characterized by the above 
elements. One such case is that of E. Blyton (McKellar 
1957; Stoney 1974). In her correspondence with McKellar 
Blyton wrote of her "night stories" which appeared vividly 
and autonomously as she lay in bed "and went on evolving 
like a proper story till I fell asleep" (Stoney 1974, p. 
211). Although she explicitly distinguishes these stories 
from hypnagogic imagery which is "just a jumble, fleeting, 
and of no account" it is difficult to see what else they 
were given the fact that they went on evolving until she 
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fell asleep. She uses the simile of a "private cinema 
screen" to describe them. "But", she explains, "it's a 
3-dimensional screen, complete with sound, smell and taste 
- and feeling! This is why I can describe things so real- 
istically in my stories 'as if I had been there'. I have 
been there - but only in my imagination! " (Stoney 1974, 
p. 210). Her process of writing a story consists of telling 
herself in a very general way what the story is to be 
about, and "when, on Monday, I sit down to begin the book, 
it will already be complete in my imagination" (p. 211). 
At the actual writing 
I shut my eyes for a few minutes, with my portable 
typewriter on my knees - and I make my mind a blank 
and wait - and then, as clearly as I would see real 
children, my characters stand before me in my mind's 
eye.... I am in the happy position of being able to 
write a story and read it for the first time, at one 
and the same moment.... If I am writing 'real' poe- 
try, as distinct from ordinary verse, I have to work 
hard over it - and welcome the sudden gift of a com- 
plete line or two, or the happy word - these come from 
the 'under-mind' or whatever you call it - the hard 
thinking comes from my upper conscious mind. I use 
my 'undermind' a tremendous lot. I send things down 
to it and let them simmer there, forgotten. The 
answer comes up complete when I want it. 
(Stoney 1974, pp. 206-207). 
Interestingly, in answering why she prefers a type- 
writer to a tape-recorder, she says that the latter would 
"break the spell" - suggesting the presence of fascination. 
Garrett (1941 pp. 64-65) offers a similar case in which the 
person concerned explicitly points out that 
There is no selection, no apparent logical sequence. 
It is like reading from a written page of an unknown 
author, and the style is not mine. I listen with fas- 
cination as the little tale unfolds itself, and some- 
times I say to myself, 'This fellow is surely building 
his effect in an odd way', and I watch him with some- 
thing of the excitenent which comes when one first encoun- 
ters a strange and original talent. 
(Garrett 1941, p. 65). 
Similarly, the scene of the death of Uncle Tom in 
"Uncle Tom's Cabin" (Stowe 1909 ) came to Stowe while she 
was sitting "in her pew in the college church at Brunswick, 
during the communion service.... Suddenly like the unroll- 
ing of a picture scroll, the scene of the death of Uncle 
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Tom seemed to pass before her" (W. F. Prince, 1963, p. 174). 
Commenting on this Prince says that the writing of this 
chapter "has many analogies in authorship without conscious 
participation" and that "it seems as though, in the main, 
the material gushed up from a concealed spring" (p. 174). 
Suggestive of 'forced' states of fringe consciousness, 
and at the same time diminishing the gap between hypnagogia 
proper and hypnagogic-like states, is Beveridge's (1950, 
p. 73) description of some very well known cases of creat- 
ivity. He writes: 
Einstein has reported that his profound generalization 
connecting space and time occurred to him while he was 
sick in bed. Descartes is said to have made his dis- 
coveries while lying in bed in the morning and both 
Cannon and Poincare report having got bright ideas 
when lying in bed unable to sleep - the only good 
thing to be said for insomnia! It is said that James 
Brindley, the great engineer, when up against a diff i- 
cult problem, would go to bed for several days till 
it was solved. 
(Beveridge 1950, p. 73). 
To these cases we may add Housman (in Ghiselin 1952, p. 91) 
who stated that "I have seldom written poetry unless I was 
rather out of health". 
In this respect, it will be recalled that in an earl- 
ier discussion of hypnagogia it was suggested that for 
some people hypnagogic phenomena are rarely experienced 
or attended to unless they were 'forced' to relax and 
become more receptive and introspective while bedbound. 
Originality: creativity and madness: 
The criterion of originality, Hallman (1967, p. 20) 
points out, logically "requires the category of singularity 
as a principle of explanation, though the psychologist may 
prefer the term 'individuality'". Hallman sees this cate- 
gory as specifying four qualities which must be present 
if a product is to be considered original. These quali- 
ties are "novelty, unpredictability, uniqueness, and sur- 
prise; they refer to the same fundamental characteristic 
of originality, but from the frames of reference of philo- 
sophy, science, art, and psychology respectively" (p. 21). 
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Novelty is expressed in the finding of new connections 
(Kubie 1958). relationships (Rogers 1959,1961), composi- 
tions (Murray 1959), insights (Gerard 1961), organizations 
of experience (Taylor 1959), constellations of meanings 
(Ghiselin 1952). McKellar (1957) sees creativity as the 
fusion of perceptual experiences in novel ways, Wilson et 
al (1953) as remoteness of association, unusual response, 
and cleverness (Hallman 1967, p. 21). 
Unpredictability "asserts the incompatability of crea- 
tivity and causality theory.... Creativity produces quali- 
ties which never existed before and which could never have 
been predicted on the basis of prior configurations of 
events. Metaphoric activity intrudes upon logical-causal 
necessity" (Hallman 1967, p. 21). 
Likewise, uniqueness asserts that "original creations 
are incomparable, for there is no class of objects to which 
they can be compared. They are untranslatable, unexampled" 
(Hallman 1967, p. 22). 
Surprise "refers to the psychological effect of novel 
combinations upon the beholder. Surprise serves as the 
final test of originality, for without the shock of recog- 
nition which registers the novel experience, there would 
be no occasion for individuals to be moved to appreciate 
or to produce creative works" (Hallman 1967, p. 22). 
Hallman's list of workers who stressed this quality in cre- 
ativity includes Fromm (1959), Schachtel (1959), Getzels 
and Jackson (1962), and Bruner (1962). Getzels and 
Jackson (1962) draw attention to the presence of surprise 
in humour, incongruities, and unexpected endings to plots. 
Bruner (1962) considers it to be the essence of creatiivty. 
The criterion of originality, so essential to the con- 
cept of creativity, has, in fact, been reported by many 
hypnagogic subjects as can be seen in Part One and, indeed, 
throughout this paper. The quality of novelty has been 
partly discussed in reference to "connectedness" where we 
saw how different perceptual and conceptual FsOR fuse or 
combine in hypnagogia resulting in strange imagery and 
statement-conclusions. We have also seen that hypnagogia 
abounds in neologisms, incongruous combinations of words 
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or ideas, strange combinations of visual imagery e. g., a 
crab holding a cigar in its claw (McKellar 1963, p. 142), 
visual images viewed from unusual angles (Leaning 1925), 
juxtapositions of imagery or ideas belonging to different 
matrices. Wilson et al's (1953) "remoteness of associa- 
tion" and Mednick's (1962) "improbable associative resp- 
onses" are fully realized in hypnagogia. 
Similarly, unpredictability is a regular feature of 
hypnagogia. Many subjects have spoken not only of the irr- 
elevancy of hypnagogic images to concurrent trains of 
thought (e. g., Maury 1878; Alexander 1909; Arnold-Forster 
1921; Leroy 1933; McKellar 1959; Singer 1976) but also of 
their irrelevancy to each other and their often unpredict- 
able and apparently disconnected sequences that led to 
their being compared to a mixed-up collection of lantern 
slides belonging to a number of different lectures (e. g., 
McKellar 1977). Again, remoteness, and improbability of 
association are words well fitting the description of many 
hypnagogic experiences of imagery. 
Referring back to Part One, again we come across rep- 
orts in which hypnagogic imagery is described as something 
never experienced before, as unique, as unparalled in 
beauty or ugliness and incomparable to any perceptual exp- 
erience. This has led some subjects to place it in a super- 
natural or spiritual world (e. g., Leaning 1925; Poe 1949). 
Also, the unpredictable juxtaposition or fusion of unrela- 
ted matrices of imagery or thought, which are typical of 
hypnagogia, have contributed to the production of unique, 
if peculiar, quasi-perceptual phenomena and just as unique, 
if peculiar ideas. We shall see more of this below. 
The quality of surprise as the subject's reaction to 
the novelty, unpredictability, and uniqueness of his ima- 
gery and thought is sometimes encountered in hypnagogia. 
We have seen it, for instance, in Kekule's case, and in 
many of those cases where the subject's emotional reaction 
terminated the state. However, in many cases, the sub- 
ject's LEB resulting in empathic identification with the 
contents of his experience deprives him of the ability to 
recognize the novelty, unpredictability, and uniqueness 
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of these contents and thus renders him incapable of feel- 
ing surprised. Milder words have been used to describe his 
emotional reaction: curiosity, childlike interest, amuse- 
ment, or even mild surprise. On the other hand, many rep- 
orts refer to the subject as a disinterested spectator. 
Flatness of affect in hypnagogia has been noted by various 
subjects and investigators, and it has been pointed out 
that strong emotional reactions have the effect of termin- 
ating the state. 
Surprise in general, like all emotions, implies a 
value judgement, it is a personal reaction to the evalua- 
tion of a certain state of affairs. This observation bears 
directly on the concept of originality in creativity and 
argues for its personal and subjective nature. It suggests 
that novelty, unpredictability, and uniqueness are relative 
qualities dependent partly on the individual's history, 
constitution and character make-up and partly on his gene- 
ral mental state at the moment; they are also dependent 
on the individual's set of beliefs and social milieu. 
Poincare (1978) argues that "to create consists of 
making new combinations of associative elements which are 
useful". Similarly, Mednick (1962, p. 221) defines the crea- 
tive process as "the forming of associative elements into 
new combinations which either meet specified requirements 
or are in some way useful". On the other hand, Guilford 
(1967, p. 109) dismisses the criterion of usefulness on the 
ground that it "involves us in values in a way that sci- 
ence cannot deal with directly; hence the criterion of 
social usefulness can be quickly dismissed by the psychol- 
ogist". He defines originality as "the production of 
unusual, far-fetched, remote, or clever responses" (p. 108). 
Although Guilford's definition springs from his view- 
ing of originality in an experimental laboratory setting, 
it can be generalized to apply to any situation if thinking, 
imaging, conceptualizing, and so on, are seen as responses 
to overt or covert stimuli. This is not to suggest the 
adoption of a purely stimulus-response theory of mental 
life. Stimuli need not be solely externally generated, 
as ma laboratory setting. Indeed the subject need not 
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even be conscious of them, as has been seen in the previous 
section. They may be instigated or sought for by explicit 
or implicit motivational factors. Thus, we come across 
creative products in hypnagogia which may be thought of 
as responses to earlier, and sometimes forgotten, stimuli 
and which are re-activated, as it were, by current formu- 
lated or unformulated motivational factors (e. g., Miller 
1906). This analysis may account for the phenomena of ser- 
endipity, i. e., the discovery of things for which one is 
not looking and which impinge on one's consciousness when 
his conscious mind is otherwise occupied. This is a pheno- 
menon encountered both in creativity and hypnagogia. 
In this respect, hypnagogia is teeming with unusual, 
far-fetched, remote and clever responses. As noted on a 
number of occasions, this is the result of the crossing, 
fusion or juxtaposition of two or more FsOR rising from 
the root phenomenon of the LEB. In a similar vein, Koestler 
(1981, p. 201) remarked that "the essence of discovery is 
that unlikely marriage of cabbages and kings - of prev- 
iously unrelated frames of reference or universes of dis- 
course - whose union will solve the previously insoluble 
problem". Although solutions to posed problems are not 
infrequent in hypnagogia, the latter is, of course, better 
known for its unsolicited responses which, consisting as 
they are of very peculiar marriages, convey a certain air 
of poetry. This is most apparent in visual and auditory 
hypnagogic imagery and speech and has led to comparisons 
with surrealist products. For instance, one of McKellar's 
(1963, p. 142) subjects reported that his hypnagogic ima- 
gery was "chiefly noticeable for its original and surreal- 
ist character... objects arranged in unusual ways, being 
most like paintings by Dali". 
Indeed, the comparison with surrealism is most fitting. 
As Breton (1924) wrote in his manifesto, "surrealism is 
sheer psychological automatism, by means of which it is 
intended to express verbally, in writing, or in any other 
way, the actual function of thought. Thought's dictation 
in the absence of all control exercised by reason and out- 
side all aesthetic or moral prejudice". Furthermore, 
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Surrealism is based on belief in the importance of 
certain forms of association hitherto neglected, in 
the omnipotence of dream, in the purposeless game of 
thinking. It aims at the final annihilation of all 
other psychological mechanisms, and at taking their 
place in solving the foremost problems of life. 
(Breton: quoted by Schmeller 1960, p. 11). 
Automatism, which, as Breton explains is a monologue 
uttered as rapidly as possible, thus eliminating control 
and criticism, is reminiscent of Jung's (1909) and 
Stransky's (Oswald 1962) experiments of the same nature 
which invited parallels with schizophrenic thinking and 
states of inattention, and which I have related to hypna- 
gogia in the chapter of 'Schizophrenia'. 
In surrealist artistic creations, as in hypnagogic 
imagery and mentation, "well-known objects are used in 
a fantastic manner, they are freely linked in away unheard- 
of in our conscious, wakeful, purposeful, reality" (Schmeller 
1960, p. 10). As de Chirico noted: "Furniture taken from 
its habitual place acquires a particular, strong express- 
iveness - for instance, when seen in the street, during 
a removal.... Imagine an armchair, a divan, chairs placed 
in a group in some deserted spot of Greece, or in the 
American Prairie" (Schmeller 1960, p. 12). As Schmeller 
(p. 12) points out, the surrealist ideal is well represen- 
ted by "Comte de Lautreumnt's" formula: "Beauty: the possi- 
bility of a sewing machine and an umbrella meeting on the 
dissecting table". He further describes the nature of sur- 
realism thus: 
Surrealism is contradiction become corporeal and 
incarnate. On the surrealist stage the law of grav- 
ity is suspended, which normally keeps things in their 
terrestrial order; things penetrate each other and 
give birth to new beings no longer 'after their kind, 
whose seed is in themselves upon the earth'. The 
basic foundations of this cosmos are sunk into an ever- 
changing ground. 
(Schmeller 1960, p. 14). 
Max Ernst's "oneiric" collages are strongly remini- 
scent of hypnagogic imagery. This, of course, should not 
be surprising since Ernst himself reported painting from 
his own hypnagogic imagery, of "being present as a 
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spectator, indifferent or impassioned" (Ernst 1952, p. 65) 
at the birth of his own work. Indeed, he explains that 
he owes his discovery of frottage to "one of those dreams 
between sleeping and waking" (p. 64). 
Another painter whose works and method can be most 
closely related to hypnagogia is Salvador Dali. Not only 
are the objects in his paintings, as in works of other sur- 
realists, sharply and minutely detailed, but also the dev- 
elopment of some of his themes as well as the method he 
used to conceive of his images are relevant to our discus- 
sion. His method he called "paranoiac-critical activity". 
In his 'Conquest of the Irrational' he describes it thus: 
It was in 1929 that Salvador Dali brought his atten- 
tion to bear upon the internal mechanism of paranoiac 
phenomena and envisaged the possibility of an experi- 
mental method based on the sudden power of the system- 
atic associations proper to paranoia; this method 
afterwards became the delirio-critical synthesis which 
bears the name of 'paranoiac-critical activity'. Para- 
noia: delirium of interpretive association bearing a 
systematic structure. Paranoiac-critical activity: 
spontaneous method of irrational knowledge based upon 
the interpretive-critical association of delirious 
phenomena.... By this method paranoiac-critical act- 
ivity discovers new and objective 'significance' in 
the irrational; it makes the world of delirium pass 
tangibly on to the plane of reality. 
(Dali 1976, pp. 436-7). 
In this method, by deliberately suspending the wake- 
ful, critical activities of the mind Dali would allow the 
emergence of unconscious and irrational elements and then 
seize upon them and utilize them. This is not unlike my 
description of hypnagoiga as a preconscious state in which 
material from the unconscious comes to the surface. We 
saw that this material appears in forms that flout the laws 
of logic. For instance, they cross or fuse together unrel- 
ated FsOR, assimilate unrelated objects or mental processes, 
allow objects to have added meanings and significances 
unwarranted by waking logic, allow objects to be themselves 
and yet something else. Dali's paintings contain all of 
these paralogical manifestations. One of the most striking 
effects in his employment of the paranoiac-critical method 
is the creation of the double or "paranoiac" image which 
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he describes as "the image of an object which, without the 
least figurative or anatomical modification can at the 
same time represent another, absolutely different object 
(Dali: quoted by Wilson 1980, p. 18). 
The two best known paintings in which this effect app- 
ears are the "Swans reflecting elephants" and the "Meta- 
morphosis of Narcissus". The former, as the title suggests, 
depicts four swans in a lake whose reflections are strik- 
ingly represented by four elephants. The latter carries 
a much greater significance not only because of its profound 
theme but also because a book by Dali of the same title 
provides us with a clue as to its origin and a glimpse of 
the workings of Dali's paranoiac-critical method: 
The clue is in the form of a few lines of dialogue 
between two fishermen of Port-Lligat, a small fish- 
ing village near Cadaques and Dali's home since 1930. 
They are evidently speaking of a slightly demented 
villager: 
First fisherman: What's the matter with that chap 
staring at himself in a mirror all 
day? 
Second fisherman: If you really want to know he's got 
a bulb in his head. 
Dali explains '"A bulb in the head" in Catalan corres- 
ponds exactly with the psychoanalytic notion of "com- 
plex". If a man had a bulb in his head it might break 
into flower at any moment, Narcissus! ' Dali's inst- 
ant association of the mirror with the Greek myth fol- 
lowed by the mental jump of his transformation of the 
Catalan phrase into the image of the flower sprouting 
from Narcissus' head, vividly evoke the dynamic pro- 
cesses of paranoiac thought. But the most extraordin- 
ary transformation of all is that of the boy's body 
into the strange fossil hand holding an egg. Here 
can be seen precisely the way in which paranoiac thought 
transforms reality to conform with unconscious obses- 
sions. Furthermore, by a masterly stroke of illusion- 
ism, a virtuoso piece of painting, Dali makes the 
change take place before our eyes as our attention 
switches from the figure in the pool, brilliantly 
caught at precisely the half-way point from boy to 
hand, to the final monument at the pool side. 
(Wilson 1980, p. 18). 
Comparable to Dali's 'Metamorphosis of Narcissus' is one 
of Leroy's (1933, pp. 42-3) reports in which the hypnagogic 
vision of a carpet being shaken from a window brought to 
the subject's mind the thought of a tooth which led to 
the carpet's turning into a molar tooth whose roots 
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represented (turned into) the legs of the person who was 
shaking the carpet! 
The paranoid systematization of associations referred 
to by Dali has an important bearing on the present discus- 
sion in that, as with hypnagogia, it tends to bring toget- 
her and relate many normally unrelated objects, concepts, 
processes, and so on. In a sense, the paranoid patient 
who systematically relates normally unrelated events, 
thoughts, situations, etc., to his delusion resembles the 
creative individual who produces unusual, remote, and far- 
fetched or clever associations and responses: they both 
associate systematically and the associations they produce 
are far-fetched and yet relate to a central theme. The 
resemblance is often too strong to be ignored. It gener- 
alizes into one's behaviour. As Guilford (1967, p. 107) 
remarked, "the highly creative person's behaviour is some- 
times eccentric. This has sometimes branded him as being 
abnormal and even pathological". Dali encapsulated the 
problem in his classical retort: "The only difference bet- 
ween me and a madman is that I am not mad" (Wilson 1980, 
p. ll). The resemblance, however, sinks deeper than Dali's 
witticism. In some cases it is not merely a superficial 
resemblance but more of an employment of identical mental 
processes. These latter, as already seen, are clearly 
revealed in hypnagogia which thus brings together onto a 
common ground the genius and the madman. 
The marrying of cabbages to kings, the ability or ten- 
dency to produce remote, far-fetched associations which 
is found in both creativity and madness may be seen in 
hypnagogia as the outcome of the LEB. The presence of the 
latter in schizophrenia has already been suggested in the 
previous chapter. The same is being argued in respect to 
creativity. As Koestler (1981) points out, 
From Kepler and Descartes to Planck and de Broglie, 
the working methods of the great pioneers seem to have 
been inspired by Einstein's jingle, improvised for the 
benefit of an unknown lady who asked him for a dedica- 
tion on a photograph: 
A thought that sometimes makes me hazy: 
Am I- or are the others crazy? 
(Koestler 1981, p. 146). 
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In reference to Kekule's hypnagogic vision Koestler 
(1981, p. 170) further remarks that "the whirling, giddy 
vision reminds me of the hallucinations of schizophrenics, 
as painted or described by them"; Faraday's visions resem- 
ble "the stable delusional systems of praranoia" (p. 171). 
As I have argued, one of the effects of the LEB is the 
melting or throwing away of constraints. This effect, 
Koestler (1981, p. 210) argues, "is symptomatic both of the 
genius and the crank; what distinguishes them is the intui- 
tive guidance which only the former enjoys". But does he 
always enjoy this guidance, and is the latter any guarantee 
for drawing an objective distinction? As Koestler himself 
points out, science is not immune to false inspirations: 
"a kind of inspired blunder which presents itself in the 
guise of an original synthesis, and carries the same sub- 
jective conviction of Archimedes' cry did" (Koestler 1981, 
p. 212). Moreover, false inspirations may not be more mom- 
entary flights or excited imagination: they may be full- 
fledged systematized delusions, and as such resist any 
evidence contradicting their tenets. By and large, Koestler 
(1981, p. 214) continues: 
scientists are inclined to trust their intuitions; and 
if confronted with experiments which give ambiguous 
or divergent results, either declare - as Einstein 
did - that 'the facts are wrong'; or - as Hobbes did 
- that 'the instance is so particular and singular 
that 'tis scarce worth our observing'; or to resort 
to the standard phrase that the unfavourable experi- 
mental result is due 'to unknown sources of error... ' 
(Koestler 1981, p. 214). 
"In other words", he concludes after the discussion of a 
number of cases, "a physicist should not allow his subjec- 
tive conviction that he is on the right track to be shaken 
by contrary experimental data" (pp. 245-6). Moreover, lack 
of recognition that their ideas were right has driven emi- 
nent scientists literally insane (Koestler 1981, pp. 239- 
40), indicating the strength and tenacity with which they 
held onto these ideas. The point is not that they were 
right or wrong but that they felt certain that they were 
right. And this feeling of certainty, as shown above, 
is not restricted to the experiences of those scientific 
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geniuses that were clinically diagnosed as insane. 
The feeling of certainty experienced so indiscrimi- 
nately in hypnagogia (viz., as accompanying both truth and 
falsehood), and the tendency to produce unusual relation- 
ships and associations, - phenomena which are pre-eminently 
present in creative individuals and madmen - both, indicate 
the importance of hypnagogia in uncovering common func- 
tional features in creativityand madness and point to the 
presence of LEB as the possible cause of these phenomena. 
The feeling of certainty which was proposed in an earlier 
chapter ("Hypnosis") as taking the diffuse form of a sense 
that 'nothing can go wrong' during hypnagogia - and thus 
allowing the individual to surrender his precious waking 
logic before entering sleep - will be further discussed 
in the following section in respect to "openness". 
The production of unusual and unique associations 
viewed as partaking of the criterion of originality in 
creativity, but also found in madness and in hypnagogia, 
can, further, be seen as the creation of 'actualized' meta- 
phors or analogies in all three conditions. This can be 
seen in examining and comparing the following four cases: 
(a) von Domarus's (1964) patient who identified with each 
other a saint, a box of cigars, and sex on the basis of 
their all being encircled, (b) Kepler's comparison of the 
sun, the stars or planets, and the space between them to 
God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, (c) Kekule's 
vision of the snakes as an analogy with the benzene mole- 
cule, and (d) Silberer's autosymbolic hypnagogic phenomena. 
To begin with, in all four cases the associations are 
indeed unusual. It might be argued that in the case of 
von Domarus's patient the identification is not only unusual 
but entirely unjustified, indeed crazy. However, the mad- 
ness is not so much in the remoteness of the associations 
as in the fact that a metaphor has been taken literally, 
it has been 'actualized', in the mind of the patient a cigar 
box is a saint. In Kepler's case I suspect a similar pro- 
cess. On one occasion he specifically stressed that "it 
is by no means permissible to treat this analogy as an 
empty comparison; it should be considered by its Platonic 
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form and archetypal quality as one of the primary causes" 
(quoted by Koestler 1981, pp. 125-126). The interesting 
point here is that the image of the holy trinity as an 
analogy was superimposed on the solar system much in the 
way a paranoid relates phenomena to fit his central belief. 
Kepler's comparison of the planets to the Son is not merely 
unusual but entirely irrelevant: there is neither external 
similarity (the Son is one, the planets are many) nor an 
internal one (the Son does not revolve round the Father). 
Kekule's and Silberer's examples have already been 
discussed. 
Poetry, like all other forms of art, makes perhaps an 
easier comparison with hypnagogic mentation and speech 
than scientific invention. It also makes an easier com- 
parison with madness. In science one may apply the crit- 
erion of usefulness no matter how relative the latter might 
be; he can also apply sheer logic and rational analysis 
to scientific products. But with poetry such criteria may 
not be merely inadequate but altogether inappropriate. 
Koestler (1981, p. 352) thought of art as the juxtaposition 
of FsOR. Housman (1952, p. 86) spoke of poetry as essen- 
tially devoid of meaning. The latter regards Blake as "the 
most poetical of all poets" and "more poetical than 
Shakespeare" primarily becuase "Blake's meaning is often 
unimportant or virtually non-existent, so that we can lis- 
ten with all our hearing to his celestial tune" (1952, p. 
87). He also says that "the production of poetry, in its- 
first stage, is less an active than a passive and involun- 
tary process" (ib., p. 91) and quotes Plato who said: 
He who without the Muses' madness in his soul comes 
knocking at the door of poetry and thinks that art 
will make him anything fit to be called a poet, finds 
that the poetry which he indites in his sober senses 
is beaten hollow by the poetry of madmen. 
(Plato: quoted by Housman 1952, p. 86). 
In this transient state of madness the creative poet 
brings together images from distant FsOR and produces unu- 
sual associations and, as Aristotle noted, compounds and 
strange words. As already pointed out by many writers, 
the more remote these elements the more fertile or creative 
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the process. Mednick (1962, p. 221), for instance, quotes 
as an illustration a line from Marianne Moore's (1951) 
"The Monkey Puzzle" which reads: "The lion's ferocious 
chrysanthemum head". Compare this with Hannah Green's 
(1973): "Heat-craze my teeth in bitterest anger" and "there 
was a gear all teeth, two at least world-caught. And now 
nothing engages the worlds" Or the hypnagogic sentence 
reported by one of Trömner's (1911) subjects: "He reg- 
ally escaped into his existence". Many other hypnagogic 
examples have been given in Chapter 12 and throughout this 
paper. 
Housman's statement in respect to the first stage of 
poetic creation being passive and involuntary and his ref- 
erence to Plato's view of poetic inspiration, introduce 
into the present discussion certain terms which are often 
used in relation to creativity and sometimes as its syno- 
nyms, namely, 'intuition', 'insight', 'inspiration'. I 
consider it a good place to discuss them here as they rel- 
ate not only to creativity but also to madness and hypna- 
gogia both through their nonrational-unconscious character 
and their originality as represented by the qualities of 
novelty, unpredictability, uniqueness and surprise. 
Further to his comments above Housman offers a perso- 
nal example illustrating the process of inspiration. Hav- 
ing drunk a pint of beer at luncheon, he says, he went for 
a walk during which, thinking of nothing in particular, 
would flow into his mind unexpectedly, 
Sometimes a line or two of verse, sometimes a whole 
stanza at once, accompanied, not preceded by a vague 
notion of the poem which they were destined to form 
a part of. Then there would usually be a lull of an 
hour or so, then perhaps the spring would bubble up 
again. I say bubble up, because, so far as I could 
make out, the source of the suggestions thus proffered 
to the brain was an abyss which I have already had 
occasion to mention, the pit of the stomach. 
(Housman 1952, p. 91). 
Earlier on he calls this process "a secretion". 
There are two points in this excerpt I consider rele- 
vant to my discussion. The first comes out of Hcusman's 
noting that his conceiving a line or two of verse or a 
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whole stanza is accompanied by a vague notion of the whole 
poem. This is very much like the feeling of significance 
encountered in hypnagogia. In most cases of course it 
remains just a feeling, undirected and unattached. Some- 
times it is the beginning of a flash of insight, as in 
Kekule's case. And yet on other occasions it constitutes 
an intimation of an impending poetic inspiration, as in 
Miller's (1906) case (see also her hypnagogic poem "The 
Moth to the Sun" reported in the same paper). 
The second point is his reference to inspiration as 
a secretion and as having its source in the pit of the 
stomach, i. e., as being 'visceral'. Similarly, Williams 
(1922, p. 261) speaking of the phenomena of intuition said 
that "the primitive, the visceral, the unconscious mind 
gives information to the conscious, and like the experienced 
judge, it announces its conclusions but withholds its rea- 
sons". Jung (1946) defined intuition as "that psycholog- 
ical function which transmits perceptions in an unconscious 
way". Berne (1949) noted that "directed participation of 
the perceptive ego interfered with intuition" (p. 219) and 
that "when the perceptive ego was not directed the activ- 
ity of some other function could be 'felt'". He further 
argued that "to understand intuition, it seems necessary 
to avoid the belief that in order to know something the 
individual must be able to put into words what he knows 
and how he knows it. This belief, still common since Freud, 
is the result of what appears to be an over-development 
of reality testing" (p. 223). These are descriptions that 
take us, once more, back to primitive, regressive menta- 
tion, the unconscious, and sub-cortical activities. In 
a study on inspiration, Kris (1939) notes that the literal 
meaning of the term refers to the influence of the spirit 
of God or some supernatural power and that in its meta- 
phoric sense the term is characterized by the quality of 
externality. It is thus also autonomous and unpredictable. 
Kris points out that in their purest form states of inspir- 
ation are found in primitive society: 
They are mostly connected with a partial loss of con- 
sciousness and are almost habitually accompanied by 
various sorts of more or less unco-ordinated motor 
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activities. 
The clinical classification of these states is not 
always easy. They sometimes shew characteristics of 
epileptic or - perhaps more frequently - hysteroepil- 
eptic states (morbus sacer) or else a more or less 
complicated hysterical symptom formation. But while 
there seems to be a certain variety of clinical syn- 
drome which may predispose to these states, the psych- 
ological conception of the belief in inspiration and 
of the processes occurring in it aims at a solution 
that will not be limited to any of these clinical 
conditions. These highly complex processes may be 
described as phenomena of regression. In clinical 
cases this regression is likely to lead to a withdrawal 
of ego control from many of the higher mental activi- 
ties. As an example we have mentioned that the coor- 
dination of motor activities is frequently affected. 
To add another most characteristic feature, in states 
of inspiration speech becomes automatic.... It is the 
voice of the unconscious. 
(Kris 1939, pp. 378-379). 
Although it is not argued that hypnagogia is always 
and in all respects a state of inspiration, it will be 
noted that the features described by Kris as present in 
a trance-like state of inspiration are encountered in hyp- 
nagogia: primitive, regressive, epileptic-like, motor auto- 
matism, ego withdrawal, automatic and autonomous speech, 
these are terms already used to describe hypnagogia. It 
would also appear that inspiration could be understood as 
both 'bubbling' and 'babbling' of the unconscious: as the 
primitive, kinesthetic-visceral feeling of welling up, 
often with a sense of being filled up and oozing out or 
over-flowing, and as the irrepressible tendency to let go 
of all conscious controls over thought, moveme+t, speech, 
and so forth, resulting, for instance, in talking seeming 
nonsense. It is encountered in hypnagogia in both of these 
senses. In the form of 'poetical nonsense', as Housman 
might have said, it is found in, for instance, neologisms, 
alliterations, assonance, sound associations, verbal- 
auditory and visual punning, strange verbal constructions 
with intimations and undertones of mysticism, philosophy, 
religion, and poetic grandeur, sometimes reminiscent of 
Housman's remark that all poetry contains are embryo ideas 
and suggestions of thought and that "that mysterious gran- 
deur would be less grand if it were less mysterious" (1952, 
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p. 88). 
An example from Kretschmer (1934) describing a pheno- 
menon called "FÖrster's syndrome" and quoted by Koestler 
(1981, pp. 315-16) with comments, may further bring together 
hypnagogia, the poetic, andth pathological and, in addition, 
strengthen my argument in regard to sub-cortical or old- 
brain activities in hypnagogia and hypnagogic-like states. 
The phenomenon was first elicited by Förster, when, oper- 
ating on a patient, he manipulated "a tumour in the third 
ventricle -a small cavity deep down in the phylogenetic- 
ally ancient regions of tie mid-brain". As Kretschmer rep- 
orts, the manipulation threw the (conscious) patient into 
a flight of speech 
quoting passages in Latin, Greek and Hebrew. He exhi- 
bited typical sound associations, and with every word 
of the operator broke into a flight of ideas. Thus, 
on hearing the operator ask for a Tupfer [tampon] he 
burst into 'Tupfer... Tupfer, Hupfer, Hüpfer, hüpfen 
Sie mal... ' On hearing the word Messer, he burst into 
'Messer, messer, Metzer, Sie sind ein Metzel, das ist 
ja ein Gemetzel, metzeln Sie doch nicht so messen Sie 
doch Sie messen ja nicht Herr Professor, profiteor, 
professus sum, profiteri'. 
(Kretschmer: quoted by Koestler 1981, pp. 
315-6). 
Koestler comments: 
Förster's patient opened up a curious insight into the 
processes in the poet's brain - in an unexpectedly 
literal sense of the word. The first flight of ideas, 
Tupfer, Hupfer, etc. - 'tampon, jumper, go and jump 
into the air' - has a gruesome kind of humour coming 
from a man tied face down to the operating table with 
his skull open. The second flight, translated, runs 
as follows: Messer, Metzer, etc. - 'Knife, butcher, 
you are a butcher in a butchery; truly this is a mass- 
acre [Gemetzel]; don't go butchering [metzeln], take 
measurements [messen]; why don't you measure, Herr 
Professor, profiteor, professus sum', and so on. 
Thus the patient's apparently delirious punning 
and babbling convey a meaningful message to the sur- 
geon - his fear of being butchered, and his entreaty 
that the surgeon should proceed by careful measure- 
ments, that is, in a more cautious, circumspect way. 
(Koestler 1981, p. 316). 
Openness and self-actualization: 
Hallman's (1967) criterion of openness encompasses 
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sensitivity, tolerance of ambiguity, self-acceptance, and 
spontaneity. "Defined as traits by most psychologists, 
these conditions are learned and are not aspects of man's 
inheritance; they are environmental factors". He makes 
reference to Rogers' (1961) category of openness as 
the opposite of psychological defensiveness, when to 
protect the organization of self, certain experiences 
are prevented from coming into awareness except in 
disturbed fashion.... It means lack of rigidity and 
permeability of boundaries in concepts, beliefs, per- 
ceptions and hypotheses. 
(Rogers 1961, p. 353). 
The trait of sensitivity, Hallman explains, "refers 
to a state of being aware of things as they really are 
rather than according to some predetermined set" (p. 28). 
He calls the roll of those who have supported these ideas 
as follows: Angyal (1956), Fromm (1959), Mooney (1956), 
Guilford (1959), Stein (1953), Lownfeld (1958), Greenacre 
(1957), Hilgard (1959). To these I would add Cropley (1978 
p. 123) who proposed that "those people whose cognitive 
style involves the least censoring of the information avai- 
lable in the external world are most likely to be creative 
thinkers". 
Tolerance of ambiguity refers to the ability "to tol- 
erate inconsistencies and contradictions, to accept the 
unknown, to be comfortable with the ambiguous, approximate, 
uncertain" (Hallman 1967, p. 28). Out of sensitivity and 
tolerance of ambiguity comes flexibility one implication 
of which is the ability "to perceive meaning in irrelevan- 
cies" (p. 28). The condition of self-acceptance, again, 
follows from that of tolerance of ambiguity since "the cre- 
ative person... needs to rely upon his own sensitivity for 
guidance" (p. 28). Finally, spontaneity "gives the creative 
act the feeling of being free, autonomous, undetermined. 
It allows creative behaviour to be unbound and uncoupled 
from previous causal conditions" (p. 29). 
Guilford (1950), in a factorial analysis of the perso- 
nality of creative scientists, technologists and inventors, 
proposes the following eight traits: sensitivity to prob- 
lems, fluency (i. e., the ability to produce "a large num- 
ber of ideas per unit of time" p. 452), novelty, flexibility 
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of mind ("the ease with which one changes set" p. 452), 
analysing ability (as a complement to organizing ability), 
reorganization or redefinition of organized wholes ("trans- 
formation of an existing object into one of different 
design, function or use" p. 453), complexity or intricacy 
of conceptual structure ("how many interrelated ideas can 
a person manipulate at the same time" p. 453), evaluation. 
However, he expresses the reservation that not all of these 
traits might be applicable to all forms of creativity. 
Furthermore, he decries theories postulating stages (e. g. 
Wallas, 1926) because they are untestable and merely chase 
the problem out of sight. On the other hand, McKellar 
(1963, pp. 131-132), equating the concept of 'creativity' 
with that of 'originality' points out that "an individual 
may exhibit high originality on one occasion and remark- 
ably little on others" and suggests that "it may often be 
more fruitful to regard the term like 'originality' as des- 
criptive of instances of behaviour rather than-underlying 
personality traits". . 
However the case may be, most of the conditions ref- 
erred to above are to be found, in one form or another, 
in hypnagogia. This is not to say that hypnagogic subjects 
are necessarily endowed with these traits but that the 
state of hypnagogia is conducive-to their emergence, that 
is, hypnagogia may represent one of McKellar's "instances 
of behaviour" characterized by creativeness. We have 
already seen that the hypnagogic subject is open to pre- 
conscious elements. Hallman (1967, p. 28) notes that the 
creative person is sensitive to "unconscious impulses", 
among other things. A wider aspect of openness in hypna- 
gogia was discussed in chapters 7 ("Suggestibility- 
Receptivity") and 8. Throughout this paper we saw that 
the hypnagogic subject is sensitive to internal activity, 
e. g., imagery, ideas, impulses, intuitions; that boundaries 
of the self and of concepts are fluid and permeable; that 
psychological openness as opposed to defensiveness is the 
sine qua non of hypnagogic induction and progression. In 
hypnagogia the subject accepts approximations, ambiguities, 
and contradictions. He may be thought of as 'fluent' in 
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the sense of producing a large number of images which are 
characterized by spontaneity and autonomy, 'flexible' in 
terms of "the ease with which he changes set" and the vari- 
ety and changeability of his imagery. In respect to the 
latter it is interesting to note Hudson's (1975) remark 
that persons whose imagery is overly flexible are like 
"nomads" in regards to their inner and outer world, that 
their ego boundaries are poorly maintained and they tend 
to differentiate neither between their own inner and out- 
er life nor between themselves and other people - observa- 
tions pointing, once again, to the LEB. Further the hypna- 
gogic subject reorganizes or redefines in the sense of 
transforming an existing object into one of different des- 
ign or function, and his conceptualization is often complex, 
consisting of intricate crossings of FsOR. 
In respect to self-acceptance the hypnagogic subject 
may be said to be in a state of 'forced self-acceptance', 
that is, he is placed, by the very nature of hypnagogia 
which requires relaxation and abandonment, in a position 
of allowing normally constrained or simply unconscious men- 
tation to come freely to the fore. It is true that this 
form of self-acceptance does not entirely coincide with 
that proposed by Hallman; also, hypnagogic imagery and 
thought are generally characterized by the feature of 'ext- 
ernality', of transpiring 'outside' the subject, and thus 
the hypnagogic subject may be thought of as transferring 
reliance onto something outside himself. However, we have 
only to reflect on cases like those of Kekule, Poincare, 
and Hadamard to understand that acceptance of spontaneous 
and autonomous thoughts and images which have the appear- 
ance of externality does not necessarily imply reliance 
on factors lying outside the subject - such reliance, as 
already seen, is related to set and setting. 
Again, the tolerance of ambiguity in hypnagogia is 
both 'forced' and necessary. It is 'forced' in the sense 
that it occurs irrespective of the personality of the sub- 
ject, and necessary because there must be no sense of unac- 
ceptable ambiguity in the mind of the subject as he enters 
the state: there must be relaxation and a diffuse feeling 
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of certainty that ambiguities, incongruities and contra- 
dictions will either be resolved in due course or they are 
just what they are and should be taken in one's stride. 
*** 
Hallman's criterion of self-actualization logically 
"rests upon the category of change as an explanatory prin- 
ciple" (op. cit., p. 25). Psychologically, this is spoken 
of "in terms of motivation as the energy source for change, 
and of growth in the direction of psychological health as 
the goal toward which this energy is directed. This cate- 
gory must account for change as transformation and as trans- 
cendence.... It implies that though all personality change 
may not terminate in growth, all instances of personality 
growth are possible grounds for creativeness... it ident- 
if ies creativity with self formation, and therefore implies 
that unless significant transformation occurs in person- 
ality during an activity, that activity will fall short 
of the creative" (p. 25). 
Maslow (1956), Hallman (op. cit., p. 26) points out, 
equates creativity with the state of psychological health, 
and this with the self-actualizing process. He further 
notes that "this criterion also asserts a connection bet- 
ween motivation and creativity, for the self-actualizing 
person is characterized by an unusually strong motivational 
drive" (p. 26). 
Now, in hypnagogia though there are many changes 
these are mostly fleeting and transient. However, various 
writers (e. g., Vogel et al 1966; Green et al 1971b; 
Budzynski 1972,1977; van Dusen 1972; Stoyva 1973) have 
pointed to the therapeutic value of hypnagogia. Sometimes, 
this is done in relating hypnagogia to the creative process 
(Crichton-Brown 1895; Tauber and Green 1959; Green et al 
1971b) through which it may be related to mystical experi- 
ence due to their common connection with preconscious men- 
tation (Greeley 1974) - and through the latter, once more, 
to creativity (Kubie 1958). 
If the process of self-actualization is seen as a 
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progressive integration of the personality wherein the 
individual comes to strike a balance between the conscious 
and the unconscious, the rational and the nonrational, then 
hypnagogia may play a twofold major role in the achievement 
of such a goal: firstly, it may contribute directly to the 
realization of the target, and secondly, it may point to 
an underlying aetiology and provide the framework for under- 
standing the presence of the particular traits character- 
izing the self-actualized person. 
To begin with, in respect to Hallman's remark that 
"all instances of personality growth are possible grounds 
for creativeness", hypnagogia may constitute such an inst- 
ance in the sense of facilitating self-acceptance and pers- 
onality balance characterized by practically all of the 
features of Maslow's (1968) creative personality, viz., 
spontaneity and effortlessness, expressiveness and inno- 
cence, lack of fear for the uncertain, ambiguous or 
unknown, ability to tolerate bipolarity and ability to 
bring together and integrate opposites. It might, of 
course, be argued that neither creativity nor hypnagogia 
are always instances of personality growth, if the latter 
is understood in the strict sense of healthy growth. There 
are many cases of powerfully motivated geniuses who were 
far from reflecting healthy personalities, just as hypna- 
gogic imagery may occur in individuals irrespective of 
their state of physical or psychological health. 
Nonetheless, hypnagogia, because of its character of 
bringing to the surface unconscious material, may act as 
a diagnostic screen against which is projected both the 
physiological and psychological state of the individual. 
Evidence from various sources (e. g., Silberer 1965; Leaning 
1925; Vihvelin 1948; Oswald 1962; van Dusen 1972) suggests 
that somatic, psychosomatic, and psychological states are 
reflected in the contents of the subject's hypnagogic 
imagery. 
(Germane to this aspect of hypnagogia are Head's (1901) 
findings of mental changes and images that accompany 
visceral diseases. In the same vein, Leaning (1925, p. 331 
footnote 3) notes that attacks of headache may be 
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accompanied by visions of "the battlements of a fortress". ) 
Significantly, on the psychological level various wri- 
ters, e. g., Silberer (1965), Slight (1924), Kubie (1943), 
McKellar (1957), Foulkes and Vogel (1965), Vogel et al 
(1966), Schneck (1968), van Dusen (1972), Oliver (1976), 
Budzynski (1977) have shown that hypnagogia is a most fer- 
tile period for the emergence of symbols and for symbol- 
interpretation. Moreover, Silberer's (1965) idea of "func- 
tional" symbolism in hypnagogia argues (a) for a type of 
'dream' symbolism which is independent of repression of 
censorship (Piaget 1951), and (b) for "anagogic" interpre- 
tation (Silberer 1971), i. e., for states or processes to 
be realized in the future, thus relating present preoccu- 
pations with problems and their possible future resolution 
(see Griffiths 1935; French and Fromm 1964; Oliver 1976, 
for similar arguments in respect to nocturnal dreams). 
In addition, hypnagogic symbolism appears to contain 
both Freudian references to the outside world as well as 
integrative Jungian (1966) representations wherein aspects 
of the subject's personality are symbolically manifested 
(Oliver 1976). More important, the Foulkes et al (1966) 
study showed that good hypnagogic subjects reflect person- 
alities with positive characteristics. As Green and Green 
(1978) remarked: 
Is it not interesting that, on the one hand, many out- 
standing creative people have reported their greatest 
insights... were associated with reverie and hypnopom- 
pic imagery, and, on the other hand, the imagery and 
insights reported by college students in the theta 
training project involved changes in their personal 
lives.... These are also amenable to insight, intui- 
tion and creativity. 
(Green and Green 1978, p. 149). 
Budzynski (1972) suggested that the findings of Foulkes 
et al (1966) may be used to advantage by training less pos- 
itive subjects to become more tolerant of others, less dog- 
matic, and better able to express their feelings simply 
by training them to enter and remain in hypnagogia for inc- 
reasing intervals. Personality changes and treatment for 
depression and obesity, inter alia, might also be facili- 
tated by the use of hypnopaedic programmes utilizing hypna- 
gogia (Budzynski 1977). 
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The important but controversial area of hypnopaedia 
or sleep learning (e. g., Leuba and Bateman 1952; Stampf 
1953; Simon and Emmons1955,1956; Svyadoshch 1968; Rubin 
1968,1970) has involved hypnagogia in as much as the lat- 
ter's definition includes stage 1 of sleep during which 
stage the subject is said to be highly suggestible and 
receptive. 
The early stages of hypnagogia may also be utilized 
for their beneficial effects of psychophysical relaxation 
(e. g., Jacobson 1929,1970), especially when combined with 
autogenic practices (e. g., Schultz and Luthe 1959). 
Thus, hypnagogia may indeed contribute directly to the 
process of self-actualization (i) by facilitating the emer- 
gence of unconscious material, and (ii) by aiding in the 
acceptance and integration of such material into an expan- 
ding personality either by simply allowing the material 
to surface or by utilizing the receptivity of the state 
to suggest positive personality changes. 
Secondly, Maslow's features of the self-actualized 
personality listed above are typically psychological asp- 
ects of the root phenomenon of the LEB which characterizes 
hypnagogia. Thus, the latter's central feature of the LEB 
may account for the presence or emergence-development of 
the traits characteristic of self-actualized, creative, 
individuals. 
Summary and Conclusion: 
In this chapter the relationship between creativity 
and hypnagogia was discussed. In doing so, an analysis 
of the mental state of the individual in the creative pro- 
cess was carried out and was found to agree in most impor- 
tant respects with hypnagogia. Conversely, hypnagogia was 
shown to contain all of the necessary and sometimes all 
of the sufficient, conditions of creativity. 
It was further seen that creative thinking shares many 
dynamics with schizophrenic mentation, and that a greater 
understanding of these two states or conditions can be 
gained through the study of hypnagogia which typically acc- 
ommodates both. It was suggested that this understanding 
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could be achieved if the phenomena of creativity, like 
those of schizophrenia, are viewed as functions of the 
LEB which is a defining feature of hypnagogia. 
In conclusion, it can be said that hypnagogia is a 
state conducive to creativity, it can constitute an essen- 
tial part of the creative process, and it often contains 
the act of creation itself - indeed, the moment of illum- 
ination or insight is, not infrequently, indistinguishable 
phenomenologically from hypnagogia, save for the fact that 
it does not lead to sleep and that when it occurs in hypna- 
gogia it causes the latter to terminate. 
CHAPTER 14 
OTHER AREAS OF EXPERIENCE: 
Under this heading I shall discuss very briefly a 
number of other states, processes, and experiences which 
share various phenomenological and cognitive-affective 
features with hypnagogia. 
Epilepsy: 
In his Cavendish lecture Crichton-Browne (1895) drew 
attention to the observation that dreamy mental states 
in epileptics tend to come on "almost invariably in 
solitude" and that they are particularly prone to show 
themselves "during the invasion of sleep, when the brain 
is freed to a large degree from external solicitations and 
volitional control, and is in a transitional state" (p. 5). 
Referring to one of his patients he noted that his attacks 
occurred occasionally in the afternoon or early evening, 
"and by far most frequently as he was undressing to go to 
bed. As they wore off in adult life the last vestiges of 
them were experienced while he was drowsy and just falling 
to sleep" (p. 4). Of another young patient he wrote: 
Objects at which she gazed intently sometimes 
grew smaller and smaller and receded into dis- 
tance, and this experience was always followed 
by a feeling of sleepiness for a few minutes. 
When just falling asleep she would often hear 
a low murmuring, crooning noise, as if someone 
were sneering at her -a sound which was horrid 
and created alarm, and was so real that she was 
obliged to jump up in bed and rub her ears. At 
other times when falling asleep she would have 
a loud dinging in her ears, and while still 
awake, but lying with closed eyes, she often 
saw long black figures which changed into little 
dumpy white ones. 
(Crichton-Browne, 1895, p. 5) 
Crichton-Browne also noted that epileptic attacks come 
on "almost invariably in solitude" and when the patient is 
in a meditative mood, whereas they are prevented when in 
company and when attention is engaged actively, that they 
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can be induced by autohypnotic practices (e. g., gazing 
at one's face in the mirror), and that they are usually 
accompanied by a feeling of loss of personal identity. 
As in hypnagogia, loss of orientation is another known 
phenomenon occurring also in epilepsy, some other features 
of the latter being hallucinatory smells such as those 
of rotting vegetables, rancid fat or burning rubber, 
hypnagogic visions, sounds and voices, dejä vu experiences 
-known collectively as "intellectual aurae". Queasy feel- 
ings, "sexual smells", and "erotic sensations in the geni- 
talia" (Sedman 1966) are also not atypical of epileptic 
visceral sensations. 
Epilepsy, like hypnagogia, contains a wide spectrum 
of alterations of consciousness ranging from minor dis- 
orientations and quasi-hallucinations to full halluci- 
nations and loss of consciousness. The hypnagogic or 
hypnagogiclike quasi-perceptual elements in epilepsy take 
on various forms and, as just noted, appear in all modali- 
ties. In the visual sphere, and often prior to the attack, 
they may develop from flashes of light (e. g., a yellow 
and white flickering) to a complete scene that appears 
as a comic strip (Beck and Guthrie 1956). One patient 
described as part of his attack "'cartoon-like' pictures 
which appeared in his mind's eye, projected as if just in 
front of him and which he could see with his eyes open or 
closed... Although he saw them in his mind's eye they 
were somehow not part of him and experienced as being 
beyond his evocation or control" (Sedman 1964). Penfield 
and Perot (1963) refer to the occurrence of "interpretive 
illusions", that is, to experiences in which, for instance, 
sounds appear louder or clearer, nearer or more distant, 
and visual perceptions are distorted (paliopsias). As 
in hypnagogia, epileptic patients often hear their names 
being called and may, likewise, hear nonsensical comments. 
Thus, Sedman (1964) reported of a patient who "often heard from her : name called 'Edith', which seemed to comeAjust behind 
her, usually like a whisper and in her father's voice". 
Another patient "heard a voice which commented thus 'She 
does look queer - she's not working". Sometimes the 
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experiences are clearly psychotic, such as hearing the 
voices of men and women threatening to kill the patient 
or making insinuations as to the patient's sexual relation- 
ships (Sedman 1964). Not infrequently, voices and visions 
are of a religious character (Slater et al 1963). Some 
epileptics experience a "sense of power and control" and 
have a "clearer head and a clearer understanding" during 
their attacks (Sedman 1966). 
The remarkable phenomenon of autoscopy, i. e., of 
seeing oneself as a double, is occasionally reported by 
epileptics. For instance, a patient reported: "I suddenly 
saw myself as if drawn away from my body - it was like 
looking at a mirror -I was stood a few feet away from 
myself, clearly outlined.... The actual experience to me 
was as if I were dead and looking at my body -I don't 
speak - it is just like somebody standing there" (Sedman 
1966, pp. 6-7). 
Thought and speech disorders like those occurring in 
schizophrenia also occur in epilepsy (see, e. g., McLean 
1964). These include: thought withdrawal and thought 
intrusion, thought blocking, allusive answers, neologisms 
(Slate and Beard 1963). Thoughts and speech in which 
punctuation is almost entirely absent (Sedman 1966, pp-8-9) 
and thoughts and words that succeed each other in the 
manner that hypnagogic visions do are apparently relatively 
common with epileptics. Further, the schizophrenic-like 
aspects in epilepsy are sometimes so strong that cate- 
gorizing the patient as schizophrenic or epileptic becomes 
problematic, as in the case of van Gogh (see Riese 1958, 
and Navratil 1959). Furthermore, Sedman's (1966, p. 8) 
observation that sometimes occurs in epilepsy "a delus- 
ional mood (paranoid mood, delusional atmosphere, or 
Wahnstimmung) in which there is a feeling that there is 
something mysterious or unnatural going on", may be closely 
related to the feeling of a sense of significance encoun- 
tered in hypnagogia. 
An interesting phenomenon that occurs in epilepsy and 
is also linked with hypnagogia is the deja vu experience. 
McKellar (1957, p. 54) found that dejä vu experiences 
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occurred in more than 69% of his subjects, suggesting that 
they are quite common in normal individuals. Reed (1972, 
p. 111) proposes that "perhaps we do experience dejä vu 
more often than we think, but discount the experience or 
fail to pay attention to it". Cognitive psychology con- 
siders dejä vu to be an illusion of recognition: in it 
the person has the feeling of 'having lived through this 
before'. A typical example would be the case of a person 
who visits a particular place for the first time and is 
inundated by a feeling of familiarity and the knowledge 
of the topographical structure of the place, e. g., he 
knows that at the second turning on the left there is 
such and such a shop or house. A distinction is often 
drawn between visual deja vu, as in the above example, 
and auditory deja vu. A typical case of the latter is 
given by McKellar (1957, P. 55): "I feel I know what is 
going to happen a moment before it actually does - also- 
what a person is going to say. In the latter case I feel 
I know each sentence before it is said, but on one occas- 
ion a whole conversation seemed to flash through my mind 
before it was spoken". Buck and Geers (1967, p. 151) 
reported significant positive correlations between inci- 
dence of hypnagogic imagery and visual (r=. 35) and 
auditory (r=. 27) dejä vu in their 91 student sample. Holt 
(1972) in his sample of 28 students found a near signi- 
ficant positive correlation (r=. 32) between hypnagogic 
imagery and "miscellaneous" types of experience, viz., syn- 
aesthesia, recurrent images, hallucinations, body image 
changes, negative hallucinations, and dejä vu (ib., pp. 18- 
20). Earlier, Ellis (1897) had claimed that dejä vu is 
a common experience in hypnagogia, and Isakower (1938) 
related the similarity of feeling between dejä vu and 
"oral cathexis" in hypnagogia. In hypnagogia, in the epi- 
leptic aura and in the experience of dejä vu, Isakower 
(ib., p. 336) argues, "the subject knows, or thinks he 
knows, exactly what is going to happen". 
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Perceptual isolation and sensory deprivation: 
At first sight the evidence for positive relationships 
between, or equatability with, hypnagogic and sensory 
deprivation experiences is conflicting. For instance, 
Freedman and Greenblatt (1960), Freedman et al (1962), 
and Lilly (1956) argued for the presence of hypnagogic 
imagery in sensory deprivation experiments. Zuckerman 
and Cohen's (1964) reports argued for reported visual 
sensations (RVSs) occurring only in wakefulness (see also 
Bexton et al 1954), and Leiderman's (1960) reports con- 
tained RVSs both in wakefulness and in drowsiness. 
The confusion as to what exactly RVSs are plays an 
important part in the interpretation of these phenomena 
illustrated in the various names they have been given: 
"visual" and "auditory images"(Bexton et al 1954), 
"hallucinations" (Vernon 1966; Vernon et al 1958), a kind 
of "hypnagogic imagery" (Freedman et al 1962), "reported 
visual sensations" (Myers and Murphy 1962), "non-object- 
bound (n. o. b) sensory phenomena" (Scheibel and Scheibel 
1962). Further, the term"sensory deprivation"describing 
experimental conditions of absence or marked reduction of 
sensory stimulation is loosely exchangeable with the term 
"perceptual isolation" which stands for invariant or 
monotonous experimental settings (Brownfield 1965). But 
relative invariance of stimulation is one of the necessary 
components of the hypnagogic syndrome, and so is marked 
reduction of stimulation. 
Arguing against the equatability of hypnagogic and 
sensory deprivation imagery, Schacter (1976, p. 464), 
following Zuckerman and Hopkins' (1966) argument that if 
the RVS - hypnagogic parallel were valid then persons who 
doze and sleep frequently during isolation should have 
more RVSs than persons who remain alert, presents evidence 
from the Goldberger and Holt (1958) study showing no 
correlation between RVSs and time spent sleeping and the 
Holt and Goldberger (1961) investigation showing a -. 66 
correlation. He also cites the Zuckerman et al (1962) 
findings that showed a -. 71 correlation between sleep 
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ratings and RVS complexity, and the Murphy, flyers, and 
Smith (in Zuckerman and Cohen 1964) study showing that 
subjects who reported frequent episodes of drowsiness also 
reported less complex RVSs than did alert subjects. 
Schacter's first argument is invalid in that it 
assumes that incidence of drowsy episodes and sleep 
should correlate with RVSs. This assumption appears to 
ignore subject variables, the attentional state of the 
subjects, and the occurrence of sensations in other sense 
modalities - in particular kinesthetic and somaesthetic 
sensations (see Leiderman 1960). People in non- 
experimental situations that feel drowsy and fall asleep 
more often than others do not necessarily have more visual 
hypnagogic hallucinations than the latter: besides indi- 
vidual differences that may show predilection for a parti- 
cular sense modality, the 'actual attentional state of the 
individual is of great import as it may influence the 
latency of the emergence of the experience, the type of 
visual experience (e. g., complexity, meaningfulness), and 
the modality involved - attentional shift is also of 
import. In addition, in sensory deprivation the results 
and their interpretations are also subject to other inter- 
acting conditions such as kind and duration of confinement 
and criteria for the classification of the experiences. 
These objections will also apply to Schacter's second 
argument. In addition, attention must be drawn to the 
observation that RVSs, just like visual hypnagogic exper- 
iences, appear in degrees of complexity (Hebb 1954, 
Myers and Murphy 1962, Zuckerman 1964) stretching from 
dots and lights to lines and simple geometric patterns, 
'wallpaper' patterns, isolated objects, and integrated 
scenes. Zuckerman (1964) reviewing the literature found 
that the majority of reported visual and auditory sensa- 
tions in sensory deprivation experiments were "unstructured". 
It is not unlikely that being "alert" in. the Murphy et al 
study stood for making efforts to think while drowsing 
lightly, in which case complex autosymbolic phenomena might 
have emerged. The parameter of effort to think while drow- 
sing was, unfortunately, not considered in this study. 
380 
Findings in respect to correlations in incidence of 
prior history of hypnagogic images and sensory depri- 
vation imagery are conflicting: Whereas Freedman et al 
(1962) found significant positive correlations (p=. 05), 
Holt (1972) found insignificant correlations (r=. 29). 
However, as Schacter (1976, p. 465) rightly points out, 
prior history of hypnagogic imagery was assessed by means 
of the method of "highly unreliable" questionnaires. 
Interestingly, in two studies by Holt and Goldberger (1959, 
1961) where Block's MMPI scale for neurotic under-control 
was applied the negative correlations with imagery fre- 
quency that were obtained were interpreted as "reflections 
of the intellectual flexibility and emotional freedom 
clusters" forming part of an "adaptive reaction" remini- 
scent of the Foulkes et al (1966) personality findings in 
respect to hypnagogia. 
Further, neither Holt's (1964) argument that to refer 
to all sensory deprivation phenomena as hypnagogic is an 
oversimplification nor Schacter's (1976) contention that 
sensory deprivation phenomena are a potpouri of daydreams, 
fantasies, hypnagogic images, and dreams, are properly 
justified. Reviewing the literature one cannot help but 
be struck by the phenomenological richness of hypnagogia 
within whose boundaries are encountered all of those pheno- 
mena that occur in sensory deprivation. Moreover, a care- 
ful examination of the conditions of hypnagogia reveals 
that both spontaneous as well as experimental induction of 
the state is clearly achieved, as noted earlier, by a 
considerable degree of perceptual isolation. 
Hallucinogenic drug induced states: 
In 1895 Prentiss and Morgan initiated the systematic 
investigation of the hallucinogenic properties of mescalin 
and in the following year Mitchell (1896) drew attention 
for the first time to the similarities of mescalin and 
hypnagogic experiences, and in particular to the autonomous 
nature of both and to the tendency of the former to become 
intensified during sleep onset. Other workers since 
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(e. g., Hollingworth 1911; Klüver 1928a, 1942; Rawcliffe 
1952; 1111cKellar and Simpson 1954; Ardis and McKellar 1956; 
Caldwell 1968) have confirmed Mitchell's observations 
and exposed additional similarities. 
Klüver (1928a, pp. 36-39) identified "form constants" 
that occur in both, viz., (a) grating, lattice, fretwork, 
filigree, honeycomb, chessboard-design, (b) cobweb figure, 
(c) tunnel, funnel, alley, vessel, (d) spiral. In addition, 
he noted that mescalin visions are characterized by (1) a 
large variety of colours, (2) intense brightness, (3) un- 
usual saturation of colour, (4) sourceless illumination, 
(5) lack of "an exact egocentric localization", (6) micro- 
scopic clarity of detail, (7) autonomy, (8) continuous and 
rapid change. The size of the objects seen may be "gigan- 
tic" or "lilli putian" (macropsia and micropsia) although 
Kldver's personal experiences were solely of the latter 
kind. Images of objects sometimes appear distorted 
(dysmorphopsia) and in multiples of themselves (polyopsia). 
In most cases when a subject tries to visualize a parti- 
cular image a similar or related one appears. 
A very interesting observation is the occurrence of 
what Klüver (1928a, p. 56 et seq. ) called the Presque vu- 
experience, that is, the experience of the feeling of 
incompleteness as one views a vision, accompanied by a 
sense of hidden significance often of cosmic dimensions. 
This may often be the result of minute and apparently irre- 
levant details acquiring central importance and signi- 
ficance. Voices are sometimes hallucinated, and so are 
tactile or haptic sensation (e. g., sensations of hot or 
cold in various parts of the body). There are also olfact- 
ory and kinesthetic hallucinations and body-schema distort- 
ions, e. g., shortening or lengthening of limbs, swelling, 
shrinking or melting away of the whole body; "irregular 
muscular contractions may take place in different parts of 
the body, yet the subject may doubt that the muscles 
belong to his body" (ib., p. 95); synesthesias are also 
reported, e. g., the hearing of rhythmically presented 
sounds accompanied by the seeing of small grey circles. 
In some cases the drug may cause such a "marked depression 
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of the muscular system" as to render the subject unable 
to stand up. The ability to think and to organize and 
abstract material diminishes or disappears. Although 
consciousness is narrowed down to the experience of sen- 
sory and imaginal details, these details expand and the 
subject becomes identified with the object (ib., pp. 104- 
105). 
As with hypnagogic experiences there is here also a 
progression from simple to complex (Klüver 1928a; 
Leuner 1963), from clouds of colour and sparkles of light 
to geometric figures and patterns to landscapes, faces, 
and complex scenes. 
Klüver (1942) concluded that mescaline and hypnagogic 
experiences involved the same processes. The same con- 
clusion was reached by Ardis and McKellar (1956) who also 
confirmed the phenomenological similarities between the 
two states emphasized earlier by Klüver. 
Richardson (1969) hypothesized that previous exper- 
ience of hypnagogic imagery should facilitate the exper- 
iencing of meaningful hallucinogenic imagery. Although 
this hypothesis has not yet been tested, Holt (1972) 
found a zero correlation between intensity of LSD imagery 
and previous experience of hypnagogic imagery. McKellar 
and Simpson (1954) and Smythies (1960) found that subjects 
that were given hallucinogenic drugs during sensory depri- 
vation and photic stimulation experienced facilitation in 
their RVSs. 
Photic, pulse current, and direct electrical stimulation: 
Experiments of photic stimulation with stroboscope 
(Costa 1953; Smythies 1960; Freedman and Marks 1965; 
Horowitz 1967), excitation of the brain by means of 
externally attached temporal electrodes (Knoll and Kugler 
1959,1964; Knoll et al 1962), direct electrical stimu- 
lation of the visual cortex (Penfield and Rasmussen 1950; 
Penfield 1958; Ishibashi et al 1964; Horowitz et al 1968; 
Horowitz 1973) have yielded all the phenomena of hypna- 
gogia ranging from flickers of light (Knoll et al 1962) 
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to more meaningful 'objective' phenomena such as animals 
and reminiscences (Penfield and Rasmussen 1950; Penfield 
1958; Horowitz 1978). Oswald (1960,1962) has observed 
that rhythmic photic stimulation for a few seconds causes 
the disappearance of alpha rhythm in the EEG of the sub- 
ject. 
Further, (a) subjects that experience a great amount 
of imagery during photic stimulation fall into the same 
category as those people that experience freely hypnagogic 
imagery, and are characterized by the possession of an 
artistic, sensitive and creative self concept which is 
found to relate to a syndrome that includes imagery (Holt 
and Goldberger 1959; Goldberger and Holt 1961; Foulkes et 
al 1966; Richardson 1969), (b) prior history of naturally 
occurring hypnagogic imagery was found to be related to 
the incidence of visual imagery experienced in rhythmic 
photic stimulation (Freedman and Marks 1965, Richardson 
1969), (c) the external conditions of photic and pulse 
current stimulation are similar to those under which 
hypnagogic imagery occurs, i. e., lying on a bed with 
closed eyes in a dark and quiet room, (d) electrical 
stimulation "induces a state of consciousness which makes 
it more probable that primary-process modes of function- 
ing will prevail" (Mahl et al 1964, p. 36; see also 
Horowitz 1978). 
Eidetic imagery: 
A close look at the literature on eidetic imagery 
(Galton 1880; Allport 1924,1928; Klüver 1926,1928,1930, 
1932; Jaensch 1930; Teasdale 1934; Purdy 1936; Meenes and 
Morton 1936; Luria 1975; Haber and Haber 1964, Doob 1965) 
reveals some striking similarities between eidetic and 
hypnagogic imagery: (a) clarity of detail and three- 
dimensionality, (b) externality of localization with eyes 
open or shut, (c) relatively clear distinction from after- 
imagery and memory, (d) like the hypnagogic kind eidetic 
imagery may occur in other sense modalities (Purdy 1936, 
Sheehan 1968), (e) as with hypnagogic imagery there are 
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"degrees" of "strength" in eidetic imagery, (f) function- 
ally they may both subserve an earlier, easier, concrete, 
percept-like form of cognizing (e. g., Luria 1975; Doob 
1964,1965; Siipola and Hayden 1965). 
But there are also striking differences between eidetic 
and hypnagogic images: unlike the latter, the former 
(a) are scanned, (b) persist much longer (Luria 1960, 
Doob 1965), (c) they always result from definite percep- 
tions, (d) their size depends on the original perceptions, 
(e) often greater control can be exerted over them, 
although this is restricted to normal and plausible alter- 
ations (Allport 1924, Gengerilli 1930). 
A number of writers (Ferriar 1813; Müller 1848; Ward 
1883; F. W. H. Myers 1903; Titchener 1916; Warren 1921; 
Leaning 1925; Goodman and Downey 1929; Leroy 1933; Vihvelin 
1948; Hanawalt 1954; McKellar 1957,1979b; Oswald 1962) 
have drawn attention to the apparently common hypnagogic 
phenomenon called variously "recurrent sensations", 
"cerebral after-images", "recurrent images", "delayed 
after-sensations", "visions of memory images", "persev- 
erations". This phenomenon, according to Leaning (1925, 
p. 298) is one in which "some scene, or some object has 
engaged concentrated attention during the day, and an 
absolute reproduction takes place spontaneously against 
a background of darkness" at sleep onset (see chapter 4). 
Both Hanawalt (1954) and Richardson (1969) have argued 
for the placing of this phenomenon in the category of 
after-images, the latter writer in an attempt to distin- 
guish it from hypnagogic imagery on the grounds that its 
production requires "prolonged and intense retinal stimul- 
ation" (Richardson 1969, pp. 21-23), and the former in an 
effort to distinguish it from eidetic images on the 
grounds that recurrent images (a) occur after long and 
intense stimulation, (b) are located in the retina, 
(c) tend to be seen with eyes shut or in very dim 
light. 
The first arguments in both cases is countered by evi- 
dence which shows that recurrent images may emerge only 
after a short attentive glance (e. g. Vihvelin 1948, p. 368). 
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The second argument is likewise unsupported, and the third 
is only partially true. Further, Richardson's and 
Hanawalt's argument that recurrent images are "idealized" 
images refers only to one kind of hypnagogic perseveration, 
the other being "an absolute reproduction" (see chapter 4 
for a more detailed argumentation). Interestingly, 
Hanawalt closes his paper leaving the argument open to the 
possibility "of breaking up the eidetic image into two 
types: recurrent images and visualizations" (p. 174). On 
the other hand, studies like those carried out by Meenes 
(1933) and Stiipola and Hayden (1965) in which eidetic 
visions were made to combine into a whole (a) with the 
background onto which they were projected, and (b) with 
a succeeding eidetic vision respectively, may throw some 
light on the formation of the "idealized" perseverative 
hypnagogic vision. 
Oswald (1962, p. 96) suggests that no sharp distinction 
can be drawn between hypnagogic, eidetic, and sensory 
deprivation imagery. 
Sleep deprivation: 
Sleep deprivation may be considered as a condition in 
which the need for sleep and the effort to stay awake 
place the subject in a vacillating intermediate state not 
unlike the naturally occurring hypnagogia. Hypnagogic 
experiences in sleep deprivation have been noted by, among 
others, de Boismont (1859), Galton (1883), Kleitman (1967), 
Tyler (1955), Bliss et al (1959), Bliss and Clark (1962), 
Oswald (1962). Bjerner (1949), Bliss and Clark (1962), 
and Oswald (1962) have observed that even slightly sleep 
deprived persons fall into lapses of inattention or take 
catnaps even while standing, sometimes not being aware of 
"falling asleep" (Oswald 1962) and often having "the 
sensation of floating in and out of consciousness with 
their eyes open" (Bliss and Clark 1962, p. 103). The 
latter authors group together "the visions of hypnagogic 
states, dreams, and sleep deprivation" on the grounds that 
they "have in common the elements of semi somnolence and 
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altered electroencephalographic activity" (p. 105). 
The motor behaviour of sleep deprived subjects is 
erratic (Tyler 1955), they mumble and ramble and slur 
their speech, mispronounce, repeat, use jargon, change 
topics for no apparent reason, avoid any task that req- 
uires effort or attention (Morris et al 1960). Oswald 
(1962, p. 185) notes that "much of the behaviour of sleep- 
deprived persons resembles that of drunkenness: sheer 
incompetence during drowsiness". Body-schema and weight 
alterations, time and space distortion (Cappon and Banks 
1960), macropsia and micropsia (Bliss et al 1959; Morris 
et al 1960), tactile hallucinations (Morris et al 1960), 
visual hallucinations such as seeing smoke rising from 
the floor (Bliss et al 1959), women standing in the room 
(Tyler 1955; Brauchi and West 1959), and auditory hallu- 
cinations (Tyler 1955) are not unusual phenomena in con- 
ditions of sleep deprivation. One of Oswald's (1962, 
p. 186) subjects who had bent forward and kissed the EEG 
paper while having "dream-like thoughts about his girl- 
friend" recorded his experience by writing "Leant forward 
and downwards to plant a kiss upon the unmarried letters. 
ECoohch". A subject of Bliss et al (1959) reported that 
he had written a "profound statement" whose ending was 
the irrelevant comment "Owes $8.00". 
Dream scintillations: 
Various workers (e. g. Forbes 1949; Saul 1965; Horowitz 
1966; Horowitz, Adams, and Rutkin 1967; Horowitz 1978) 
have observed what have come to be called "dream scinti- 
llations" or "flickering images", that is, "a rapid 
succession of images which intrude upon awareness and are 
difficult to remember" (Horowitz 1978, p. 16). Saul noted 
that these experiences may last up to half an hour, and 
described them thus: 
One feels as though he has just had a dream which 
he is trying hard to recall. He keeps trying to 
recall it, but while thus striving in vain, that 
which he is trying to recall seems to change. 
Then the realization dawns that this effort to 
grasp the dream is itself part of a dream state, 
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a dream state which goes on like a real dream, 
shiftingly and distractingly, but while one is 
fully awake and in full command of his behaviour 
and feelings so that no one else could observe 
or suspect anything unusual unless it is a 
slight distraction. 
(Saul 1965, p. 286) 
Dream scintillations often appear after physical exertion 
but in the absence of drowsiness. 
Forbes (1949) having drawn a distinction between three 
types of dream, one of which was that occurring "at the 
onset of sleep or during transient dozing in the day", 
he pointed out that "'dream scintillations' were striking 
examples" of the latter type (p. 160). The contents of 
these visual experiences were mostly fragments of recent 
or long forgotten dreams and bits of actual events. 
Throughout these occurrences, Forbes recounts, "I exper- 
ienced a strange dreamy feeling, but at no time did I 
actually doze... They were like the first dream figures 
of ordinary dozing and they kept on coming in a rapid-fire 
sequence" (p. 160). He noted that during the time he had 
this "strange dreamy feeling" his memory was confused: 
he had difficulty in deciding what day it was, and pre- 
viously familiar names and words were either impossible to 
recall or looked unfamiliar. On one occasion he reported: 
About 12: 30, when dream flashes were about maximum, 
I dictated a fairly long letter to a friend. At 
4 p. m., reading over before signing, I noted that 
much of it seemed strange and unfamiliar. The 
letter said what I wanted to say, but I didn't 
recall using some of its phrases. I was surpri- 
sed at reading what I had dictated. 
(Forbes 1949, p. 161) 
The phenomenological similarities between dream scinti- 
llations and hypnagogic imagery need no stressing. More- 
over, as Forbes points out, the former are "striking exam- 
ples" of the latter. Horowitz (1966) suggested the repla- 
cing of the term "dream scintillations" with that of 
"flickering images" on the grounds that these experiences 
take place when the person is not asleep and "because the 
event could be a transient change in consciousness due to 
a minor variant of temporal lobe epilepsy or 
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migraine" (Horowitz 1978, p. 17). The term "flickering ima- 
ges", however, falls short of conveying the mental state 
of the subject, viz., a dreamy "transient change in con- 
sciousness", which is more accurately conveyed by the older 
term. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS OF PART TWO: 
In this part I examined the relationship of hypnagogia 
to a number of states, processes and experiences, and fur- 
ther expanded my analysis of hypnagogic phenomena. In rel- 
ating it to hypnosis it was seen that hypnagogia is a natu- 
ral autohypnotic state -a point already noted in chapter 
7. In particular it was pointed out that hypnagogia and 
hypnosis resemble each other both in their psychophysical 
induction and experiential aspects. That is, they are both 
dependent on relative immobilization and monotony or regul- 
arity of low intensity stimuli that induce in the subject 
relaxation and secure expectancy freeing him from distrac- 
ting affects. Further, they are both characterized by abs- 
orbed and fascinated attention, LEB and regression to pre- 
logical ideational processes typified by the tendency to 
experience the environment as part of oneself, dissolution 
of time and time barriers, i. e., everything (including mem- 
ories) appears to be endowed with the immediacy of the 
present. 
In relating hypnagogia to sleep dreams it was found 
that the former contains experiences indistinguishable 
from the latter both in their physiology and their exper- 
iential aspects. Moreover, hypnagogia appears to encompass 
a variety of types of dream as well as inter-dormitum 
experiences. Further, the fact that the hypnagogic sub- 
ject may retain awareness of his environment and/or aware- 
ness of being 'awake' in a dream argues against the con- 
tention that dreams are not experiences and that state- 
ments about them are mere inferences about experiences that 
did not take place. It was further suggested that hypna- 
gogic experiences in general, and hypnagogic and other 
types of dream in particular, may be correlated with the 
activities of subcortical structures, thus being in 
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agreement with theories and data arguing for the 'regre- 
ssive' nature of dreams and dreamy states. 
In respect to the relationship between meditation and 
hypnagogia, it was, again, found that these share the 
same psychophysical factors of induction, viz., relaxation, 
shift to parasympathetic predominance and hypometabolic 
processes, lowering of EEG to the theta range, psycho- 
logical withdrawal, ego abandonment, receptive attention 
leading to absorption-fascination. Non-analytic (non- 
cortical), 'regressive-primitive' organization of percep- 
tion and thought was found to characterize both states, 
as were the presence of unusual sensations, the feeling 
of intense realness, the feeling of being 'chemically' 
linked with the world, the inability to describe some of 
these experiences, the sense of temporal immediacy. It 
was also argued that meditation tends to lead to hypna- 
gogia and that the latter sometimes breaks out into a 
state of satori or mystical enlightenment. 
Some psi states and processes, viz., telepathy, clair- 
voyance, clairaudience, psychometry, ecsomatosis and some 
forms of trance have also been found to be closely related 
to hypnagogia in their psychophysical induction and their 
phenomenology. Further, hypnagogia was found to be 
highly conducive to psi activities while psi states were 
clearly seen to be hypnagogic in nature, i. e., they tend 
to lead to sleep. Furthermore, the mentation encountered 
in psi states, like that of hypnagogia, is typically non- 
analytic and regressive. Indeed, a close examination of 
physiological and psychological parameters shows that the 
above mentioned psi states and processes are only disting- 
uishable from hypnagogia by the subject's set of beliefs 
and/or the setting in which they take place. 
Hypnagogic mentation was further found to contain most 
of the features that characterize schizophrenic distur- 
bances such as loosening of association of ideas, dis- 
sociated thinking, over-inclusiveness in conceptualization, 
thoughts spoken aloud, hallucinations, delusions, body 
schema alterations. These phenomena, it is argued, are 
the direct result of the LEB which facilitates the 
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breakdown of the filter mechanism operating in the 
normal, waking state. This leads to a loss of figure- 
ground relationships and allows the simultaneous emer- 
gence and crossing of a number of FsOR which often results 
in neologisms, punning, poetic or funny remarks and the 
identification with each other of concepts on the basis 
of apparently tenuous similarities. Schizophrenics, like 
hypnagogists and absent-minded individuals, appear to be 
responding primarily to an internal, imaginal FOR. 
Hypnagogia was also found to be conducive to creati- 
vity, constituting an essential part of the creative 
process and often containing the act of creation itself. 
Specifically, the creative act is characterized by LEB 
and regression to earlier modes of mentation in which 
emerging imagery is accompanied by a sense of reality and 
concepts from apparently unrelated FsOR are connected, 
combined, or fused. Much of this is effected on an un- 
conscious, - nonrational level which, however, can be made 
conscious through the preconscious character of hypnagogia. 
Both hypnagogia and creativity are further characterized 
by their subjects' openness, sensitivity, tolerance of 
ambiguity, self-acceptance, loosening of ego strictness. 
Moreover, since both creative thinking and schizophrenic 
mentation are encountered in hypnagogia, the present ana- 
lysis of the latter clearly reveals common dynamics and 
facilitates understanding of both schizophrenia and 
creativity. 
In regards to the relationship between hypnagogia 
and epilepsy, the former was found to be conducive to 
the occurrence of epileptic attacks during which many 
hypnagogic phenomena, known as "intellectual aurae", are 
also present, e. g., loss of personal identity, loss of 
orientation, visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and 
other quasi-perceptual experiences, thought disturbances, 
deja vu phenomena. Hypnagogic phenomena are also found 
in sensory deprivation or perceptual isolation experi- 
ments which are conducted under conditions very similar 
to those present in the naturally occurring hypnagogia, 
i. e., reduction and relative invariance of stimulation. 
Further, hallucinogenic-drug induced states are populated 
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with quasi-perceptual and cognitive phenomena and 
features which are very similar to those encountered in 
hypnagogia - indeed, it is more than likely that both 
conditions involve the same processes. Photic, pulse 
current, and direct electrical stimulation experiments 
have also yielded hypnagogic l-ike states and phenomena. 
In addition, eidetic imagery displays strong similarities 
with hypnagogic imagery such as clarity of detail, exter- 
nality of localization and three-dimensionality. Sleep 
deprivation is conducive to the occurrence of -hypnagogic 
experiences and dream scintillations are considered as 
striking examples of hypnagogic imagery. 
In concluding this part of the paper two general ob- 
servations can be made. First, all of the above states, 
processes, and experiences possess a measure of hypnagogia, 
that is, they begin with, lead into, or contain strong 
features of, hypnagogia. Indeed, some are indistinguishable 
from hypnagogic experiences both in their phenomenology 
and physiology. In respect to the latter, the shift to 
theta rhythms in the EEG and to a parasympathetic pre- 
dominance have been especially noted. In regards to the 
phenomenology, the similarities were striking both in the 
quasi-perceptual and the cognitive-affective spheres. 
Even in the weakest of cases, a degree of 'dreaminess', 
psychological withdrawal, and primacy of an internal FOR, 
were clearly present. This observation contains at least 
two important implications: one, hypnagogia comprises the 
psychophysical mechanisms by which these states and pro- 
cesses are produced, and two, the study of the nature and 
function of hypnagogia will shed light on the nature and 
function of the above states and processes. These studies 
constitute, of course, one of the major aims of this 
paper. The study of the former, i. e., the nature of hypna- 
gogia, has now almost been completed. I say almost, 
because the study of the phenomenon of LEB, which I con- 
sider an important aspect of the nature of hypnagogia, has 
not yet been offered. This will be undertaken in Part 
Three which deals with the brain mechanisms and function of 
the state. The reason for this is that the LEB partakes 
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both of the nature and function of hypnagogia, that is, 
it both constitutes an aspect of its phenomenology 
(hypnagogia is charcterized by its presence) and lies at 
the basis of its evolutionary role. Its study and anal- 
ysis should, of course, shed light on the possible function 
of the above states and processes. 
The second general observation rising out of the 
discussions in Part Two concerns the interrelationships 
existing among the various states and processes. For 
instance, epilepsy may display all the phenomena of schizo- 
phrenia. On the other hand, some well-known creative 
individuals have been epileptics whereas others have been 
categorized as schizophrenic. Meditative moods have been 
found to be conducive to the onset of epileptic fits. 
The factors of "intellectual flexibility" and "emotional 
freedom", characteristic of creative individuals, have 
been found in subjects most susceptible to the emergence 
of hallucinatory phenomena in sensory deprivation and 
photic stimulation experiments. Hallucinogenic-drug 
induced states have been related to psi, creativity, 
mysticism and schizophrenia: these last four have also 
been related to one another. Since these states and 
processes are, severally, strongly related to hypnagogia, 
their interrelationships strengthen the view that they 
all share of the nature and function of one central state 
or process, namely, hypnagogia -a conclusion that takes 
us back to the significance of hypnagogia as a state whose 
nature and function underpins some very important aspects 
of mental life. 
PART THREE 
BRAIN MECHANISMS AND FUNCTION OF HYPNAGOGIA 
INTRODUCTION: 
In the preceding two parts, in examining the nature 
of hypnagogia and its relationship to other states and 
processes, I made occasional reference to subcortical 
structures as being the brain correlates of hypnagogia. 
In this part I shall, first, substantiate these claims 
with specific data and arguments and, then, examine the 
function of hypnagogia and its role in a wider, evolu- 
tionary scheme. 
As it will transpire from these arguments, the corre- 
lating of hypnagogic experiences with the activities of 
subcortical structures points both to hypnagogia being 
evolutionally older than sleep and wakefulness and to its 
constituting the exemplification of Oneirosis, i. e., the 
need and readiness to have dreams and dreamlike experiences 
periodically throughout the 24 hour cycle. This, however, 
should not be taken as implying that hypnagogia is merely 
and necessarily 'regressive', i. e., that it merely 
constitutes a regression to older modes of experiencing 
and cognizing. There is evidence to indicate that hypna- 
gogia can fulfill the roles of both dreaming and sleeping 
without necessarily relinquishing waking consciousness 
totally, and without some of the harmful concomitants 
of sleep dreams and the full waking state. 
Thus, the correlating of hypnagogic experiences with 
the activities of subcortical structures has a further 
and most important implication: it indicates that the 
'seat' of the mind, so to speak, (and, here, mind is not 
to be taken as being co-extensive with consciousness) is 
'centred' below the cortex, which further suggests that 
not only is the term 'regression' a biased one used by 
cortical, rational thinking, but also that so-called 
'regressive mentation' is a living, practised mode employed 
by human adults for purposes other than those aimed at by 
rationality. The fact that hypnagogia can ride both modes 
of mentation endows it with the additional significance 
of becoming an integrative state, a really "special state" 
by means of which wakefulness may be carried into dreams 
and dream activities be brought into wakefulness. 
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CHAPTER '15 
CEREBRAL CORRELATES OF HYPNAGOGIC VISIONS 
Neurobiologic influences or instigations: 
Galton (1883, p. 115), discussing his own limited 
visual imaginal experiences, suggested that "it is most 
easily conceivable that some very slight physiological 
change, short of a really morbid character, would enhance 
their vividness". 
Indeed, there are several reports relating the appear- 
ance or increase of hypnagogic phenomena to physiological 
sources. Silberer's (1965) "somatic phenomena", for 
instance, show clearly how physiological conditions might 
provide stimuli for the appearance of a hypnagogic 
vision. On one occasion, while in the state of hypnagogia, 
Silberer takes a deep breath and has the hypnagogic 
vision of lifting a table high with someone's help. On 
another occasion, he reports: "I have a rhinolaringitis 
with a painful irritation which forces me to swallow 
steadily. Fever. Sol: Each time I am about to swal- 
low I have a picture of a water bottle which I am supposed 
to swallow; after each swallow another one takes its 
place" (p. 206; see also Oswald 1962, p. 102). Vihvelin's 
(1948) "synesthetic visions", too, are thought to be 
instigated by physiological conditions. One of his 
subjects, for example, reports the following hypnagogic 
experience: "An image appears of the outlines of the 
naked right forearem and hand, - Connection: congestion of 
that part of the right forearm which corresponds to the 
image; the characteristic position of the observer's fore- 
arm corresponds to the shape seen in the vision" (ib., 
p. 372). Archer (1935) describes hypnagogic experiences 
which he believes were clearly instigated by sensory stim- 
ulation and elaborated by imagination. For example: 
To-night I caught dream-scenery in the act of 
evolving from the spots and patterns that one 
always seems to see under the closed eyelids. 
I was lying in my deck-chair after dinner.... 
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Perhaps the eyelid patterns were particularly 
vivid because of the fact that I was facing 
towards a broad band of brilliant moonlight 
on the sea. I was perfectly awake, fully 
conscious of my personality and my surround- 
ings; but I gradually became aware that I 
seemed to be contemplating an Eastern scene - 
an army of men in turbans moving against the 
light of a dim sky. It was vague - no indi- 
vidual figure or detail stood out distinctly - 
yet it was quite pictorial, and had even a certain beauty, or so I thought. That it was built up 
out of the eyelid patterns, I am quite sure. 
The moment I became fully conscious of it as 
an illusion it passed back into the shifting 
shimmer, so to speak, that wavers before the 
closed eyes. 
(Archer 1935, pp. 40-41) 
He, further, describes the hypnopompic vision of a "sunlit 
city" that took place one morning as he lay dozing with 
the sun pouring through his bedroom window straight upon 
his closed eyes. The vision disappeared as he "became 
more completely awake" (ib., p. 42). Also, all the repro- 
ductive and perseverative hypnagogic phenomena (e. g., Warren 
1921; Dallenbach 1924; Slight 1924; Titchener 1916; 
Leaning 1925; Leroy 1933; Hanawalt 1954; McKellar 1957) 
might be included here as they seem to have their basis 
in intense physiological (sensory) stimuli. 
De Manaceine (1897, p. 233) argued that "every nervous 
stimulus, every sensation or idea, leaves a trace in the 
cerebro-nervous system, and thus all the obscure motions 
generated in the organism may afterwards revive tempor- 
arily under the impulsion of consciousness, or spontan- 
eously by the action of unknown causes". She points out 
that Aristotle, too, remarked on this in relation to 
nocturnal dreaming. In fact, Aristotle (1931, p. 461b) 
argued that images in dreams have their basis in "the 
movements persisting in the sense-organs" [some form of 
'perseveration'? ] which are mistaken for true by the 
sleeping organism. Aristotle continues: 
That what we here urge is true, i. e., that there 
are such presentative movements in the sensory 
organs, any one may convince himself, if he 
attends to and tries to remember the affections 
we experience when sinking into slumber or when 
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being awakened. He will sometimes, in the 
moment of awakening, surprise the images which 
present themselves to him in sleep, and find 
that they are really but movements lurking in 
the organs of sense. 
(Aristotle 1931, p. 462a) 
Aristotle is thus pointing to hypnagogic/hypnopompic 
experiences (a) as having a common instigator with noc- 
turnal dreams, viz., "presentative movements", (b) as 
being the precedents (hypnagogic) and consequents (hypno- 
pompic) of nocturnal dreams, and (c) as affording a sub- 
ject the appropriate psychophysical conditions for the 
observation of dream formation. 
Cane (1889) argued that various neurobiologic con- 
ditions such as hyperaesthesia or dysaesthesia of one or 
more nerves, set of nerves, or branches might be the 
cause of numerous subjective experiences and hallucin- 
ations: 
in the optic nerve these conditions cause photopsia 
or flashes of light, flaries, sparks, and stars. 
In the auditory nerve we have humming, buzzing, 
singing, ringing of bells, violent explosions, 
and even words or conversations. In the ol- 
factory nerve and nerves of taste we have odours 
and flavours. Many of these... phenomena are 
simply the hyperaesthetic nerves picking up the 
physiological sights, sounds, and sensations. 
(Cane 1889, p. 1331) 
During sleep and adjacent states, he continues, the 
"intelligism is deprived of its full means to test their 
nature". Cane further argues that "from the chemical 
reactions involved, from biological analogy, and from 
physiological and pathological facts, we have good reason 
to believe that there is actual light produced within the 
body itself" (mainly produced by electrical currents and 
phosphoric acid), and that this light is to account for 
the visual aspect of dreams and dreamy states. 
On a rather occult note, Indian yogis call hypnagogic 
phenomena vrittis and refer to them as "thought-forms which 
constitute part of the relaxed brain's excretory mech- 
anism" (D. M. Baker 1980). They are a form of psychophys- 
ical energy that becomes released from "a fatigued body 
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that relaxes rapidly". Along similar lines, Castaneda's 
(1976, p. 131) don Juan says that "at the moment of death... 
the awareness and memories and perceptions stored in our 
calves and thighs, in our back and shoulders and neck, 
begin to expand and disintegrate". 
Galton (1883, p. 122) hypothesised that "a condition of 
the presentation of visions lies in the over-sensitiveness 
of certain tracks or domains of brain action and the under 
sensitiveness of others, certain stages in a mental pro- 
cess being represented very vividly in consciousness 
while the other stages are unfelt", suggesting a shift 
from individualism to dividualism in the organism - an 
interesting suggestion from which one might infer a 
causative factor for the initiation of personality split 
(see McKellar 1979b). 
It is relevant to mention here a hypothesis advanced 
by Deikman (1969b) in connection with the results of a 
study in meditation. Referring to his subjects' reported 
perceptions during the experiment, he says: 
as far as anyone can tell, the actual substance 
of the perception is the electrochemical acti- 
vity that constitutes perception and thinking... 
If awareness were turned back upon itself, as 
postulated for sensory translation (the percep- 
tion of psychic action - conflict, repression, 
attentiveness, and so forth - via the relatively 
unstructured sensations of light, colour, movement, 
force, sound, smell, or taste), this electro- 
chemical activity might itself be experienced 
as a truth about the outer world, rather than 
the inner one. 
(Deikman 1969b, p. 39) 
Similarly, one could argue that hypnagogic images might 
be psychic actions structured into pseudo-sensations 
through the utilization of sensorial elements such as 
light, colour, sound, etc., that emerge into recognizable 
shapes in the subject's highly suggestible mind. 
One of Leaning's (1925a, p. 152) hypnagogist corres- 
pondents suggested that visual hypnagogic images are due 
to some disturbance of the optic nerve, another pointed to 
indigestion as having much to do with their appearance. 
The latter's remark is exactly the same as that made by 
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Herodotus (1973) in respect to some nocturnal dreams. 
This is, also, very relevant when related to Head's (1901) 
findings on mental changes that accompany visceral dis- 
eases: "Usually the patient wakes up from sleep to see 
the figure or face beside his bed.. -. In other cases 
the hallucination appeared in the evening when the patient 
was sitting quietly in a dimly lighted room" (ib., p. 354). 
"All those sensations that are associated with visceral 
activity, which do not exist in consciousness under normal 
conditions, come to the surface... Reason is displaced... 
That barrier which the normal mind sets between conscious 
life and that of the viscera... has broken down" (ib., 
p. 401). 
De Manaceine (1897, p. 243), on the other hand, sugges- 
ted that "to some extent, this phenomenon is due to the 
amount of blood flowing to the brain". Galton (1883, 
p. 122), too, with reference to sleep, proposed that "the 
absence of common sense during dreams" is due to the 
brain being imperfectly supplied with blood. Ellis (1897, 
p. 286) argued that hypnagogia is "an enfeebled and 
impaired state of consciousness" and that it is "a con- 
dition of mental feebleness and suggestibility doubtless 
correlated with a condition of irregular brain anaemia" 
(ib., p. 285). De Manaceine (1897), viewing the hypno- 
pompic state as a "weakened state of consciousness" (ib., 
p. 197) pointed to a dependence of this state on the condi- 
tion of the vascular system. "The most important condi- 
tion", she noted, "for the development of half-awakening 
and of suggestibility we have found to be different anom- 
alies of the vascular system, and especially a want of 
tonus in the walls of the blood-vessels, and their con- 
sequent inertness" (ib., p. 215 ; see also Lhermitte and 
Sigwald 1941 on vagotony in hypnagogia). In experiments 
on suggestibility she carried out on subjects in the hypno- 
pompic state, de Manaceine noted that subjects woke from 
this state when ideas or emotions of an exciting type such 
as joy or anger were suggested to them whereas the sugges- 
tion of ideas and emotions of a depressive character did 
not have this effect. The explanation offered is that 
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emotions such as anger and joy "are always accompanied 
by a flow of blood towards the brain" (lb., p. 200) and 
this increase of blood flow to the brain terminates the 
hypnopompic state bringing the subject to wakefulness. 
In contrast, other workers, e. g., Maury 1848,1878, 
Guyon 1903, argued, the former mainly on the strength of 
personal data and the latter in respect to subjects suf- 
fering from chorea, that hypnagogic phenomena are causally 
related to brain hyperaemia and cerebral blood congestion. 
Van Dusen (1975, pp. 19-20) suggests that Swedenborg's 
induction and intensification of his hypnagogic and other 
inner experiences was partly due to the building up of 
carbon dioxide in the blood resulting from slowing down 
of breathing. C. P. Kelly (1962) writing on "The natural 
way to healthful sleep" draws attention to the importance 
of the presence of a normal sleep onset state as a pre- 
requisite to sleep, and offers a technique for its induc- 
tion involving increase of the blood's'carbon dioxide 
through shallow breathing. 
Retinal arguments: 
Numerous writers (Gruithuisen 1812; Purkinje: cited by 
Leroy 1933, p. 74; Müller 1826; Maury 1848,1878; Radestock 
1879; Ladd 1892; Binet 1894; de Manaceine 1897; Ellis 1911; 
Hicks 1924; Warren 1921; Griffiths 1927; Archer 1935; 
McKellar and Simpson 1954) presented data and argued that 
hypnagogic imagery is entoptic in origin, that is, it 
rises out of the physiology and chemistry of the eye. Of 
interest in this respect is the list of entoptic pheno- 
mena compounded by Hyslop (cited by de Manaceine 1897, 
p. 238) in regard to visual hallucinations in general and 
which includes: shadows formed on the retina by opaque 
bodies, movements of the blood corpuscles in the retinal 
capillaries, the entoptical pulse, pressure phosphenes, 
electric phenomena, spectra arising from internal causes 
such as increased blood pressure through retina (see also 
White and Levatin 1962; Horowitz 1978). 
Ladd (1892, p. 300) was convinced that there was no 
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shape known to him by perception or by fancy, whether of 
things on the earth or above the earth or on the waters, 
that had not been "schematically represented by the 
changing retinal images under the influence of intra- 
organic stimulation". Like a number of other eminent 
psychologists before and after him, Ladd took a great 
interest in the conditions of the "ideo-retinal light", 
"luminous dust" or Eigenlicht and its part played in the 
birth and formation of hypnagogic images. 
As argued earlier by Cane (1889), the body produces 
a vast number of proprioceptive sensations ("intra- 
organic stimuli"), and in particular a great deal of light, 
which might act as causative factors in the creation of 
hypnagogic images. Indeed, Cane posited that "all the 
phenomena of dreams are fully accounted for by the auto- 
sensations physiologically developed within the body... 
sometimes increased... and modified by external impressions 
and stimuli". More specifically, he pointed out that 
in a dark room with our eyes closed, we see 
that area of dim light called 'the proper field 
of the retina', and across which many see dim 
moving figures and shades of colour, which blend 
and dissolve fantastically. This field gets 
gradually brighter the longer we abstain from 
viewing actual light. 
(Cane 1889, p. 1331) 
Müller (1826) referred to these brilliantly coloured 
images which he never failed to see at sleep onset "with 
closed eyes and in the darkness of the field of vision" 
(ib., p. 20), as being "nothing else than the luminous phan- 
tasms which appear in the visual substance, before going 
to sleep, when our eyes are closed" (ib., p. 49) and which 
originate in intra-organic stimulation, in particular 
through the changes in blood supply taking place in the 
eyes. Maury (1878, p. 79) said that he was often able to 
establish "the passing-over of a luminous image, due 
apparently to the excitement of the optic nerve, into a 
clearly defined figure". Galton (1883, p. 114) pointed out 
that one's field of view in the dark is by no means essen- 
tially black but that rather "a kaleidoscopic change of 
patterns and forms is continually going on". Ladd (1892, 
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p. 300) talked of "a black mass or wall... with a great 
multitude of yellow spots dancing about its surface". 
James (1890, p. 46) made a general principle of the Eigen- 
licht by noting that "any objective stimulus to be per- 
ceived must be strong enough to give a sensible increment 
of sensation over and above the ideo-retinal light". 
And, although "even in conditions of full daylight care- 
ful inspection will reveal luminous dust effects, an 
achromatic mottled atmospheric haze" (McKellar 1957, p. 83), 
it is clear that the optimal conditions for observing ideo- 
retinal phenomana are those of darkness or twilight during 
which James' "increment" is "wholly or mostly absent" 
(ib., p. 82). 
Both Ladd (1892) and Ellis (1911) took this physio- 
logical phenomenon as the basis for the formation of 
dream and hypnagogic visual images. Ladd (1892, p. 299) 
noted that Müller and Maury had both theorised "that 'the 
stuff' of certain dreams or the material made into many 
of their visual dream-images, originates in the scheme 
marked out in the 'retinal phantasms' by chance variations 
in the blood supply", and that their confidence in this 
hypothesis "was chiefly based upon their ability to fol- 
low the retinal phantasms up to, or into, the visual hallu- 
cinations of dream-life". All three agree that "any form 
of unusual cerebral excitement is conducive to very lively 
activity among the retinal phantasms" (ib., p. 300). 
Whereas Müller and Maury drew their conclusions by obser- 
ving "retinal phantasms" turning into hypnagogic images, 
Ladd set himself the task of observing the latter fading 
into the retinal Eigenlicht (ib., p. 300). He was, thus, 
able to wake himself fully after a few minutes of dozing 
and catch the images just as they began to disappear. His 
introspections led him to conclude that "the visual 'stuff' 
of those dreams which occur soon after falling asleep is 
largely, if not wholly, due to excitement of the retina 
by intra-organic stimulation" (ib., p. 301). He further 
explains that the intra-organic changes which take place 
all the time in the body acquire prominence due to the 
increased sensitiveness of the soul owing to the raised 
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threshold of consciousness as regards susceptibility to 
external stimuli. (cf. Aristotle 1931 on the causation 
of dreams, and Arnold-Forster 1921 and Ornitz et al 1967 
on the sensitivity of hypnagogia). 
In dreams and dream onset states, Ladd explains, 
"the superior psychophysical mechanism which combines, ela- 
borates and interprets... data is, for the time being, 
partially freed from the laws which control its action in 
waking consciousness" (Ladd 1892, p. 303) and thus one falls 
victim to the strange, irrational, rapidly shifting and 
intermingling of ideoretinal-born images (see also Cane 
1889: the "intelligism is deprived of its full means to 
test their nature"). In addition, Ladd points out that 
there is "a marked change in the character of the muscular 
adjustment and movement of the eye on passing from dream 
consciousness to waking consciousness" (ib., p. 304) and 
that this "change in muscular sensations and in the feeling 
of fixated attention... is necessary to the recognition of 
the schemata in the retinal field as the components of 
those fanciful things" with which one's "mind's eye" 
holds commerce in a dream or dreamlike state (ib., p. 304). 
In arguing for the ideo-retinal origin of hypnagogic 
visual imagery Delage (1903) distinguishes between objec- 
tive and subjective retinal images. In the latter group 
he subsumes (a) chance images, (b) phosphenes and (c) en- 
toptic lights. The first are after-images of physical 
objects; the second emerge as a result of pressing or 
rubbing one's eyeballs (immediate and consecutive phos- 
phenes respectively) and consist of coloured figures, whir- 
ling and animated geometric "tapestry" patterns and colou- 
red clouds; in the third he distinguishes between entoptic 
lights arising from near-morbid conditions (e. g., blood 
pressure changes, fever, ingestion of certain substances) 
and spontaneous ideoretinal phenomena. It is the latter 
he implicates in the emergence of hypnagogic visual images 
in normal subjects. Like Ladd, Delage (1903,1920) obser- 
ved hypnagogic images dissolving into spots and'patches 
of colour. In addition, he contended that eye movements 
are involved in the observation of hypnagogic visual 
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images. 
As Leaning (1925, p. 388) pointed out in respect to 
visual hypnagogic imagery, all the 'perceptual' features 
present in hypnagogia, that is, brilliancy, rapidity of 
movement, colours, cloudiness, shapes, as well as the 
circularity of form, the impossibility of retaining a 
given combination of elements or repeating it exactly, 
the frequency of bright points, the incessant change in 
the pictures and the fact of the latter being sometimes 
observed as they form, and the indication that in respect 
to health "there is a common factor to a state of over- 
fatigue, of exhilaration, and of fever, in the velocity 
of the blood currents", all point to physiological explan- 
ations. 
Central involvement: 
Nonetheless, it is conceded by all researchers con- 
cerned with the issue that the whole gamut of quasi- 
perceptual phenomena occurring at sleep onset, even if 
we accept that some or all of them have their genesis in 
physiological sources, still they are the result of inter- 
pretation involving the participation of higher cerebral 
centres. Thus, "it is to occult processes which go on 
within the cerebrum", Ladd tells us, "that we must look 
for the physiological antecedent of the elaborated, assoc- 
iated, meaningful and memorable character of the visual 
shapes of our dreams" although "we neither see nor imagine 
aught without participation of the retinal changes in the 
complex psychophysical process" (op. cit., pp. 301-2). 
Hence, "the most elaborate visual dreams may originate in 
intra-organic retinal excitement', and since 
the variety of material in the shape of dots, dashes, 
splashes, lines, and angles which are furnished by 
the retinal Eigenlicht is infinite,... all manner of 
inanimate things, of animals, plants, and human 
beings, seen in dreams, may resolve themselves 
into the phantastic schemata of the retinal field, 
if we can only manage to surprise these schemata 
with an observing critical consciousness. 
(Ladd 1892, p. 302) 
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Conversely, we can choose and determine what we wish 
to see in the ideo-retinal dust since "idea and volition, 
with their correlated psycho-physical cerebral processes, 
can (and to a certain extent) determine the condition of 
the retinal field" (lb., p. 303). 
"The eye", Ellis concurs, "supplies entoptic glimir. - 
erings, and the brain, acting on the suggestions thus 
received, superposes mental pictures to those glimmerings" 
(Ellis 1911, p. 31). Similarly, McKellar and Simpson 
(1954, p. 274) concluded that "the outline of the images 
is provided by the luminous dust, but these are interpreted 
on the basis of such past perceptions as are activated" 
(see also McKellar 1957, p. 81). Hicks (1924) too, had 
contended that 
there can hardly be any question that such 'phos- 
phenes' or 'ocular spectra' do supply the objec- 
tive nucleus of visual imagery in certain dreams. 
And I know not why they should not likewise to 
some extent be operative even in the waking life. 
Indeed, one can in a state of reverie, by fixing 
attention upon these little objects in the field 
of vision, watch the way in which imagery clus- 
ters round them. 
(Hicks 1924, p. 142) 
He went on to argue for "the probability that in imagi- 
nation as in perception there is actually given sense- 
material, for the most part vaguely and confusedly appre- 
hended, and often, no doubt, intra-organic in nature, 
which serves as the pivot around which the suggested 'imag- 
ery' is grouped and hence interpreted in objective fashion" 
(ib., p. 144). 
Warren (1921, p. 455) wrote in connection with his 
(perseverative) hypnagogic images: "I wish to emphasize 
strongly... the fact that they appear unmistakably of 
retinal origin". More specifically, he said that he 
obtained these visualizations, as he called them, "by 
concentrating the attention on the retinal field, endea- 
vouring to form pictures out of what I see, and projecting 
them into a real scene. At first I see only the play of 
indefinite retinal light, which I weave into a picture with 
the help of imagination. Then all at once the picture 
becomes vividly real for an instant" (Warren 1921; see also 
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Griffitts 1927). Delage (1903) considered hypnagogic 
visual imagery to be an accidental correlation of ent- 
optic lights (which form "the substratum"), and cortical 
imaging. He says that "its precise representation of a 
given object is due to the cortical element, its strong 
externalization to the retinal element, and its intensity 
and relative position and stability to the joining of the 
two" (p. 245) 
However, oculo-retinal theories, even when they impli- 
cate the cortex in the production of hypnagogic visions, 
are not totally exempted from criticism. To begin with, 
if hypnagogic visions are indeed peripherally instigated 
the same must be shown to be the case with the rest of the 
hypnagogic imagery (auditory, tactile, etc: cf Alexander 
1909). Moreover, Holt (1972) found no correlation between 
awareness of entoptic phenomena and the occurrence of 
hypnagogic imagery, although this piece of evidence does 
not necessarily argue against the possibility that in most 
instances, as Galton (1833), Ladd (1892) and Delage (1903) 
contended, hypnagogic images form themselves too quickly 
for the relaxing consciousness to be able to observe their 
formation. 
Although some writers (e. g Gelle 1903; Janet: in 
Delage 1903; Leroy 1933) are willing to concede that some 
hypnagogic visions may form out of entoptic lights, others 
(e. g., Herve de Saint-Denis 1867; Alexander 1909; Leaning 
1925; Tournay 1941; Rouques 1946) contend that they are 
essentially centrally initiated and that oculo-retinal 
participation is of secondary importance or even entirely 
unessential. As Alexander (1909, pp. 629-630) put it: 
"there is no discoverable, nor indeed conceivable, rela- 
tion between such [retinal] stimulation and the objects 
perceived. The images are neither perceptions nor illu- 
sions nor inchoate sensations; they are distinctly mental 
constructs,... [they) are externalizations, or, to use the 
word in its common-speech sense, materializations of 
mental facts; that is, they end rather than begin in 
sensation, acquiring a kind of phantasmal reality". 
Leroy (1933, p. 64) points out that hypnagogic visions 
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and entoptic lights may have nothing in common except for 
the fact that they tend to appear under the same condi- 
tions, i. e., a light state of cerebral congestion, eye 
fatigue, need for sleep, closing of the eyes. The nature 
of entoptic lights, he argues, is such that leaves them 
short of accounting for the appearance of hypnagogic vis- 
ions. The latter, he further notes, may appear suddenly, 
complete, and yet not immediately recognizable, i. e., they 
are not formed by a play of imagination on entoptic spots. 
Further, they may develop into, or be replaced by, other 
images which are not visually related to them and thus rev- 
eal no entoptic links (pp. 70-71). 
Gelle (1903), Janet (in Delage 1903, pp. 247-8), and 
Leroy (1933) all argue that ocular movements do not necess- 
arily imply essential or active participation of the eyes 
in the perception of hypnagogic visions: they may simply app- 
ear in response to our natural habit of moving our eyes in 
pursuance of a moving object. Even the fact that they app- 
ear in front of us, Janet argues, might only be "because we 
are used to always seeing objects in the line of vision", 
i. e. in front of us, whereas hypnagogic visions can in fact 
be placed anywhere as they are not truly related to our 
optical space. 
Some support for the above contentions comes from more 
recent arguments in respect to functional similarities of 
imaging and perceiving (e. g., Sheehan 1966; Hebb 1968; 
Zikmund 1972; Finke 1980). If Hebb is right in saying that 
an image is a reinstatement of the perceptual process then 
it would be reasonable to expect involvement of oculomotor 
movements in visual imaging, e. g., hypnagogic visions. As 
Zikmund (1972, p. 379) points out, there is "a certain sim- 
ilarity between the physiological processes underlying vis- 
ual perception and those occurring while sensory experi- 
ence of vivid visual imagery takes place". Thus, "during 
vivid visual imagery complex visual and oculomotor compon- 
ents of visual perception mechanisms are reactivated". 
It would appear then that vivid visual images acting as 
centrifugal impulses from the brain may stimulate the oculo- 
retinal complex which, in turn, may involve the whole 
or part of the visual pathway through 
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movement feedback mechanisms. 
In Finke's (1980, p. 114) view, visual "mental images 
can be functionally equivalent to physical objects and 
events at many levels of the visual system, even those 
levels that are uninfluenced by how objects and events 
might be conceptualized". He further argues that the 
mental images themselves, once formed, cause the visual 
mechanisms to become activated. That is, "images are 
the source of this activation not the product of it" 
(p. 130). He continues, 
According to this view, mental images can stimu- 
late visual processing mechanisms directly. Thus, 
when mental images are formed, these mechanisms 
would respond in much the same way as they do when 
objects and events are observed, resulting in the 
sensation that an image can be 'seen' as if it 
were an actual object or event. 
(Finke 1980, p. 130) 
This view may explain both the findings of Brooks (1968) 
and Segal and Fusella (1970) which showed mental imaging 
interfering with visual perception and the fact stressed 
by various hypnagogists (e. g., Collard 1953) that deli- 
berately formed visual mental images do not blend with 
ongoing hypnagogic visions: the former were presumably 
using the same level of the visual system for both per- 
ceiving and imaging whereas the latter was using different 
levels. 
A source of evidence supporting the hypothesis that 
visual hypnagogic images are primarily centrally initiated 
and that their 'projection' may secondarily activate or 
involve peripheral receptors, e. g., the retina, are reports 
of the occurrence of after-images from hypnagogic-hypnopompic 
imagery, deliberate conscious visualizations, and experi- 
ments with hypnosis. Various writers (Gruithuisen 1812, 
p. 256; Burdach 1839; Meyer 1840 and Strtlmpel 1874: cited 
by de Manaceine 1897; de Manaceine 1897; Alexander 1904) 
reported after-images from dreams and hypnopompic visions. 
Wundt (1863, p. 337), Fere (1885), Meyer (referred to by 
James 1890, p. 67), Binet (1894, reporting on the work of 
Ladd), Klüver (1928), Jaensch (1930), Weiskrantz (1950), 
Oswald (1957a, 1957b, 1959a) reported after images on 
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opening the eyes after intense visualization of a mental 
image with closed eyes. Si ilarly, mental visions 
suggested to subjects under hypnosis resulted in their 
experiencing after-images on opening their eyes (e. g., 
Binet and Fere 1898; Downey 1901; Bechterev 1906; 
Erickson and Erickson 1938). In most hypnopompic cases 
the imagery experienced on opening the eyes is not diffe- 
rent from that being experienced with the eyes closed, 
although it sometimes appears in complementary colours. 
The latter phenomenon is nearly always the case with 
voluntary visualizations and hypnotic cases. Weiskrantz 
(1950) found that with one subject the after-image of a 
visualization followed closely Emmert's Law (see also 
Alexander 1904). Concluding from the results of his own 
experiments and others, Oswald (1957a, p. 98) says that 
after-images can occur as a purely central phenomenon, 
that there are spontaneous after-images in complementary 
colours of images or hallucinations, that the construction 
of a vivid image may involve many of the same neurones as 
are involved in the perception of a similar real stimulus, 
and that (Oswald 1957b, p. 115), in addition to the above, 
on opening his eyes a subject may experience the original 
image projected with a quality of a real sensation. 
Further support for a hypothesis of non-peripheral 
origin and formation of visual imagery comes from some 
old investigations carried out in regard to the dreams 
of the blind (e. g., Heermann 1838, Jastrow 1888, Hitschmann 
1894: cited by de Manaceine 1897, pp. 302-308) which showed 
that when loss of eyesight occurred after the age of 
seven the visual dreaming ability was often retained and 
when sight was only partially lost dream visions became 
distinctly more vivid than physically seen objects. In 
particular, Heermann noted that dream visions were still 
experienced after twenty years of blindness, by which 
time the patient's optic nerves must have had atrophied. 
More recently, Walter and Yeager (1956) found some evi- 
dence suggestive of retention of visual imagery if sight 
is lost in later life. 
Also supporting the theory of "central initiation" of 
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visual imagery in general are the results of a number of 
experiments in direct electrical stimulation of the visual 
cortex (Penfield and Rasmussen 1950, p. 10) and excitation 
of the brain by temporal electrodes (Knoll et al 1962) 
whereby flicker as well as various subjective experiences 
of geometric patterns are reported. The results of Knoll 
et al (1962) study, in which electrical stimulation was 
applied through electrodes attached to the forehead of 
subjects, suggest that "besides the retinal ganglion net- 
work, the visual (but not the temporal) cortex or the 
primary visual pathway participates in the pattern exci- 
tation phenomenon" (ib., p. 67). By comparison, the direct 
electrical excitation of the temporal cortical 'memory' 
centres (Penfield and Rasmussen 1950, Penfield 1958) 
yielded more 'objective' phenomena, e. g., horses and other 
animals, and reminiscences. Although various studies repor- 
ting 'entoptic scintillation' patterns and bright dots 
produced by electrical stimulation and other means (see 
Knoll et al 1962 for historical review and comparisons) 
tend to ascribe these phenomena to stimulation of the 
retinal ganglion cells, more recent research (Ishibashi 
et al 1964) shows that even colours and simple geometric 
forms are found to originate in deep structures of the 
non-dominant temporal lobe during electrical stimulation. 
The implication of subcortical structures: 
However, although electrical stimulation of cortical 
areas has elicited visual imagery it does not necessarily 
follow that these areas are directly responsible for 
the occurrence of such phenomena. As Mahl et al (1964, 
p. 361) pointed out, "electrical stimulation of the tem- 
poral lobe... induces a state of consciousness which makes 
it more probable that primary-process modes of functioning 
will prevail". Penfield (Penfield and Jasper, 1954) 
noted that the surgical removal of those cortical areas 
which yielded specific memories when electrically stimu- 
lated produced no detectable loss of memory. Horowitz et 
al (1968) are led to postulate that "possibly the posterior 
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areas of the hippocampal formation are relatively devoted 
to the regulation of image formation" (Horowitz 1978, 
p. 275). Moreover, there is a considerable accumulation 
of evidence arguing that the destruction of the visual 
cortex does not lead to total blindness (e. g. Klüver 1941; 
ter Braak and Vliet 1963; Weiskrantz 1963; Humphrey and 
Weiskrantz 1967; Brindley et al 1969; Pasik et al 1969; 
ter Braak et al 1971; Schilder et al 1972; Poeppel et al 
1973; Sanders et al 1974). 
Klüver (1941), for instance, found that in monkeys 
whose striate cortex had been completely removed on both 
sides the animals could still respond positively to a 
single light, to the brighter of two lights, could respond 
differentially not only to situations involving a sudden 
appearance of light but also to lights which were contin- 
uously present, could discriminate perfectly stationary 
stimuli, could discriminate two equally large and equally 
bright stimuli. Similar results have been obtained by 
later reseachers working both with animals and humans. 
Ter Braak et al (1971, p. 141) found that certain ('passive') 
optokinetic movements "produced by the movement of the 
majority of contrasts in the visual field [are]' still 
present after ablation of the visual cortex and even 
after total decortication". Sanders et al (1974) found 
that a field defect could localize visual stimuli with 
considerable accuracy and differentiate certain aspects 
of their orientation and spatial distribution even though 
the patient had no awareness of 'seeing' in his blind 
field. 
Weiskrantz and his collaborators found that a patient 
with loss of the striate cortex in the right hemisphere of 
his brain had residual vision in the part of his eyes 
not served by the striate cortex: the patient had little 
trouble discriminating between lines of different orien- 
tations and between noughts and crosses, his visual acuity 
in the blind half field was very close to that in the 
normal field, and performed well in colour discrimination 
tests (Lewin 1975). In earlier experiments with Helen, 
a rhesus monkey whose striate cortex was surgically 
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removed on both sides, Weiskrantz found that the animal 
"could run around a field or a laboratory without bumping 
into objects. She could climb trees and she was able to 
see small objects only 2mm across scattered on the floor. 
In an experimental obstacle course, Helen could pick up 
25 currants in less than a minute without knocking over 
or even touching any of the obstacles placed in her way" 
(Lewin 1975, p. 54). 
Such experiments have led to the formulation of the 
"two visual systems" hypothesis according to which 'focal' 
vision is subserved by the visual cortex and 'ambient' 
vision by the superior colliculus of the mid-brain (see 
Trevarthen 1968; Perenin and Jeannerod 1975; Lewin 1975). 
It would appear that in ambient vision one's visual space 
is subjective in the sense that everything is located in 
relation to one's body; it is also unconscious, as witnes- 
sed by the subjects' denial of 'seeing' a stimulus although 
they can locate it accurately. As Humphrey remarked in 
reference to Helen "in one sense she sees everything, and 
in another, nothing" (Lewin 1975, p. 54). Of particular 
psychological interest are the introspective reports of 
cortically blind patients of the way they 'see' the 
various stimuli. For instance, when Weiskrantz and 
Warrington asked their patient to describe how he deter- 
mined the difference in the pattern discrimination test - 
the test between noughts and crosses - he said he could 
tell the difference by the "'feeling' of something jagged, 
or something smooth" (Lewin 1975, p. 55). This hapto- 
kinaesthetic "feeling" would further strengthen the hypo- 
thesis involving subcortical structures in vision, and 
particularly the superior colliculus since the latter is 
known to be especially concerned with the body's movement. 
Another source of information lessening the importance 
of the visual cortex, this time in respect to hallucinations, 
comes from Schatzman's (1982) experiments with an unusual 
subject. Ruth, Schatzman's subject, would sit with eyes 
open in front of a television screen which displayed chan- 
ging checkerboard patterns that elicited normal visual 
evoked response. Then, by producing an apparition of her 
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daughter and placing it in front of her - thus imaginally 
blocking the screen from her visual field - she would 
cause her visual evoked response to completely disappear. 
Electroretinographic recordings showed that her retinas 
responded normally to external stimuli from light while 
she was engaged in the production of the apparition. 
This would suggest that stimuli entering her eyes were 
blocked before they reached the visual cortex. In other 
experiments in which she caused her apparition to turn 
off or on a real or imaginal light, these imaginal acti- 
vities did not show any effect on her visual evoked res- 
ponse. This, in turn, indicates that the presence and 
activities of the apparition had no direct effect on the 
visual cortex except for blocking stimuli reaching it. 
One is forced to conclude that Ruth's imaginal, and yet in 
a sense very real, activities must have involved the 
visual pathway lying between retina and visual cortex 
and thus point strongly to the implication of the sub- 
cortical pathway to the superior colliculus and thalamus. 
Of interest to this discussion is also Ruth's explanation 
of how she produces her apparitions. She says: "I stop 
paying attention to everything around me. I decide whose 
apparitions I want to make. I remember what the person 
looks like,... And I produce the person" (Schatzman 1982, 
p. 256). 
In contrast to Ruth's deliberate visualizations, James 
(1975, p. 77) describes the case of a blind man, "an 
exceptionally intelligent reporter [who] ... is entirely 
without internal visual imagery and cannot represent light 
or colours to himself" and who one day felt the presence 
of "a grey-bearded man dressed in a pepper and salt suit, 
squeezing himself under the crack of the door and moving 
across the floor of the room towards the sofa". James 
commented that this vision "with the feelings of reality 
and spatial outwardness directly attached to it" was "a 
fully objectified and exteriorized 'idea". 
From the evidence presented I would argue that hypna- 
gogic visions are basically 'central' phenomena correlated 
with subcortical activities. They may rise initially at 
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any level of the visual system, that is, they may be insti- 
gated at a retinal, cortical, or subcortical level but 
they are subcortical in *riature. The retinal components, 
when present, are incidental: they do not develop any 
further in the absence of absorption and psychological 
withdrawal. On the other hand, visions initiated in the 
visual cortex will remain faint visualizations without 
absorption and psychological withdrawal - and they will 
become hypnagogic when these two features are strongly 
present. It has been shown in the foregoing that there 
is a form of physical sight entirely independent of the 
visual cortex. On the other hand, in the production of 
visions, the retina need not be involved at all. These 
observations together with the reports of hypnagogic sub- 
jects that they cannot mix their more vivid hallucination- 
like hypnagogic visions with ordinary memory images and 
visualizations, and the data from Schatzman's experiments 
with Ruth, argue that fully-formed hypnagogic visions 
(as opposed to ideoretinal lights and phosphenes) are 
neither retinal nor cortical in nature. 
Added strength to my claim may come from arguments in 
respect to the nature of alpha rhythm. Golla (1948, p. 107) 
argued that "just as the alpha rhythm would appear to be 
associated with an absence of sensory stimulation of the 
visual system, its presence may also be taken as evidence 
of an arrested or non-cooperative state of the neurones 
subserving the mental processes that is the basis of 
visual imagery" (see also Golla, Hutton, and Walter 1943). 
Other workers who have studied this problem in relation 
to sensory stimulation and state of attention include 
Jasper et al (1935), Bagchi (1937), Williams (1939), 
Mundy-Castle (1951), Short (1953), Short and Walter (1954), 
Walter and Yeager (1956). 
In contrast to Golla's argument above, Oswald (1957b, 
p. 113) found that "subjects could experience changing or 
static visual images without any blocking of the alpha 
rhythm providing that 'difficulty was not, ex periericed in 
perceiving the images" (my underlining). Jasper (Penfield 
and Jasper 1954) also found that Einstein displayed a 
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fairly continuous alpha rhythm while engaged in compli- 
cated mathematical operations which, as we saw in the 
section on 'Creativity', involved a high degree of absorp- 
tion in visuo-kinaesthetic imagery. Thus the suppression 
of alpha EEG appears to be related to the effort of 
vizualizing rather than to the presence of visual imagery. 
Conscious, effortful vizualization may indeed be initiated 
at the visual cortex and thus cause suppression of alpha. 
But as absorption sets in the role of the visual cortex 
diminishes and the imagery becomes intensified taking on 
a life of its own as it becomes increasingly dissociated 
from the cortex. 
It will be recalled that in chapters 4,11, and 13 
reports were presented describing how concentration on a 
mental image would result in the latter becoming vivified 
and either leading to sleep or to the subject's becoming 
'fascinated', absorbed, and kinaesthetically involved in 
the character of the image. These phenomena might be 
better understood if related to the activities of sub- 
cortical structures, functionally severed from retina and 
visual cortex which are primarily concerned with locating 
one's body in external space. This functional severance, 
or deafferentation, from retina and visual cortex might 
also explain the hallucinatory character of the phenomena 
of an advanced hypnagogic stage as well as the fact that 
in general hypnagogic visions are seen in sharp detail 
and yet possess depth and perspective. 
It is true that if the superior colliculus is primarily 
concerned with ambient vision and if hypnagogic visions 
are to be correlated with the activities of this structure 
then the sharp detail of these visions has to be accounted 
for. This contradiction, however, is only apparent and 
due both to the fact that in ordinary wakeful vision the 
visual cortex receives signals from the retinas and 
especially the fovea, and to the fact that under these 
circumstances the superior colliculus, through evolution, 
has come to be deprived of most of the focal retinal infor- 
mation supplied to the visual cortex - most, but not all 
of it. In hypnagogia, in sleep dreams, and in states of 
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intense visual internal absorption the visual cortex 
becomes functionally disconnected from the rest of the 
visual system while the superior colliculus and other 
subcortical strutures are especially activated. This 
need not necessarily imply that cortically blind persons 
would have more numerous and more vivid dreams and hypna- 
gogic hallucinations (although hallucinations in the 
blind are not infrequent: see e. g. ter Braak et al 1971). 
As noted above, the visual cortex may play a part in 
the instigation of at least some of these visions. This 
may be partly due to the fact that we naturally learn 
to rely mainly on the visual cortex which provides us 
with the greatest amount of our focal vision while sub- 
cortical structures are mainly relegated to the task of 
ambient vision. As recent research reveals, however, 
cortically blind animals, although at first behave as if 
they are totally blind, with training they come to see 
almost as well as before they lost their visual cortex. 
Furthermore, as ter Braak et al (1971, p. 141) point out, 
"in the lower animals (birds, reptiles) ablation of the 
forebrain does not produce a state which we would call 
'blindness', so that 'vision' in these animals must be 
achieved by the relatively more powerful subcortical 
structures". However, both evolutionary habit and histo- 
logical connections may play their part in the instigation 
of visions. Moreover, hypnagogic visions are by defini- 
tion and by experience state-bound, that is, they emerge 
in the presence of a particular psychophysical state. 
This state, I shall further argue, is strongly related 
to the activities of certain subcortical structures only 
one of which is the superior colliculus. 
One other area of research that may be brought in at 
this point of the discussion is that encompassing theories 
of "paroptic vision", "eyeless sight" (Romains 1924), 
"eyeless vision" (Ivanov 1964) or "dermo-optic sense" 
(Novomeiskii 1965) developed to account for the phenomenon 
of 'seeing' by means of one's skin. In these phenomena, 
as with cortically blind subjects, visual perception is 
'felt', colours are perceived as "smooth", "sticky", or 
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"rough" (Novomeiskii 1965). Romains (1924) argued that 
paroptic vision was circular, or even spherical, that is, 
one could see in all directions, it did not involve the 
eyes although there was an acquired "cerebro-visual atti- 
tude of accommodation", it involved nasal mucosa in the 
perception of colours, its colour perception was wider on 
the ultraviolet side, it possessed the same characters 
as clairvoyant vision. He ascribed this type of 'visual' 
phenomena to the presence of 'ocelli - rudimentary but 
complete visual organs comprising refracting body, ocellary 
retina and optic fibre - situated in the epidermis and 
grouping themselves into "umbels or composite eyes control- 
led by a paroptic centre which was very likely situated 
extra-cerebrally. 
Although I will refrain from discussing the details of 
these theories I would make a point of drawing attention 
to the fact that the experiences they seek to explain, 
although purportedly visual, are characteristically syn- 
aesthetic and kinaesthetic phenomena which, I shall argue, 
typically characterize the activities of subcortical struc- 
tures. I have already referred to the superior colliculus 
being concerned with bodily movement. As a result of his 
studies in synaesthesia Schiller (1935, p. 468) concluded 
that "perception is produced by sensations of different 
modalities, which often create intersensorial patterns". 
He noted that Werner distinguished between two types of 
sensory function. The first and most primitive, sensation, 
is "a vital event resembling an emotion, in which subjec- 
tive state and object consciousness are not yet separated". 
The second, perception, is a more developed sensory func- 
tion, it is "less emotive and shows a highly differen- 
tiated objectivity". There is an evolutionary ascent from 
sensation to perception, a "development of diffuse 
emotions into detailed perceptions, ascending from a syn- 
aesthetic stage to a stage of differentiated configurations 
which give the impression of a world containing constant 
objects" (pp. 468-9). 
Thus perceptions, which are a later evolutionary 
acquisition, characterize higher mammals, and especially 
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humans, they are localized on the cortex which is of 
recent evolutionary development, they are concerned 
with 'stabilizing' and 'objectifying' sensations. By 
contrast, the synaesthetic stage is evolutionally older 
and should be found in its strongest form in lower animals 
and thus in the activities of the old brain. That this 
is the case can be seen in Schiller's experiments with 
fish. Be writes: 
I myself have trained fish (Phoxinus laevis) to 
discriminate between a bright and a dark chamber. 
In the first series the fish had to choose the 
bright chamber, and in the second series the 
dark one. After the fish had learned to choose 
the right light, I let them choose between two 
unilluminated chambers containing different odours, 
one musk, the other indol. Musk gives a bright, 
indol a dark impression to humans. The fish 
which were trained to choose the bright light 
also chose the brighter-smelling musk; those 
which had learnt to choose the dark chamber also 
chose indol. Neither of the scent was preferred 
to the other before learning to discriminate 
between the lights. 
(Schiller 1935, p. 469) 
In earlier experiments Schiller had established that in 
humans the "so-called 'light' odours give a brighter 
impression than the 'heavy' odours" (pp. 466-7). 
In hypnagogia, strong synaesthesias are not uncommon. 
For instance, Fiollingworth (1911, p. lO1) describes the 
following hypnagogic experience during a concert: 
The orchestra played Grieg's 'Wedding day at 
Hegstad'. In the last bar there were three 
finishing blasts with full orchestra. I had 
become very drowsy and these blasts seemed to 
me to be movements of some huge bug which came 
sailing from behind the wings, suddenly alighting 
on the stage, first on the two hind feet, then 
bringing down the middle pair, and finally the 
two front feet with the final blast. 
(Hollingworth 1911, p. 101) 
Other examples involving tactile, pressure and heat 
sensations turning into visions are given throughout this 
paper (e. g. Silberer 1965; Vihvelin 1948). Commenting 
on his experiments with fish quoted above, Schiller states 
that in these phenomena "there is a transfer of training 
between different senses". In the case of Romains'(1924), 
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Ivanov's (1964) and Novemeiskii's (1965) subjects who 
were trained to 'see' with their skin I would paraphrase 
Schiller's comment and say that in such experiences there 
is a training of transfer between the senses, or perhaps 
even a re-learning of sensing through one nuclear sense 
out of which developed and differentiated sensations 
and perceptions. In hypnagogia, due mainly to the LEB, 
such transfers occur spontaneously. Moreover, the exper- 
iences are felt kinesthetically, thus strengthening both 
the view that hypnagogic imagery is correlated with act- 
ivities of subcortical structures and pointing to the 
possibility that, evolutionally, a nuclear sense, prima- 
rily tactile in character, existed before distant rece- 
ptors were developed. Ontogenetically, this may still 
be witnessed in the way infants presumably perceive the 
world inside and outside them. I shall return to this 
point in the next chapter. In the present chapter I have 
been mainly concerned with pointing out that although 
hypnagogic visions may be peripherally instigated and 
the eyes, visual pathway and visual cortex become involved 
or activated during visual hypnagogic experiences, these 
latter are subcortical in nature and beyond the active 
control of the visual cortex. 
CHAPTER 16 
CEREBRAL CORRELATES OF HYPNAGOGIC NlENTATION: 
In the previous chapter I argued that hypnagogic 
visions are related to activities of subcortical 
structures. In this chapter I shall pursue those argu- 
ments with additional data and, further, propose that 
hypnagogia as a whole is related to subcortical activities 
and that the latter constitute the physiological corre- 
latives of unconscious-paralogical processes revealed 
in this state. 
Costello and McGregor (1957, p. 794) have argued that 
"the higher processes have an inhibitory effect on the 
visual processes - the visual processes being released 
from this inhibition in the drowsy state". Davis et al 
(1935, p. 33) remarked that "'floating' seems to involve 
a depression of cortical activity". Walter and Dovey 
(1944, p. 63) noted that "electrical activity at about 
6 c/s is associated with involvement of subcortical 
structures". Walter (1948, p. 240) further points out that 
the 4-7 c/s theta rhythms recorded from the parieto- 
temporal regions and characteristic of hypnagogia "are 
definitely correlated with a subcortical disturbance and 
particularly with perturbation of the relations between 
the cortex and basal structures". Similarly, Adie (1926) 
and Lhermitte and Tournay (1927) related the occurrence of 
hypnagogic hallucinations to cortico-subcortical pertur- 
bations. 
These observations are of especial importance to the 
present discussion since one of the major tenets of this 
paper has been the claim that the occurrence of hypna- 
gogia is closely related to subcortical activities which 
have gained the upper hand, so to speak, in their syner- 
getic relationship with the cortex, or, at times, have 
become totally dissociated from it resulting in what 
Bremer (19371 has called cortical deafferentation. The 
latter term is, of course, used from the viewpoint of 
cortical supremacy but there is enough evidence to argue 
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that the cortex is more dependent on subcortical struc- 
tures than the other way round. For instance, besides 
the relationship of theta rhythms to subcortical struc- 
tures, the alpha rhythms too appear to "represent bio- 
electric activity in cortical cell dendrites, paced or 
regulated by centres in the thalamus" (Morris 1976, p. 238). 
Moreover, facilitation of slow rhythms and suppression 
or total abolition of cortical activity can be achieved 
through manipulation of subcortical structures. Gerebtzoff 
(1941: cited in Walter 1948) produced abolition of cortical 
rhythms by stimulating the striatum, and by destroying the 
latter he produced an excess of theta rhythm. Also, 
stimulation of the posterior nuclei of the hypothalamus 
produces fast rhythms in the cortex while destruction of 
this area abolishes normal potentials (see e. g., Obrador 
1943). Both, the striate and the hypothalamic effects on 
the cortex seem to be mediated through the thalamus. 
Evidence argues that the intralaminar nuclei of the thala- 
mus are concerned with the regulation of the electrical 
activity of the brain (e. g Dempsey and Morison 1942; 
Kennard and Nims 1942a, 1942b; Morison and Dempsey 1942; 
Kennard 1943; Adrian 1947; Jasper and Droogleever-Fortuyn 
1947). Le Gros Clark (1932: quoted by Jasper, in Penfield 
and Jasper 1954, p. 157) emphasized that the cortex, "from 
a developmental and functional point of view, is to be 
regarded as a dependency of the thalamus and not vice 
versa" and that "the thalamus is the anatomical equi- 
valent of the very threshold of consciousness" (p. 407). 
Walker (1938, p. 277) concluded that the thalamus seems 
to be "the mediator to which all stimuli... congregate and 
become modified and distributed to subcortical and corti- 
cal centres... The thalamus thus holds the secret of 
much that goes on within the cerebral cortex". 
Penfield and Jasper (1954, p. 156, footnote) postulated 
a centrencephalic system which they defined as "that 
neurone system in the higher brain stem which can be 
shown to have equal functional relationship with the two 
hemispheres'. They added that "cortical functions may 
be better understood in terms of their interrelationship 
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with subcortical structures". Jasper (in: Penfield and 
Jasper 1954, p. 179) further notes that on the brain stem 
are found centres, controlling respiration, cardio- 
vascular and gastrointestinal functions and the posture 
and the tone of the body as a whole. He refers to 
Magoun and Rhines' (1946) findings that the mesial 
bulbar reticular formation has powerful inhibitory effect 
on motor centres, spinal reflexes and cortically induced 
movements. Moruzzi and Magoun (1949) and Lindsley et al 
1949) have also shown that the brain stem acts upwards 
as well upon the cerebral cortex. 
Significantly, and in respect to my relating epilep- 
tic 'aura' phenomena to hypnagogia, Jasper remarks that 
The appearance of focal cortical epileptiform 
discharges, either spikes, or sustained high- 
voltage rhythmic activity, does not prove that 
these discharges originate in the cortex. They 
may be evoked potentials or secondary epileptic 
activation of the cortex in response to intense 
bombardment over specific projection pathways 
from subcortical structures... Experimentally, 
we have observed such discharges in numerous 
cortical areas - frontal, sensorimotor, temporo- 
parietal, and occipital - in cats and monkeys 
following local electrical stimulation of 
specific nuclei in the thalamus... If the 
thalamic discharge is sufficiently prolonged 
and intense, a self-sustained cortical discharge 
develops which continues after the thalamic dis- 
charge has ceased. 
(Jasper: in Penfield and jasper 1954, pp. 222 
He further adds that "the specific relationship between 
the bilateral wave-and-spike complex of petit mal epilepsy 
to brief lapses of consciousness, and its electrographic 
reproduction from the thalamic reticular system adds 
considerably to the weight of evidence which relates this 
system to states of consciousness" (p. 224; see also: 
Penfield and Erickson 1941; Jasper and Droogleever-Fortuyn 
1947; Cairns 1952). 
Furthermore, Hunter and Jasper (1949) by implantation 
of stimulating electrodes within the mesial portion of 
the thalamus of cats and monkeys were able to produce not 
only the electrographic picture but also the clinical form 
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of both petit mal and grand mal epilepsy. "Discharges", 
Jasper (Penfield and Jasper 1954) concludes, "in widely 
separated cortical areas, frontal to occipital, and in 
homologous areas of the two hemispheres, can be thus 
triggered from a common pacemaker" (p. 225, footnote). 
Additionally, motor seizures can be elicited by electrical 
stimulation of the globus pallidus, subthalamus, tegmentum, 
and portions of the bulbar reticular formation without 
involving the cortex. For instance: 
From the subthalamus it is possible to elicit 
bilateral myoclonic movements... In animals 
these movements can be obtained after bilateral 
removal of the sensorimotor cortex and frontal 
lobes. Cortical circuits do not seem to be 
involved in their elaboration. They may be accom- 
panied by changes in cortical electrical activity, 
but this seems to be secondary to their more 
direct downstream action upon lower motor centres. 
(Jasper: in Penfield and Jasper, 1954, p. 225) 
On the other hand, Horowitz's (1978; see also 
Horowitz et al 1968) stimulation of the deep structures 
in the limbic system of epileptic patients has elicited 
experiences very similar to those reported in the hypna- 
gogia of normal subjects. For instance, on stimulating 
the left posterior hippocampus of a patient, Horowitz 
(1978, p. 267) reports that the subject "seemed to compre- 
hend some of the meaning of the questions, but his verbal 
contents and tonal inflections resembled those found in 
aphasia, sleep-talking, or hypnagogic speech". One 
patient described his experiences with electrical stimu- 
lation as "trying to grab hold of my memory but can't" 
(p. 272). The stimulations, Horowitz notes, tended to 
produce an altered state of consciousness in which lexical 
cognition was reduced and image formation was enhanced 
or disinhibited, and increased influence of primary pro- 
cess prevailed (pp. 274 and 276). The contents of the 
experiences ranged from sparks, lights and geometric 
figures to complete scenes with animals and humans. 
Some of the latter constituted memories and others were 
condensed pictorializations of the patient's current 
ideas and motives. And yet others were images and 
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hallucinations probably "never actually seen in prior 
experience. Sometimes the self was seen in a way in 
which would not be possible by self-perception" (p. 273). 
As in hypnagogia, many of these hallucinations were for- 
gotten within minutes of their occurrence. 
Drawing on his own findings and on those of MacLean 
and co-workers (e. g., Pribram and MacLean 1953; Cuenod, 
Casey, and MacLean 1965; MacLean 1966) Horowitz (1978, 
p. 275) suggests that either "there are visual pathways to 
the posterior hippocampal gyrus or "this area is, in 
some way, involved in the regulation of image formation". 
In Douglas's (1967) review of the literature on the func- 
tion of the hippocampus in man there is the suggestion 
that the hippocampus is concerned with the maintenance of 
the distinction between images arriving from actual 
perceptions and internal imagery. In view of Pribram and 
MacLean's (1953) findings that the cortex fires into 
the posterior hippocampal gyrus which in turn fires into 
the hippocampus, it might be conjectured that at sleep 
onset when general cortical activity is considerably 
reduced the cortico-hippocampal firing would also diminish. 
But, if at this time of diminution of cortical firing into 
the hippocampal gyrus a certain minimum arousal is main- 
tained, or even deliberately initiated, in the brain stem, 
then the function of the hippocampus as a regulator of 
imagery may be severely upset. Internal imagery may be 
confused with external perception. A certain minimum 
degree of arousal without active thinking ('passive alert- 
ness') is, of course, what investigators and experients 
of hypnagogia indicate as one of the most important charac- 
ters of the state. 
Lhermitte (1925,1932) and van Bogaert (1927) showed 
that lesions of the mesencephalic tegmentum produce hallu- 
cinatory phenomena, and so do lesions or electrical stimu- 
lation of the upper brain stem core (e. g., Olds and 
Milner 1954; Roberts 1958). Lhermitte and Tournay (1927), 
van Bogaert (1927,1968), Lhermitte (1938), Lhermitte and 
Sigwalas(1941), Tournay (1941), Rouqües (1946), Ey (1957), 
and Reimer (1970) have related, and some of them identified, 
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hypnagogic hallucinations with peduncular hallucinosis in 
brain-stem perturbations. Lhermitte and Sigwald (1941, 
p. 236) pointed out that hypnagogic experiences and pedun- 
cular hallucinosis are strongly related by dint of their 
connections with the sleep regulatory system located in 
the mesodiencephalic and peduncular region. They note 
that in mesencephalic disturbances "the subject abandons 
real life and descends into a world wherein are unfurled 
the whims of an imagination free from all restraint or 
support" (p. 236). They also relate hypnagogic hallucin- 
ations and cataplexy, as components of narcolepsy, to 
the loss of mesencephalic tonus. The latter may further 
be implicated in the production of hypnagogic phenomena 
in Huntington's chorea where these phenomena have been 
observed to wax and wane with the illness (Guyon 1903). 
My relating of schizophrenia to hypnagogia may also 
gain extra support here by the findings of various inves- 
tigators indicating disturbances of the reticular system, 
thalamic nuclei, diencephalon and brain stem of patients. 
For instance, Hoskins' (1933, p. 450) findings in respect 
to the urine volume of schizophrenics suggest either 
"disturbed function of the diencephalon or of the poster- 
ior lobe of the pituitary gland". Hoskins also found 
that "the patients as a group showed a characteristic 
hypometabolism" (p. 451) - low blood pressure, slow pulse, 
reduced oxygen consumption. In respect to respiration, it 
is known that alveolar carbon dioxide increases with relax- 
ation (e. g., Haldane and Priestly 1935), and most notice- 
ably in the first two hours of sleep; further, low blood 
oxygen is also known to be one of the causes of hallu- 
cination (Horowitz 1978, p. 248). Hoskins (1933) concluded 
that the metabolism of the resting but wakeful schizo- 
phrenic is strikingly similar to the normal person in 
sleep and that "perhaps the characterization of the 
psychosis as a dream state is worthy of more literal 
acceptance than had previously been supposed" (pp. 454- 
5). Davison (1966, p. 71) found "an excess of diencephalic 
and brain stem lesion both absolutely and relative to 
the hospital population" of fifty schizophrenic patients. 
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He also noted that "basal brain lesions induced a psycho- 
sis more quickly than hemisphere lesions" (p. 73). 
Further, both Staehelin (1944: cited by Mayer-Gross et al 
1969) and Labhardt (1963) propose that a disturbance 
of diencephalic and mesencephalic functions may be impli- 
cated in the onset of psychotic symptoms. Labhardt views 
the appearance of these symptoms as the result of extreme 
stress often threatening the continued existence of the 
personality. Similarly, Fish (1961) associates severe 
anxiety with marked over-activity of the reticular system 
which latter he considers to be the cause of schizo- 
phrenia - which is another way of saying that the indi- 
vidual is presented with a great quantity of internal 
and/or external stimuli resulting in a breakdown of the 
filter mechanism or in "jamming the circuits". Fish's 
claim seems to be supported by experimental evidence 
showing that amphetamine overdosage in normal subjects 
produces a psychosis which is clinically indistinguish- 
able form paranoid schizophrenia (e. g., Connell 1958) 
and in which "the subjective experience is nearly always 
felt to have a dream-like quality" (Mayer-Gross et al 
1969, p. 300). Significantly, and supporting my hypo- 
thesis that hypnagogic and related experiences are associ- 
ated with subcortical activities, Bradley (1957) has 
produced evidence suggesting that in animals amphetamine 
stimulates activity in the reticular system below the 
midbrain level. 
Indeed, the complexity, plasticity of structural 
organization, sophistication in modes of activity, and 
centrality of the brain stem core (see e. g., Amassian 
and de Vito 1954; Scheibel et al 1955; Brodal 1957; 
Eldred and Fujimori 1958; Scheibel and Scheibel 1958) 
have led the Scheibels (1962) to suggest that this sub- 
cortical structure may be implicated in the production of 
n. o. b. (non-object-bound: hallucinatory) phenomena in 
general. They point out that 
virtually every sensory system projects large 
numbers of collaterals from its centripetal 
tract systems into this central neuropil field.. 
the individual reticular cell usually receives 
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impulses from a number of heterogenous afferent 
sources... Several avenues of evidence suggest 
that axonal extensions of reticular cells may 
extend as far peripherally as the receptors them- 
selves, and as far cephalad as the cerebral cor- 
tex. Extensions have been traced into virtually 
every identifiable nuclear area within the central 
nervous system. 
(Scheibel and Scheibel 1962, p. 18) 
The Scheibels (1962) further point to the studies of 
Granit (1955) and Hernandez-Peon (1955) which have shown 
respectively that single retinal cells can be facilitated 
or inhibited by stimulation in the mesencephalic tegmental 
portion of the reticular formation, and that stimulation 
of midbrain tegmentum results in depression of auditory 
potential in the cochlear nucleus. Eldred and Fujimori 
(1953) found reticular feedbacks projecting to muscles. 
Scheibel and Scheibel (1962, p. 23) report that "throughout 
the length of the brain stem, our Golgi preparations indi- 
cate intimate participation of reticular axons collaterals 
and terminals in all cranial nerve nuclei" and that pro- 
bably all of the cortex receives projections from the 
anterior end of the brain stem reticular core. Scheibel 
and Scheibel (1962) summarizing the data on the brain 
stem core indicate that the latter's axonal elements are 
present in the following: 
first, at most, if not all, sensory receptor 
areas; second, at all relays at successively 
'higher levels' of integration and differen- 
tiation; third, at virtually all, if not all, 
cortical sites; and fourth, presumably at all 
intermediate and terminal spinal stations along 
effector pathways. 
(Scheibel and Scheibel 1962, p. 27) 
Thus, the brain stem reticular core appears to be the only 
system that can be demonstrated to be involved anatomi- 
cally and physiologically at each or all levels of neural 
activity (p. 30). 
The most anterior part of the brain stem core, 
the so-called nucleus reticularis thalami, sits 
athwart all diencephalocortical and cortico- 
diencephalic systems and receives collateral 
from both. A cell ensemble within this neuropil 
field projects multiple axon systems both rostrad 
and caudad,... The unique geographical position 
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of this nucleus, and what little is known of 
its axonal trajects, suggests that it may serve 
to control functions in a way similar to the 
screen grid in a vacuum tube. 
(Scheibel and Scheibel 1962, p. 26) 
The control exerted by the brain stem on respiration, 
body-posture, spinal reflexes, and even cortically induced 
movements, may shed light on, among other things, some 
hypnagogically induced psi phenomena, such as OOBEs. 
We saw in the chapter on "Psi" that some subjects learned 
to make use of both ordinary and cataplexic hypnagogic- 
hypnopompic states to achieve "exteriorizations". Fox 
(1962, pp. 126-7) made specific mention of a "pull" he 
felt at the region of the medulla oblongata during the 
initial stages of his "projections". Muldoon (Muldoon 
and Carrington 1965) reports that conscious ecsomatosis 
may be preceded by the feeling of "a tremendous pressure 
being exerted in the back of the head, in the medulla 
oblongata region" (p. 51). This pressure causes, or results 
in, a rhythmical shaking or pulsating of the body accom- 
panied by a "pandemonium of bizarre sensations - floating, 
vibratory, zigzagging and head-pulling" followed by the 
hearing of "somewhat familiar and seemingly far-distant 
sounds" (p. 51). Further, since it is known that (a) in 
medulla oblongata are to be found certain nerves that 
control respiration and that (b) the latter is critically 
involved in the production of both hypnagogic and psi 
experiences, this old brain structure may play an important 
role in the occurrence of both. Cairns (1952, p. 127) 
pointed out that "disturbance of the medulla oblongata, 
as well as of the pons, can produce loss of consciousness... 
With this loss of consciousness there is equally some 
disturbance of breathing or circulation". Again, 
'psychics', practitioners of the occult, mystics and 
meditators (see relevant chapters) speak of employing 
patterned breathing to achieve paranormal effects. In 
some of these cases, as with Swedenborg for instance, the 
"disturbance of breathing" instead of accompanying loss 
of consciousness may lead to an intensification of the 
latter during the state of hypnagogia. 
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The phenomena described by Muldoon occurring spontan- 
eously in hypnagogia are preceded and accompanied by the 
sheer awareness that one exists but is unable to locate 
himself. As Muldoon putit in describing one such experience, 
"I was aware that I existed, but where I could not seem 
to understand. My memory would not tell me" (p. 50). 
Later in life Muldoon learned to induce these phenomena 
followed by ecsomatosis by meanq of a deliberately produced 
hypnagogia. He connects these phenomena with epilepsy 
and reports the case of a woman who "became gifted with 
unusual clairvoyant powers about the same time when she 
became a victim of epilepsy" (p. 104; see also Green 1968b, 
p. 214). 
The argument for the involvement of oldbrain structures 
suggested by the above may further be strengthened by 
reports that psychics tend to function better when they 
are "turned on" by their sitters (see Huson 1977, p. 67 on 
Eusapia Palladino). Further, Garrett (1941, pp. 52-53) 
notes that "in the telepathic experiment the senses of 
taste and smell were serving me as keen agents in knowing 
that a telepathic state was functioning" - smell being the 
most "visceral" of the senses, as Koestler (1978, p. 284) 
rightly remarked, oldbrain structures being known as the 
'visceral brain'. Warcollier (1948, p. 61) remarks that 
"in its most primitive form telepathy may produce coen- 
esthetic disturbances, that is, sensations arising within 
the vital organs, including sensations of a depressing 
type; it may give rise to fits of weeping, vague presen- 
timents or premonitions, confusions or disorientations". 
Supporting my relating hypnagogia to subcortical. acti- 
vities and to states of psi there are reports to the 
effect that "psi in animals has seemed more consistent 
than in humans" (Morris 1976, p. 241) suggesting that in 
humans there may be interference by cognitive eleboration 
and distortion from higher centres in the brain (see also 
Tart 1977). Moreover, some of these results have been 
obtained from precorticate animals (e. g., Reik 1949). 
(For more detailed argumentation along these lines see 
J. R. Smythies, ed., 'Science and ESP', 1971, and in 
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particular Hardy's article on 'Biology and ESB'). 
In placing primary importance on subcortical struc- 
tures in the production of hallucinatory phenomena I do 
not wish to ignore the fact that some of these phenomena 
can be elicited at the cortical level. However, even in 
these cases subcortical structures may still be directly 
or indirectly involved given the data on their wealth and 
structural organization. Cairns (1952, p. 141) points out 
that "destruction of both frontal lobes can result in 
profound disturbance of will, reason and emotion". But 
he also notes that "destruction of the thalami can do 
the same thing and, in addition, may be followed by the 
most profound loss of memorizing or by loss of crude 
consciousness" (pp. 141-2). It has been known for some 
time now that sleep and wakefulness are controlled by sub- 
cortical 'centres' and that consciousness can be dis- 
turbed by lesions at any level of the brain stem and 
thalamus. It is also known that, although they normally 
work in harness, there is a fair degree of independence 
between cortex and thalamus. It is this independence 
which is probably declared 'irrationally' by the thalamus 
and other subcortical structures during hypnagogia. 
It is not here claimed that complete independence is ever 
achieved, or that it is desirable, but that brain pre- 
dominance becomes clearly subcortical. 
Against hemispheric arguments: 
Evidence for hemispheric lateralization (e. g., Sperry 
1968; Sperry et al 1969; Bogen 1969a; Bogen 1969b; Bogen 
and Bogen 1969; Gazzaniga 1970; Galin and Ornstein 1972; 
Galin 1974) might appear to argue that the psychological 
features ascribed to hypnagogia, and to hallucinatory 
phenomena in general, are exactly those claimed to be 
correlated with right hemisphere (or nondominant brain 
side) activities. I have the following points to make 
against such claims. To begin with, such features as 
creativity, holistic approach (as opposed to sequential- 
linear),, artistic activity (e. g., spatial, musical), 
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unconscious processes, are not clearly shown to be pro- 
perties of the nondominant hemisphere as opposed to being 
related to subcortical structures. For instance, in 
experiments in respect to hemispheric laterilization 
Galin (1974, p. 573) reported "relatively higher alpha 
amplitude (a measure of idling) over the right hemi- 
sphere during the verbal tasks, and relatively more alpha 
over the left hemisphere during the spatial tasks. In 
other words, the hemisphere expected to be less engaged 
in the task has more of the idling rhythm". This con- 
clusion is hard to reconcile with data showing bilateral 
continuous alpha during intricate mathematical operations 
(Jasper: in Penfield and Jasper 1954). Workers in the 
hypnagogic area have often spoken of switching to an 
easier (visual) cognitive mode requiring the expenditure 
of less energy. This accords well with the general passive- 
receptive state of the organism at sleep onset. Are we 
to suppose that, on the whole, the nondominant hemisphere 
expends less energy than the dominant one? How can this 
be explained physiologically and evolutionally? By 
contrast, we know that such states of lessened expenditure 
of energy (trophotropic states) are brought on by the 
activities of subcortical structures controlling sleep 
and wakefulness. 
The features ascribed to the nondominant hemisphere 
are clearly ontogenetically and phylogenetically older 
than those ascribed to the dominant one. Should there 
not be anatomical correlations showing the temporal devel- 
opment of these two sets of features, such as the existence 
of animals having a 'right' hemisphere only out of which 
a 'left' hemisphere grew through evolution? On the con- 
trary, we speak of paleocortex and neocortex when we 
refer to brain anatomy in respect to evolution. Decor- 
ticate humans such as anencephalic and hydrocephlic mon- 
sters (Puech et al 1947; Nielsen and Sedgwick 1949) are 
known to display "pleasure, in a babyish way, when being 
sung to" (Cairns 1952, p. 113). Clearly, here we do not 
have nondominant hemispheric appreciation of music. 
Further, as we )saw above, cortically blind humans and 
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animals may respond accurately to visual stimuli and move 
about their environment like sighted beings. They would 
not have been able to do so if visuo-spatial appreciation 
were monopolised by the nondominant hemisphere. 
By contrast, we know that in hypnagogia the brain is 
'driven' by subcortical structures as witnessed by the 
predominating 7 cps rhythms emerging from these areas 
and not from any particular hemisphere. Certain spont- 
aneous physiological phenomena appearing during hypna- 
gogia such as decrease of respiration, dizziness, floating, 
myoclonic spasms are all controlled at the brain stem 
level. As we saw in the chapter on 'Creativity', in 
hypnagogia whole poems are composed, problems are solved 
and meaningful speech is heard, none of which could ser- 
iously be thought of as a hemispheric monopoly. More- 
over as noted earlier, the upper brain stem has equal 
functional relationships with the two hemispheres (Penfield 
and Jasper 1954). The significance of subcortical struc- 
tures in regard to the control they exert on the cortex 
and their relative independence has been discussed above. 
I would further argue that their geographical position and 
evolutionary 'seniority' render them the natural candi- 
date for the 'primitive', 'regressive', holistic, intui- 
tive, etc., features sometimes ascribed to the nondominant 
hemisphere. Further, their axonal connections with both 
cerebral hemispheres suggest that if hemisphere laterali- 
zation is a fact then this fact looks like a development 
out of an initial subcortical laterlization, a point that 
will be expanded in the next chapter. Furthermore, 
Sterman's (1972, pp. 194-5) likening of infants to the 
decerebrate cat lends more support to my hypothesis since 
the 'regressive' hypnagogic mentation has often been com- 
pared to that of the baby or child. Similarly, Cairns 
(1952, p. 113) pointed out that growing babies pass through 
a state of consciousness which takes place without parti- 
cipation of the cerebral cortex. Walter and Dovey (1944) 
have also drawn attention to the fact that in childhood 
the 4-7 cps theta waves are predominant. Fischer (1975) 
has even called alpha states "decorticate" states. In 
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addition, Luria and Vinogradova (1959, p. 90) showed that 
when "the subject was given the appropriate dose of 
chloral hydrate, and the cort'ex was put into an inhibitory 
state" (my underlining) he responded to words by'sound 
association (as opposed to*sense association) -- a pun- 
ning phenomenon common in hypnagogia and in childhood. 
It may, thus, be concluded that not only hypnagogic 
visions and quasi-perceptual experiences but also hypna- 
gogic mentation are related to subcortical activities. In 
the following chapter I shall further expand on this 
theme making use of data and arguments relating to epil- 
epsy and the functional dichotomy between paleocortex and 
neocortex (old and new brain). In doing this I shall 
also return to certain points made in earlier chapters 
both in regards to the nature of hypnagogia and in refer- 
ence to the latter's relationship with meditation, mysti- 
cism, schizophrenia, and creativity. 
CHAPTER 17 
THE OLD VERSUS THE NEW BRAIN: 
In respect to epilepsy, McLean (1964) writes: 
From animal experimentation on limbic epilepsy 
(induced by electrical stimulation) it has become 
evident that seizure-discharges induced in the 
limbic lobe tend in their spread to be confined 
to the limbic system... Such experiments provide 
the most striking evidence available of a dicho- 
tomy of function (or what has been called a'schizo- 
physiology' of the limbic and neocortical systems). 
Patients with smouldering limbic epilepsy may 
manifest all the symptoms of schizophrenia: the 
schizophysiology in question is possibly relevant 
to the pathogenesis of this disease... From the 
standpoint of the patient lying on the couch, the 
schizophysiology under consideration is signi- 
ficant because it indicates that the lower mam- 
malian brain is able to some degree to function 
independently, to make up its own mind. The primi- 
tive, crude screen provided by the limbic cortex 
might be imagined as portraying a confused picture 
of the inside and the outside world. 
(McLean 1964, pp. 10-11). 
In the above quotation McLean makes a number of impor- 
tant remarks at least three of which are highly relevent 
to my current discussion. I shall point them out and 
devote the rest of this chapter to discussing them in 
relation to both the experiential features of hypnagogia 
and adjacent states and to my view regarding the brain 
correlates of hypnagogia expressed in the previous chapter. 
Indeed, I shall expand on the latter to include consider- 
ations as to the genesis and nature of consciousness and 
the feeling of certainty experienced in hypnagogia. In 
previous chapters I used the self-explicit term 'sub- 
cortical structures' to stand for all brain structures 
below the cortical level. Another term bearing the same 
meaning is that of 'oldbrain' which I shall be using both 
as a convenient term and because of its phylogenetic 
connotations: it is collectively older than the cerebral 
cortex which is a mammalian acquisition. 
McLean's relevant remarks are: First, limbic epi- 
leptic discharges tend to confine themselves to the 
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limbic system; second the 'oldbrain' tends to confuse 
the inside and the outside world; third, there is a 
dichotomy of function between limbic and neocortical 
systems, the former being capable of functioning and 
'deciding' to a certain degree independently of the 
neocortex. 
In discussing McLean's first observation we must bear 
in mind that not all 'oldbrain' discharges confine them- 
selves to the subcortical level. As we saw in the pre- 
vious chapter, electrical stimulation of oldbrain areas 
may reflect clearly on various parts of the cortex acco- 
mpanied by the occurrence of related subjective experi- 
ences. Indeed, McLean is careful to qualify his remark 
by saying that limbic discharges tend to be confined to 
the limbic system. However, in limbic epilepsy there is 
a spread of the discharge within the limbic system indi- 
cating that a number of emotional and cognitive states 
may result. This is supported by the results of experi- 
ments in electrical stimulation of various loci in the 
oldbrain of animals which show that there is a spilling 
over effect resulting in 'abnormalities' of experience 
and behaviour, e. g., aggressive behaviour may combine with 
sex or oral activity. (Interestingly, in a wider context 
and under normal circumstances babies and dogs are obser- 
ved to have erections during feeding). Conversely, 
surgical ablations in which certain parts of the limbic 
lobe are excised lead to an abolition of fear and anger, 
inability to avoid painful situations, loss or perver- 
sion of instinctual feeding, mating, and parental habits 
(e. g., Miller et al 1960). It is possible that in those 
cases of epilepsy where fear precedes and/or accompanies 
the seizure, the experienced emotion of fear is a mere 
concomitant due to the excitation of a particular limbic 
area; it may be related to an instinctive cognition (at 
the level of the oldbrain) that the seizure may terminate 
the organism's life or incapacitate it in the event of 
having to defend itself against a predator during the 
fit. On the other hand, mystical experience may be the 
result of defunctionalization (akin to surgical ablation) 
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of certain parts of the oldbrain and stimulation of others 
(in addition to a suppression of the higher cortical 
centres). 
As we saw in chapter 10 the meditator seeks to make 
away with emotions, desires, external and internal noise, 
and achieve maximum psychological withdrawal (stages 
1-5 of meditation). Two of the first emotions to go are 
those of fear and anger: they are conquered partly by 
the physiological switch to the parasympathetic system 
and receptive mode, a process that leads to the near 
elimination of all characteristic sympathetic-adrenal 
features. Painful situations, likewise, are not avoided: 
they are ignored (e. g., pain from crosslegged positions 
is not avoided but simply ignored, attention being 
directed elsewhere). Also instincts are supplanted in 
meditation exercises: feeding and mating instincts are 
often denied 'normal' expression and are sought to be 
sublimated in ascetic abstinence. Interestingly, reports 
of mystical experiences are replete with expressions 
such as "divine marriage", "divine union", "becoming 
one with the Absolute", "becoming one with the Cosmos", 
"realizing the Cosmos within oneself", "expanding and 
embracing the World". It is not at all difficult to see 
how such expressions stand as symbols representing sub- 
limated oldbrain instincts. It is tempting to argue that 
the mystic, unlike the ablated animal, has the choice of 
returning to the pre-mystical (pre-ablated) reality. 
However, the issue is debatable. The long and persis- 
tent meditation and other exercises practised by mystics 
are unlikely not to have created permanent 'conditions' 
in their nervous system. This 'physiological' argument 
is supported by the experiential reports of mystics who 
declare that their experiences carry with them a form 
of permanent mutation. An important symbol in mysticism 
is that of the ouroboros, the snake that bites its own tail, 
symbolizing the return to the unconscious (and perhaps 
to autosexuality). The return to the unconscious or the 
union with the Absolute suggests an abolition or weakening 
of boundaries that distinguish the internal from the 
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external (proprioceptive and exteroceptive sensations) , 
the 'I' from the 'It' (loosening of ego boundaries). 
These, as we saw earlier, are characteristic feature 
of hypnagogia. They are also to be found in epilepsy. 
As Sedman (1966, p. 2) observed, "in any epileptic dis- 
turbance which leads to a change in the level of con- 
sciousness there will be a concomitant, indeed inseparable 
change in self awareness. In some patients this is acco- 
mpanied by states of a sense of unreality either in the 
self and/or in the environment", i. e., by a sense of 
depersonalization and/or derealization - however, the 
obverse feelings of a strong sense of reality and aware- 
ness are experienced just as often. Sometimes epileptic 
experiences start with "a feeling of power and ability to 
control things, there is a sense of expectancy, I have a 
clearer head and a clearer understanding of everything" 
(Sedman 1966, p. 3). They may "occur in an ecstatic 
setting in which epileptics see the heavens open, hear 
God speaking. Others feel transfigured, or even feel 
themselves God" (p. 3). As one epileptic reported: 
Everything appeared more vivid, as though they 
were in technicolour. I felt as though I was 
part of it... the experience was so lovely 
I didn't pay attention to anything else... I 
had so many visions, I can't pick out any one, 
every vision was replaced by another - like 
a continuous beautiful picture. I saw Saint 
Joseph and Our Lady... I seemed to be in it 
all the time, with them everything seemed placid... 
There was the sound of lovely music - so 
beautiful I couldn't describe it. 
(Sedman 1966, pp. 3-4) 
Sedman (p. 4) comments that "the mood is always elated 
but a sense of tranquility is the rule, together with 
a pantheistic experience of merging with the environ- 
ment or the visual phenomena". Changes in body schema, 
which Sedman associates with states of depersonalization, 
are also often reported by epileptics. 
In respect to his observation that the oldbrain tends 
to confuse the inside with the outside world, McLean (1961) 
further remarks that the clinical impression gained is 
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that these patients "show an exaggerated tendency to 
regard the external world as though it were part of 
themselves. In other words, internal feelings are blen- 
ded with what is seen, heard or otherwise sensed in 
such a way that the outside world is experienced as 
though it were inside. In this respect there is a 
resemblance to children and primitive peoples" (quoted 
by Koestler 1978, pp. 288-9). The suggestion of onto- 
genetic regression is quite clear. The characteristics 
of internalization and incorporability we observed in 
hypnagogia, and through it in hypnosis and meditation, 
are also present. An example quoted by Koestler (1978, 
p. 289) of an epileptic girl who as a child walked into 
the sunlight and reported the experience of having "a 
funny taste in my mouth of the sun", shows not only 
internalization of the environment but also a crossing 
over or translation of one group of perceptual data 
into another, just as in hypnagogia auditory, kinesthetic, 
tactile and other sensations turn into visual images, 
and visual imagery often carries with it tactile kines- 
thetic and other sensations. This crossing over from 
one sense modality into another is another form of 
boundary dissolution: information input is one modality 
is shared by another. These phenomena which in mild 
forms are encountered in normal individuals in the 
waking state (Galton 1883) take on exaggerated forms 
in pathological states (e. g.,. Luria 1975) and in hypna- 
gogia (e. g., Hollingworth 1911, Vihvelin 1948) where 
they are reported along with other, "aura-like", exper- 
iences (McKellar 1957, p. 70). 
McLean's observation that there is a dichotomy of 
function between the limbic system and the neocortex, 
may further strengthen the possibility of a switch to 
oldbrain predominance during hypnagogia and related 
states. As Koestler (1978, p. 286) remarked, the old- 
brain occupies a strategically central position for 
correlating internal sensations with perceptions from 
the outside world, and for initiating appropriate action 
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according to its own lights, i. e., it has its own 
mental processes: it emotes and thinks - though 
not in verbal concepts (ib., p. 283). He quotes 
McLean who says that although the oldbrain may be too 
primitive to analyse language 
yet it might have the capacity to parti- 
cipate in a non-verbal type of symbolism. 
This would have significant implications 
as far as symbolism affects the emotional 
life of the individual. One might imagine, 
for example, that though the visceral brain 
could never aspire to conceive of the 
colour red in terms of a three-letter word 
or as a specific wave-length of light, it 
could associate the colour symbolically with 
such diverse things as blood, fainting, 
fighting, flowers, etc., - correlations 
leading to phobias, obsessive-compulsive 
behaviour, etc. Lacking the help and 
control of the neocortex, its impressions 
would be discharged without modification 
into the hypothalamus and lower centres 
of affective behaviour. Considered 
in the light of Freudian psychology, 
the old brain would have many of the 
attributes of the unconscious id. 
One might argue, however, that the 
visceral brain is not at all unconscious 
(possibly not even in certain stages 
of sleep), but rather eludes the 
grasp of the intellect because its 
animalistic and primitive structure 
makes it impossible to communicate 
in verbal terms. 
(McLean: quoted by Koestler 1978, p. 287). 
We have already seen that in hypnagogia mentation 
is 'paralogical'. In particular, it has been observed 
that the notion of similarity is often totally replaced 
by the notion of sameness both on the quasi-perceptual 
level of imagery and on the conceptual level. This is 
not a matter of mere weakening of consciousness - 
implying only a reduction of higher cerebral activity - 
but also a shift to oldbrain activity. An extreme 
shift of functioning to the oldbrain may lead to one or 
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the other (or even, in really extreme pathological cases, 
to both) of two polarized groups of activities: (a) des- 
truction, and (b) preservation, or, to use Koestler's terms, 
self-assertive tendencies and integrative tendencies, which 
may be linked physiologically to the sympathetic and para- 
sympathetic system respectively. In either case, however, 
when the shift is considerable the resulting logic is 
peculiar to the locus of excitation. For instance, 
in many epileptic limbic seizures the attack is known 
to be accompanied by fear or anger suggesting the 
excitation of a particular limbic locus correlated 
with these emotions; the "lost feeling" that usually 
accompanies this type of attack can only manifest 
itself as a form of realization that one is 'cut off', 
isolated, in danger of dissolving and losing one's 
identity, implying that identity (self-assertion) is all- 
important to the patient. On the other hand, the mystic's 
ecstatic feeling of being one with everything manifests 
integrative tendencies and points to a different limbic 
locus as the cerebral correlate of his experience of 
bliss. Interestingly, in respect to animals, McLean 
has localised drives and self-preservation instincts 
in the lower half of the limbic system and those 
tendencies and instincts concerned with the "preservation 
and welfare of the species" in the upper part (Koestler 
1978, p. 292). However, on the human level one must be 
careful not to be too literal in drawing parallels with 
the animal kingdom, as human emotions and cognitions 
have wider aspects than those of animals; bearing this 
qualification in mind the dichotomy between self-assertive 
and integrative (self-transcending) tendencies may be 
maintained. 
In many pathological cases resulting from anxiety and 
emotional stress there may ensue a violent shift to 
the opposite (self-transcending) tendencies, i. e., one 
is forced to 'let go', causing in its turn a reaction 
towards the originalmode activity: the final result being one of 
vacillation between the two extremes, first affirming and then negating 
a state of affairs. This kind of 'simultaneous' assertion-and-negation 
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is also characteristic of mystical literature (e. g., Suzuki 
1974). In both cases the contradictions are resolved: 
in the latter case by 'seeing' that in a real sense (real 
to the subject) all terms contain their opposites (indeed, 
are their opposites), in the former case by creating what 
Koestler (1978) has called. a "close system" in which noth- 
ing can be contradicted. This kind of logic in which 
everything can be related to everything else i. e., in 
which there are similarities among all points of refer- 
ence, and ultimately everything is the same, is to be 
encountered in hypnagogia and its presence in this state 
may enable us, as already pointed out, to understand not 
only pathological and mystical mentation as analysed 
above but also the possible mental mechanics of creativity 
(see Part Two). 
As argued, the logic of the oldbrain as it manifests 
itself in hypnagogia and adjacent states traverses and 
intersects a number of FsOR drawing them together and 
relating them in paralogical ways, that is, it assimilates 
and relates images and concepts where 'logical' rules 
would not allow such activities. For instance, if the 
different modalities were thought of as different FsOR 
then synesthetic phenomena, as they occur in hypnagogia 
and adjacent states, are clearly paralogical: there is 
clearly no logical connection between, for example, the 
beats of an orchestral piece and the feet of a giant 
insect lowering itself on a stage (Hollingworth 1911) or 
between a flower and an umbrella (Calton 1883). Also, 
autosymbolic phenomena in general are paralogical; and 
suggest, furthermore, how the oldbrain can work indepen- 
dently of higher cortical centres. In. hypnagogia the 
links in the succession of images are sometimes tenuous 
and often impossible to trace 'logically'. Conceptually, 
too, the association between ideas becomes tenuous or 
even entirely 'irrelevant': as one thinks about something 
following a logical, orderly, series of associations, 
ideas entirely irrelevant 'pop in' which then change 
one's original chain of thoughts and lead to ideas or 
conclusions totally unconnected with the initial thought 
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or problem. Sometimes the solution or 'end' thought cuts 
itself free from the original one and appears to exist 
self-contained, for its own sake, the initial thought 
completely forgotten. On other occasions, the 'end' 
thought is strongly connected with the original one and 
presents itself as a solution, or a conclusion, or even 
as a major premise to the initial thought which is thus 
turned into a conclusion. More often than not, the inter- 
vening thoughts (and/or the initial thought) are lost and 
one is left with a solution that has no problem attached 
to it. This state of affairs is not at all uncommon in 
hypnagogia (e. g., Arnold-Forster 1921). Where the inter- 
vening thoughts are missing the subject may jump out of 
hypnagogia shouting "Eureka", full of the certainty of 
inspiration, sometimes, to spend long and arduous hours 
trying to fill in the missing logical steps. If and when 
the steps are discovered and are shown to be logically 
sound and valid the 'end' thought is then recognized as 
the result of inspiration. Not, infrequently, however, 
the half-remembered steps are shown to be invalid, i. e., 
they are 'irrelevant', and empirical research may show 
both the steps and the conclusion are invalidly carried 
out. And yet the person concerned may still remain with 
a feeling of certainty that something significant or even 
momentous was presented to him and that somehow a way 
could be found to justify his feeling of certainty. 
It can be seen from the above that hypnagogia con- 
tains innumerable combinations of 'irrelevant' associations 
both imaginal and conceptual that may simply remain, on 
the one side, 'irrelevant', and on the other prove them- 
selves highly relevant: their relevance is often a matter 
of our readiness and ability to fit them into a consis- 
tent FOR. This is not always possible, which means that 
we may always have mystics and lunactics in our midst, 
people who would not accent that their 'intervening' and 
'end' thoughts are indeed irrelevant when these are not 
shown to be valid in our universe of discourse. This is 
not merely to say that the theoretical frameworks of such 
individuals are alien to, and outside, the possibilities 
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of what can be structured according to rules of logic, 
but more importantly, that their FsOR are derived from 
paralogical experiences, that is, experiences which 
carry with them their own logic and type of understanding. 
As pointed out elsewhere in this discussion, to refer 
to hypnagogia as a strange state is simply to make a 
value judgement from a 'logically' operating waking state. 
But in the depths of hypnagogia itself no such judgement 
is possible: strange associations, and what would appear 
to be some kind of inductive and/or deductive activity 
do not seem at all strange while they are being carried 
out. It is possible that the hypnagogist the mystic, 
the 'psychic', and the 'mentally disturbed' person have 
entered into a state of mind that permits paralogical 
associations between a number of universes of discourse. 
These associations appear to them perfectly 'logical' and, 
as far as they are concerned, it is the rest of the pop- 
ulation who are unable to see them. Van Dusen (1975, 
p. 21), for instance, tells us that Swedenborg "felt it 
was possible to deal with universal ideas, understanding 
at once all the implications of a thing" by means of the 
method of "passive potency" (i. e., passive volition, 
as in hypnagogia). Plotinus (O'Brien 1975), before him, 
had practised a similar techinque which he adapted from 
Plato's "Symposiun". This method of inspiration which 
appears to circunvent or cut through logical steps, cuts 
both ways: it may lead to great and empirically verifi- 
able inspirational insights, or to irrelevant gibberish- 
ness (although it might still be argued that calling such 
statements 'unverifiable' may simply mean that we are 
only capable or willing, to try and verify statements that 
render themselves verifiable according to our principles 
of verification). 
Koestler (1978) suggests the concept of "bisociation" 
as an explanatory notion of the conceptual activity 
wherein two disparate FsOR ("matrices") such as the 
phases of the moon and the tides can be brought together. 
In fact, as noted earlier, in hypnagogia the subject is 
often faced with more than two intersecting "matrices" and 
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may thus be said to be 'multi-sociating'. In this acti- 
vity the individual does not associate 'logically' but 
'paralogically'. In the above well known example of 
Kepler's associating the phases of the moon with the tides, 
Galileo is said to have dismissed the idea as an "occult 
fancy". Similarly, in the case of hypnagogia we talk of 
the irrelevancies of imaginal and conceptual associations 
which, not infrequently, have been labelled 'occult', 
partly because of their apparent autonomy but also because 
of their paralogical nature: the hypnagogist often becomes 
overwhelmed by an 'understanding' which defies logic. A 
contributory factor to this 'understanding' is a diffuse 
feeling of a sense of significance, a feeling of certainty. 
This indescribable feeling which accompanies many of our 
everyday activities and is found to occupy a prominent 
position at the end of a logical transaction, is found in 
hypnagogia to accompany the unfolding of imagery. When 
it does not take a more defined form as the "accompanying 
sense of significance" in relation to specific imagery 
contents (see chapter 7), it is diffused throughout the 
imaginal experience and endows it with reality. This, I 
believe, is due again to the presence of 'fascination' 
which prevents the hypnagogist from 'contemplating' and 
allowing alternative possibilities to enter into the game. 
I have underlined 'alternative possibilities' because 
alternatives as such do not exist in this state. In hypna- 
gogia there are no negations, there is no possibility of 
negation. Everything that appears carries with it the 
confirmation of its own existence. The associations in 
hypnagogia, too, are confirmations of their existence. 
It is as if every image shouts 'I am', and the hypna- 
gogist does not hear this, he knows it. Thus, associ- 
ations arising in hypnagogia are paralogical in more than 
one respect: (a) they do not always follow known rules of 
association (e. g., proximity, likeness, contrast), (b) they 
cut across FsOR linking them together in 'irrelevant' 
ways. It is thus not surprising that they may relate, as 
in McLean's example above, disparate things such as blood 
and flowers. 
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Hypnagogia also manifests, like the hypnotic and 
mystical states, the paradox of combining single-mindedness 
(non-reflection) and self-transcendence (non-self'- 
assertiveness). We might get closer to understanding the 
paradox if we keep constantly in mind the hypnagogist's 
sensorial and conceptual 'openness', that is, his all- 
round sensitivity and suggestibility: the hypnagogic 
associations are not 'irrelevant' associations, because 
each one is fascinätedly attended to. irrelevant data 
are such data as cannot be 'logically' related to a FOR, 
and in hypnagogia there is no single 'logically' construc- 
ted FOR. in the depths of hypnagogia the subject is 
peculiarly single-minded since every image, concept, or 
association 'fascinates' his attention. This state of 
total attention, we may remind ourselves, is similar to 
that reached by the meditator who sets out deliberately 
to concentrate his whole attention on a particular object, 
image, or conept. The hypnagogist's fascination which 
eliminates or prevents 'secondary consciousness' also 
eliminates his self-assertive tendencies. And here may, 
perhaps, lie an important clue to man's acquisition of 
self-consciousness: its genesis may lie in those instincts 
and needs generally related to the activities of the 
sympathetic-adrenal division and the emotions of hunger, 
fear, and anger. 
It is often argued that the cerebral cortex is the 
"apparatus which generates awareness" and that (Koestler 
1973, p. 282) "the ancient structures in the brain-stem may 
be said to provide the 'raw material' of awareness: the 
the reticular formation 'arouses' the animal; the hypo- 
thalamic structures contribute the visceral component; but 
ultimately 'the cerebral cortex is to the brain what 
the television screen is to the television set and what 
a radar screen is to the pilot' (McLean 1958)". Inter- 
estingly, McLean, as noted above, localized self- 
preservation and species-preservation instincts in the 
lower and higher parts of the limbic system of animals 
respectively. These two groups of instincts are also 
linked respectively to the sympathetic and parasympathetic 
446 
divisions of the autonomic nervous system. In humans, 
Koestler (1978) has elaborated the first group into the 
"self-assertive tendencies" and the second into the "self- 
transcending or integrative tendencies". It will be 
noticed that there is a mutual implication between self- 
preservation and self-assertion: one asserts oneself in 
an effort to preserve oneself, and vice versa, he pre- 
serves himself in self-assertive efforts. The point to 
be made here is that the very notion of self-assertion (or 
self-preservation) implies the assumption that even at the 
primitive level of the oldbrain there is some form of 
self-awareness. Fear and anger may have arisen out of 
this need for self-preservation and this is, perhaps, why 
in an epileptic fit loss of identity and fear sometimes 
manifest simultaneously (thus also pointing to a locali- 
zation within the limbic system of a strongly correlated 
physical discharge and the accompanying emotions). Thus, 
through the need to preserve itself as s more or less 
self-contained unit, an animal asserts itself on its 
environment: but without some form of awareness of itself 
as a separate unit self-assertion would be meaningless - 
and the support for this argument lies in the ability to 
feel fear and to be angry, which emotions, again, would 
be utterly meaningless and useless if they did not stem 
from some form of self-awareness (obviously, it is not 
to be argued here that all animal life emotes, at least 
not in an anthropomorphic sense, but that every time an 
animal attacks or withdraws from an attack it asserts 
itself at no matter what primitive level). This leads me 
to the formulation of the hypothesis that the oldbrain does 
not merely provide the "raw material" of awareness but 
also contains the locus 'responsible' for the genesis of 
self-awareness. The "schizophysiology" talked about by 
McLean and Koestler and argued as being the "insufficient 
co-ordination between archicortex and neocortex" 
(Koestler 1978, p. 273), may in fact lie - in so far as 
there is such a state of affairs as "schizophysiology" - 
not so much in the lack of co-ordination between the two 
brains as between the self-assertive and self-transcending 
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tendencies generated in the oldbrain, and perhaps only 
emphasized and exaggerated by the neocortex. 
The relevance of the above to the nature and function 
of hypnagogia lies in my description of the latter as a 
state characterized by integrative features and self- 
transcending tendencies, viz., LEB, abandonment, lack of 
fear of identity loss, the implicit assumption that the 
environment is not inimical, the tendency to incorporate 
(internalize) and merge with the environment, lack of fear 
and loss of self-awareness (or, perhaps, willingness to 
relinquish self-awareness) and, therefore, absence of 
self-assertiveness (the latter also due to the attentional 
features of hypnagogia, viz., absorption, fascination). 
This might enable us to (a) tentatively correlate psycho- 
logical aspects of hypnagogia with the activities of 
physiological loci in the oldbrain, and (b) speculate as 
to its evolutionary genesis and significance. 
If self-awareness, no matter how diffuse or intense, 
is closely related to the self-assertive instincts whose 
cerebral correlates - if McLean is correct - are localized 
in the lower limbic system, then we may speculate that 
self-awareness may also be correlated, at least in part, 
with the same or adjacent loci and, as I shall argue pre- 
sently, with those activities of the reticular activating 
system responsible for wakefulness. Conversely, we would 
seek for the cerebral correlates of self-transcendence 
in the upper part of the limbic system, where McLean 
localized the "species-preservation" instincts, and in 
the thalamus (this contains the assumption that a human 
being transcends itself in species-preservation activities 
which are in fact only one type of manifestation or rami- 
fication of a human's self-transcending tendencies). 
Hypnagogia, characterized by the features enumerated 
above, is here considered 'integrative' and 'self- 
transcending'. The hypothesis that its correlative cere- 
bral locus is to be found in the upper brain stem is 
inferred from the activities of the RAS and its reci- 
procal influence on, and by, other oldbrain structures. 
As Magoun (1963b, p. 174) noted, "it is now possible 
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to identify a thalamo-cortical mechanism for internal 
inhibition, capable of modifying activity of the brain 
partially or globally, so that its sensory, motor, and 
higher nervous functions become reduced and cease. The 
consequences of the action of this mechanism are the 
opposite of those of the ascending reticular activation 
system for internal excitation" (see also Magoun 1963a). 
That is, the reticular activating system mediates arousal 
and alertness whereas the diffuse thalamic system medi- 
ates depression of cortical excitability and sleep. The 
medial thalamic nucleus (intrinsic nuclei) is, in fact, 
that part of the brain that induces rhythmic spindling or 
alpha activity in the cortex which can be blocked by 
higher frequency electrical stimulation from the RAS. The 
fact that the thalamus also acts as a relay station direc- 
ting afferent sensory signals to the cerebrum may have 
a great deal to do with the genesis of hypnagogia. In 
the upper brain stem the raphe system is thought to in- 
hibit the RAS and yield quiet (NREM) sleep. Giant reti- 
cular neurons are, further, implicated in the production 
of PGO spikes and paradoxical (REM) sleep in the cat. 
(The subject of relating hypnagogia to sleep and dreams 
is dealt with in more detail in chapters 5 and 9; here I 
shall concern myself with 'localization' of awareness and 
self-awareness). 
Thus, it is often argued (e. g., by James 1890; Oswald 
1976; Koestler 1978) that not only is awareness dependent 
on cortical activation but that consciousness is cortical 
activity, and that without the contribution of the old 
"visceral" brain to provide us with internal bodily sen- 
sations "the experience of our own reality would probably 
be absent" (Koestler 1978, p. 289), we should be, as 
McLean (1958) put it, "disembodied spirits". 
Now, I believe these arguments to be wrong because. of 
the criteria on which their premises are based. To begin 
with, these arguments appear to view consciousness as a 
behaviourist 'thing' entirely dependent on the criteria of 
arousal, i. e., a subject loses and gains consciousness 
(like one loses and finds a pencil) depending on his EEG 
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record and whether he opens his eyes or shows other signs 
of wakefulness or sleep, as the case may be. A consider- 
able research has been carried out to demonstrate the 
existence of "collateral afferents" that branch off into 
the reticular formation from the main sensory pathways 
that carry signals, through relays, to the cortex. 
Attaching these findings to the above criteria of conscious- 
ness the conclusion is drawn that "when human consciousness 
is lost it is because of failure on the part of the reti- 
cular formation to send up a sufficiency of the non- 
specific or 'activating' nerve impulses to the cortex" 
(Oswald 1976, p. 37); for instance, in animals that were 
given ether or the barbiturate drug thiopentone, electric 
shock to the leg resulted in a cortical evoked potential 
identical to that registered in the animals' normal state 
whereas "the evoked potential in the reticular formation 
of the anaesthetized animals was now very small" (ib., 
p. 38). In this example the cortex is clearly responsive 
(awake? ) to stimuli during the time the animal is drugged 
while the reticular formation's responsiveness is greatly 
diminished, and is thus surmised by the experimenters 
that the animal was not conscious of the stimuli. But 
surely, if signals reaching the cortex do not cause the 
animal to respond this does not support the notion that 
consciousness 'resides' in the cortex; on the contrary, 
it rather suggests that the 'residence' of consciousness 
is to be sought for in the reticular formation. In other 
experiments (e. g., Kleitman 1967) decorticated animals 
continued to show variations of wakefulness. Moreover, 
these same decorticate animals manifested loss of learned 
habits demonstrating how learning is dependent on the 
cortex and, thus, how the cortex is responsible for the 
acquisition of relationships with the environment and, 
therefore, reversing McLean's argument that if the cortex 
were on its own it would yield "disembodied spirits": It 
would seem that it is the cortex that supplies the 'reality 
anchorage' or reality testing principle so often invoked 
as a criterion for distinguishing between wakefulness and 
dreams or hallucinations. 
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It is tempting to distinguish between 'cortical cons- 
ciousness' and 'oldbrain consciousness' as indeed both 
McLean and Koestler do. But when such a distinction is 
drawn - and I myself clearly advocate a distinction - 
the criteria on which the distinction is made are of the 
utmost importance. My position is that the cortex is 
there to fill in the logical steps, so to speak, between 
the major premise and the conclusion which are provided 
by the oldbrain. As Penfield (1938,1957) and Thompson 
(1951; also Thomson and Nielsen 1948) argued, the system 
essential to consciousness is not to be found in the 
cortex but in subcortical structures, and in particular 
"where the mesencephalon, subthalamus and thalamus meet". 
Thus, consciousness as such does not 'reside' in the 
cortex but in the oldbrain: it is the specificity of 
consciousness that the cortex is concerned with - it 
provides sequential temporal and spatial relationships, it 
particularizes and individualizes existence. Major 
premises, universal ideas, and generalizations in a sense 
stand outside logic: they are assumptions supplied by the 
"integrative" aspect of the oldbrain which also provides, 
in its "self-assertive" aspect (separation, differentiation), 
the means for developing the specific logic of deduction 
and induction. It is possible that these tendencies of 
the oldbrain, as they are taken up and particularized by 
the cortex, become not only mentally but also physically 
polarized into the two cerebral hemispheres. If this be 
the case, it would be of great interest to seek for 
physiological relationships between areas of the oldbrain 
and areas of one or the other of the cerebral hemispheres 
that show strong and consistent correlations with "self- 
transcending or integrative" tendencies, on the one hand, 
and "self-assertive" tendencies, on the other. A tenta- 
tive hypothesis at this stage might argue for correlations 
(a) between the upper limbic system, right cerebral hemi- 
spheres, and integrative tendencies, and (b) between the 
lower limbic system, left cerebral hemisphere, and self- 
assertive tendencies. 
That the notion of consciousness is generally 
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and wrongly based on behaviourist criteria and environ- 
mental 'reality anchorage' can be seen in the attributes 
of consciousness offered by Oswald (1976, p. 37). These 
are: skilled response, the utilization of former 
experience, a subsequent statement of having been aware, 
and being now able to describe what passed. "Wakefulness", 
Oswald continues, "by contrast, is possible without a 
cortex. Consciousness and wakefulness are not synonymous". 
Although I do not intend to argue here against Oswald's 
distinction between these two concepts, especially since 
I have contended that a person may be asleep and yet 
conscious, I would like to draw attention to the fact 
that meditators intensify their internal experiences by 
(a) ceasing to think. analytically (cortically) and 
(b) increasing reticular formation excitation through 
breathing exercises that create excessive carbon dioxide 
in the blood or a shortage of oxygen (see also van Dusen 
1972,1975, on Swedenborg), and that creative individuals, 
as we have seen, reduce cortical - especially, lexical. - 
activity (e. g., Woodworth: "Often we have to get away 
from speech in order to think clearly": Koestler 1978, 
p. 80) as a form of induction into the 'act of creation'. 
It is also interesting to note that orientation to a 
sudden fearful or angering stimulus is known to be imme- 
diately followed by a mementary decrease of respiration 
thus, again, bringing about an intensification of aware- 
ness (excitation of the reticular formation) through 
increase of carbon dioxide in the blood. 
As argued earlier, concentration and absorption 
(fascination) on a mental image (whether in hypnagogia, 
psi, or in meditation) may lead to a dissociated state 
wherein numerous automatic acts may, be carried out giving 
a semblance of behavioural wakefulness which is also 
accompanied by all or most of the physiological criteria 
of wakefulness, and yet the subject's consciousness may 
be mostly or completely withdrawn, (e. g., A. Huxley's 
case: Erickson 1969), 'miles away' as we might say. 
Absorbed attention, also, is known to decrease respiration 
and oxygen consumption and thus excite the reticular 
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formation and intensify awareness; in psi, meditation and 
in hypnagogia (a) attention is absorbed, (b) respiration 
decreases, (c) cortical activity decreases (as partially 
evidenced by EEG recording and verbal reports): in such 
cases we have reports of experiences that are said to be 
"more real than reality" (this is not to say that all 
meditational and all hypnagogic experiences are of this 
nature; this would depend on the stage, among other 
things). 
It would thus appear that awareness and self-awareness 
have at least some very strong correlations with oldbrain 
activities and may, in this respect, throw some light on 
ontogenetic views of awareness that argue, for instance, 
that for the child "the universe is focussed on the self 
and the self is the universe" (Koestler 1978, p. 191), a 
state of consciousness Piaget called "protoplasmic" or 
"symbiotic" (see also Schachtel's "Metamorphosis" 1959). 
This state of consciousness which is said to be encoun- 
tered in meditation and psi is also met with at some 
stages of hypnagogia, and may further render explicable 
the intensity of awareness experienced by epileptics 
during limbic epileptic attacks. That is, if awareness 
(sheer, selfless awareness as might be experienced in a 
'fascinated' state) and self-awareness (rooted in instinc- 
tive self-preservation) are 'localized', as I have been 
arguing, in the oldbrain, then the epileptics' intensi- 
fication of awareness, or self-awareness, as well as 
their frequent 'clouding' of consciousness, might be 
explained as the excitation of particular areas of the 
reticular formation or medial thalamic nuclei (perhaps 
in combination with the excitation of some other areas 
of the oldbrain, e. g., the increased spiking of the 
giant reticular neurons that course from the pons to the 
thalamus and precede PGO spiking and REMs in sleep). The 
reports of dreamy mental states or aurae also preceding 
the seizures suggest that some medial thalamic activity 
is present that perhaps 'causes' a lowering of ERG 
(decrease of cortical activity). But decrease in cortical 
activity does not necessarily mean decrease in awareness. 
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If (a) the medial thalamic nuclei, somehow, 'dampen' the 
cortex and yet continue to receive sensory information 
which does not reach the cortex, or reaches it diffusedly, 
and (b) because of the dampening of the cortex the extrin- 
sic association nuclei never manage properly to convey 
information to the association areas of the cortex, we 
may then have a situation in which (1) cortical activity 
is reduced (which might be taken to mean, inter alia, a 
quantitative reduction in logical thought processes), 
(2) exteroceptive and proprioceptive information reaches 
and crowds the thalamus but does not reach the cortex and 
is thus never processed 'logically' (this might explain 
the synaesthetic and paralogical nature of hypnagogic 
experiences). Since the medial thalamic nuclei form part 
of the limbic system we may thus 'localize' in this area 
Koestler's "self-transcending" tendencies and McLean's 
"species-preserving" instincts and thus also point to a 
physiological locus whose activities might be correlated 
with the psychological features of hypnagogia and related 
states. 
In addition, it is possible that if the extrinsic 
association nuclei of the thalamus are prevented from, 
or hindered in, conveying concerted information to the 
relevant association areas of the cortex, including the 
memory areas, some of the results might be experiences not 
only of synaesthesias but also of their opposites, agnosias, 
as well as cryptomnesias, and deja vu and its opposite 
jamais vu. The feeling of loss of identity, too, may 
have its physiological genesis in this area of the old- 
brain if, as argued, information from the senses is not 
conveyed from the thalamus to the cortex thus depriving 
the individual from his 'reality anchorage' and the pre- 
servation of his 'ego schema' that normally enables him to 
relate himself to his mental and physical environment: to 
reiterate a point made earlier, in order to retain - indeed, 
to acquire - ego schema and reality anchorage, information 
must be relayed to the cortex where the senses are so 
minutely represented, indicating how the logic of 3D 
reality is 'localized' on the cortex. 
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Deja vu and the feeling of certainty: 
The dejä vu phenomenon and hypnagogic experiences may 
both be correlated with activities of the same or adjacent 
oldbrain loci if the dejä vu is seen as a phenomenon in 
which the feeling of familiarity is derived from past 
experiences of similarity of perceptual or imaginal organ- 
izing activity but in which certain crucial 'anchoring' 
elements are missing, viz., the links with the appropriate 
cortical association areas. Thus, in the deja vu we may 
have an experience in which not all the necessary per- 
ceptual-conceptual and imaginal connections have been 
effected, and in which the notion of similarity becomes 
identified with that of sameness, as is often the case in 
hypnagogia, that is, the experience is the result of 
oldbrain activation and cortical inhibition: the latter 
prevents the carrying out of detailed analysis and com- 
parison between the relevant perceptual and conceptual 
data in the cortex, whereas the former intensifies imagi- 
nal activity in the oldbrain thus drawing attention to 
features (both perceptual and conceptual) which, though 
insufficient to enable the inhibited cortex to draw 
logical conclusions, are enough for the activated old- 
brain 'logic' to decide that the present situation 'is 
the same as' another which may, in fact, have never 
taken place (or which there is no way of showing that it 
has ever taken place). This character of 'jumping to 
conclusions', not bothering with the missing links or 
intervening steps, is typical, as we saw, of the oldbrain 
paralogical mentation. The feelings of strangeness-yet- 
familiarity and certainty are shared by both the deja vu 
and hypnagogia. Referring to the former, Crichton-Browne 
(1895, p. 1) writes: "Those who are visited by it know well 
that it is no ordinary reminiscence, no error of memory, 
no mere poetical fancy, but an absolute identification of 
the present with the past". The experience is further 
characterized "by vagueness as to present surroundings, 
and an increase of consciousness in another direction", 
(ib., p. 2) both, we may note, features of hypnagogia. In 
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the "absolute identification of the present with the past" 
we may also have a very similar attentional state to that 
encountered in hypnagogia and which, as noted, invests 
the latter with a feeling of temporal and spatial imme- 
diacy. Crichton-Browne further remarks that in dreamy 
mental states in general 
[there is] a negative element in the loss of 
control of the higher centres and a positive 
element in the raised activity of other nervous 
arrangements, permitting of new cerebral combin- 
ations somewhat akin to those which take place 
during the activity of the imagination and flight 
of genius. .... A dreamy state it may be con- 
veniently called, and dreamy in some aspects it 
undoubtedly is, and yet, strictly speaking, it is 
not comparable to a dream, for it involves a 
residuum of object consciousness larger than a 
dream contains and a volume of subject conscious- 
ness to which a dream rarely reaches. It has 
peculiar features of its own and stands in the 
same relation to a dream that the darkness of an 
eclipse does to the more frequently occurring 
darkness of night. 
(Crichton-Browne 1895, p. 2) 
The relationship between dreamy mental states (and, 
in particular, hypnagogia), activities of imagination, and 
creativity have been discussed in chapter 13. Of imne- 
diate relevance are Crichton-Browne's remarks that in a 
dreamy state there is (a) "loss of control of the higher 
centres", (b) "raised activity of other nervous arrange- 
ments", and the implications of his argument in respect to 
(c) the resultant "new cerebral combinations". The first 
remark although acceptable in its general form it is 
debatable in its negative formulation. It is of functional 
and evolutionary importance to decide whether the lowering 
of cortical activity is to be considered a "loss" or an 
organismic reorientation and whether the cortex 'allows' 
the oldbrain to come into its own or the latter 'forces' 
the cortex into relative inactivity due perhaps to a 
circadian need. Although the whole subject of the function 
and evolutionary significance of hypnagogia is discussed 
in chapter 19, it would be relevant to quote here Isakower 
(1938, p. 345) who, from a psychoanalytic angle, argued 
that "it is the repressed instinctual wishes, charged as 
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they are with id-libido, which occasion the [hypnagogic] 
phenomenon, with Cs [i. e., cathexis] quality". Leaving 
out a possible argument against the notion of "repression", 
the remark clearly argues that hypnagogia is not the 
result of loss of cortical activity but of oldbrain 
desires and instincts, that is, increased oldbrain acti- 
vity appears to 'force' cortical activity into a decrease. 
Support for this argument also comes from the Hodes et 
al (1952) studies in which it was found that changes in 
the EEG activity of drowsing monkeys appeared in sub- 
cortical structures, e. g., the caudate nucleus, earlier 
than in the cortex. Crichton-Browne's second remark may 
be translated in our present terms into the raised acti- 
vity of the oldbrain and the switch to the parasympathetic 
system. The third point is debatable only in the fact of 
placing stress on the "new cerebral combinations" as 
being in any major way responsible for creative activity. 
The position held in this paper (and argued throughout) 
is that in hypnagogia and adjacent states there is a 
switch to oldbrain activity, and whatever new combinations 
arise in the cerebrum or elsewhere during these periods 
are interpreted by the oldbrain in oldbrain 'logic'. 
The existence of a strong relationship between the 
deja vu experience and hypnagogia was argued by Ellis 
(1897) who also linked the two with "the prodromal stage 
of the epileptic fit" and sleep-dream consciousness 
(pp. 285-6). Ellis considered these kinds of phenomena as 
taking place "in the presence of an enfeebled and impaired 
state of consciousness". He suggested that "it seems as 
if externally excited sensations in such cases are recei- 
ved by the exhausted cerebral centres in so blurred a form 
that an illusion takes place and that they are mistaken 
for internally excited sensations, for memories" (p. 286). 
He further considered hypnagogia and the inter-dormitum 
as one and the same enfeebled state of consciousness 
wherein paramnesic experiences are liable to take place. 
The latter are experiences in which the "subject has an 
overwhelming conviction that even the minute details of 
the present experience have been experienced before" 
457 
(pp. 284-5), that is, they are of the deja vu character, 
or they may consist of the false realization that they 
have been experienced in real life in the past whilst in 
fact they have only been experienced in a dream, i. e., they 
are dream experiences that appear as memories of real 
events. Ellis concluded that "the hypnagogic state with 
its heightened liability to autosuggestion is really 
allied to the paramnesic state" and that "just as in the 
hypnagogic paramnesia the vivid and life-like dream or 
internal impression is raised to the class of memories 
and becomes the shadow of a real experience, so in waking 
paramnesia [i. e., dejä vu] the external impression is 
lowered to the same class" (ib., p. 287). 
Now, it has been one of my main arguments that in 
hypnagogia external input becomes blurred and internalized, 
and in this respect I am in agreement with Ellis; the 
blurring, however, is not necessarily the result of 
"exhausted cerebral centres", although under such con- 
ditions similar events are reported. As argued above, 
this is probably more of a case of shift in organismic 
orientation involving oldbrain activation and cortical 
inhibition. The cerebral centres Ellis refers to are 
not necessarily exhausted but merely (a) inhibited, 
(b) whatever information slips through to them is insuffi- 
cient for the carrying out of sound and valid logical 
activities, (c) in their inhibited state they are pro- 
bably also 'rearranged', i. e., their pattern of neuronal 
activity is not that of wakefulness. In addition, in 
the defa vu experience and in most of hypnagogia there is 
a feeling of conviction and certainty in respect to the 
experience and, as Ellis himself notes, "there may be a 
subjective sensation of increased power" (ib., p. 287; see 
also Sedman 1966, p. 3), all of which suggest a positive 
interpretation in terms of increased oldbrain activity 
as opposed to a negative interpretation stressing cortical 
enfeeblement. As argued earlier, if the cortex 'houses' 
the ability to analyse and objectify temporally and spati- 
ally, it is by this very ability incapable of certainty 
and conviction, but only of deliberation and the thinking 
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of alternatives. In hypnagogia (and dejä vu) there are 
no alternatives: all possibilities appear as actualities. 
As Sartre (1978, p. 44) observed in contrasting the act of 
wakeful perception to that of hypnagogia, in the latter 
"the appearance of the face and the certitude that it is 
a face occur together". This type of mentation is more 
in line with the expression of oldbrain instincts which 
have no alternatives, and emotions which invest logical 
conclusions (indeed, any kind of conclusion) with the 
feeling of conviction. 
It might also be relevant here to consider in brief 
howcertainty and conviction are only relative concepts in 
terms of cortical thinking and how, when they are, or 
become, strong, they are not amenable to modification 
no matter how common-sense, logical, or necessary these 
modification clearly are, thus indicating that the stron- 
ger the certainty and conviction the less they are related 
to cortical activity and the more they take on the charac- 
ter of instinct, i. e., oldbrain activity. And, though 
conviction is a feeling we all experience to a greater 
or lesser degree in our daily lives, it is only in states 
of oldbrain predominance such as in hypnagogia and ad- 
jacent states (sleep-dreams, deja vu, mysticism, schizo- 
phrenia) that its strength is of such a degree (i. e., old- 
brain activity is so strong) that it cannot be wavered 
by alternatives (i. e., by cortical argumentation). 
Beliefs, especially strong beliefs which are indistinguish- 
able from claims to knowledge, are characterized by con- 
viction and may thus be said to be firmly rooted in the 
oldbrain. As Koestler (1978, p. 289) put it, "irrational 
beliefs are anchored in emotion; they are felt to be true. 
Believing has been described as 'knowing with one's 
viscera'. More correctly we should say that it is a 
type of knowing which is dominated by the influence of 
the inarticulate oldbrain". All strong beliefs are irra- 
tional in the sense that they are beyond argumentation. 
A paranoid schizophrenic or a mystic cannot allow an in- 
validation of their system of belief: their belief is 
knowledge. In a similar manner the hypnagogic experience 
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and the deja vu carry their own convictions. They may 
not always be anchored instrong emotions, but conviction 
is a feeling and as such it is rooted in the oldbrain. 
The feeling of certainty in hypnagogia has been noted 
by various investigators. Poe (1949, p. 543), for instance, 
spoke of it as "a conviction which seems a portion of the 
ecstasy itself". Van Dusen (1972), and Hollingworth 
(1911) made reference to it. We have seen it spread 
throughout hypnagogia, sometimes taking on a more obvious 
form as an accompanying awareness of significance. In 
preceding arguments I suggested relationships between the 
hypnagogic, psychotic, and creative thinking in various 
respects and in particular in the paralogical manner in 
which associations are made and in the often unjustified 
logical jumps that occur. These, as a whole, take place 
in a climate of certainty and conviction and may or may 
not survive the tests of waking logic. 
CHAPTER 18 
THE LOOSENING OF EGO BOUNDARIES : 
In the preceding three chapters it was argued that 
hypnagogic experiences are related to activities of sub- 
cortical structures. It was further proposed, both as 
a corollary of, and as supporting evidence for, this argu- 
ment that infants and children are primarily oldbrain 
creatures. These arguments accord well with ontogenetic 
theories of maturation and development which argue for 
infantile and childhood psychological characteristics 
that are identical to those displayed in hypnagogia. 
Throughout this paper both actual descriptions of 
hypnagogic experiences as well as theories built round 
them and others presented for the purpose of illuminating 
the nature of these phenomena, have stressed the regres- 
sive character of hypnagogia. Hypnagogic mentation has 
been variously called autistic (McKellar 1957), dereistic 
(Oswald 1962), egocentric (Froeschels 1946); attention has 
been drawn to its nonrational or paralogical mode of cog- 
nition exemplified in the multisociation and fusion of 
remotely related or apparently entirely unrelated con- 
cepts and FsOR, which, it has been argued, is one aspect 
of the core phenomenon of the LEB, other aspects of which 
include body schema alterations, body schema dissolution, 
blurring of the distinctions between environment and ego. 
These latter features have been especially pointed out 
in the chapter on 'Hypnosis'. 
The presentation and analysis of the events and pheno- 
mena of hypnagogia point to the presence of the LEB at 
the very inception of the state and render the latter's 
character and relationship with other states more expli- 
cable. Its presence has already been invoked in discus- 
sing the relationship of schizophrenia and creativity to 
hypnagogia. It can further be seen to be present in 
meditation and psi activities in both of which regression 
and childlike or infantile mentation have been pointed 
out as key features. 
-460- 
461 
Depth psychologists and developmental theorists alike 
point to the infant's lack of ego boundaries, to the 
baby's being one with his mother's breast and his environ- 
mentin general and only gradually, in tandem with his 
physiological growth, does he begin to differentiate him- 
self from other objects and one object from another. 
Moreover, as Campbell (1957) argued, the infant probably 
cannot tell that he, as a separate entity, perceives but 
rather that there is simply 'perception' and that he has 
to gradually learn to associate impressions with personal 
reactions to realize that he is dealing with his own per- 
ceptions. In other words, the infant's perceptual sys- 
tem and ego sense have not yet grown to the point of 
giving birth to the sense of being a separate entity. It 
is even possible that at a very early stage in the infant's 
life there is no distinction between perceptual modes, or 
that there is a profound form of synaesthesia in which 
the core sense, so to speak, is kinaesthesia. As McKellar 
(1972, p. 50) remarks "the adult has built up conventions 
about the sensory information he recognizes as visual, 
auditory, tactile, etc. At an earlier stage of develop- 
ment the child may not have established these conventions 
about the various sensory channels". We have already seen 
how synaesthesia is operant in precerebrate organisms 
(Schiller 1935). Bower (1977, p. 63) proposed that "our 
perceptual system operates with distinctive features 
rather than sense-specific items". Wheeler and Cutsforth 
(1922, p. 384) concluded that "kinaesthesis is an essen- 
tial component of the consciousness of meaning". At 
the infant stage a fused synaesthetic mode may naturally 
be present and expressed in kinaesthetic activity as the 
infant relates to an, as yet, undifferentiated universe. 
Also, the infant's attitude in general is trophotropic as 
opposed to ergotropic, concerned more with intake than 
outward expenditure of energy. 
Relevant to these observations is Collier's (1964) 
three-level theory of consciousness according to which the 
first level is "the simple, generalised contact-chemical- 
sense-feeling... seen as the phylogenetic basis for all 
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later developments of consciousness", the second level 
"appears phylogenetically when sense modalities become 
differentiated", the third level is characterized by 
"the evolved capacity to become aware of the fact that 
one is aware or conscious", that is, by "reflective con- 
sciousness". 
Similarly, investigators in the hypnagogic area point 
out time and again that the initiation of the state is 
strongly linked with the absence of directed, analytical 
(cortical) thinking and that the emergence, intensification 
and prolongation of hypnagogic imagery is connected with 
a passive-receptive attitude and a feeling of abandonment, 
of loosening of ego controls. Van Dusen (1972, p. 99), for 
example, spoke of hypnagogia in general as "the antithesis 
of ego". The hypnagogist's general feeling of 'chemical' 
(perhaps, one should say 'field') connection with his 
imagery and his tendency to internalize and subjectify 
his environment can be seen as parallels of the infant's 
trophotropic attitude; the physiological presence of the 
latter in hypnagogia has been pointed out in an earlier 
chapter. 
Thus, my relating of hypnagogia both to the activities 
of subcortical structures and to ontogenetically earlier 
mentation (i. e., infantile, regressive) renders the pre- 
sence of the phenomenon of LEB in hypnagogia not 
only plausible but necessary. Not only its presence 
might explain the occurrence of diverse phenomena in 
hypnagogia and related states but its nature is theoretic- 
ally and experientially wide enough to subsume under it, 
or contain within it, other theories formulated to account 
for the same and similar phenomena. Thus, Deikman's 
receptive mode, McKellar's autism, Oswald's dereism, 
Piaget's and Froeschel's egocentricism, Koestler's bi- 
sociationism, von Domarus's paralogical phenomena, Freud's 
unconscious and preconscious mentation, Sidis's and 
Warcollier's subconscious, Prince's co-conscious pheno- 
mena, may all fully or partly be explained by the pre- 
sence of LEB. 
In order to understand the nature and conceptual 
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breadth and potency of the LEB we have to begin by exam- 
ining basic assumptions about consciousness. To begin, 
I shall dismiss the notion that consciousness is equi- 
valent to conscious awareness. As noted, such notion has 
given rise to expressions of 'losing' and 'gaining' con- 
sciousness as if the latter were an object to lose and 
find. Since Descartes' (1976, p. 266) assertion that "the 
human soul is always conscious in any circumstances - 
even in the mother's womb", implying that so long as 
there is a mind this mind must exist in a variety of 
states of consciousness none of which could be thought of 
as constituting 'total unconsciousness', psychological 
research has strongly supported his claim. Sleep research 
and research in hypnosis have shown that the mind never 
really 'sleeps'. Moreover, experiments have shown that 
when the mind is asleep or unconscious another 'portion' 
of it may be awake and conscious, and that two or more 
levels of consciousness or 'portions' thereof can exist 
concurrently (e. g., Prince 1898,1906,1907,1917,1922, 
1929; Sidis 1912; van Eeden 1969; see McKellar 1979b for 
a most recent discussion on co-conscious phenomena). 
Further evidence also comes from reports of near-death 
experiences and the experiences of clinically 'dead' 
people (e. g., Moody 1976). These data show that even at 
moments of behavioural and physiological 'total uncon- 
sciousness' mental activity can still carry on. 
In maturation, along with the growth and dominance of 
the cortex there is a parallel development of ego sense. 
This is to be expected, since possibly the greatest achieve- 
ment of cortical development is the acquisition of the 
ability to discriminate. But in order to discriminate 
barriers must be erected, restrictions imposed, boundaries 
drawn. And the first boundaries to be traced must be 
those relating to a differentiation between ego and enviro- 
nment beginning with recognition of sensation as something 
happening to oneself before these sensations are located 
and differentiated. As discrimination becomes sharper 
and attention focal, and ego boundaries tighter and better 
defined, information processing changes from global, 
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multi-directional to linear: 'filters' are formed to 
screen from focal attention 'unwanted' information. The 
defining of ego boundaries may be thought of as such a 
filter. 
In filter theories, both when these are dealing with 
normal (e. g., Broadbent 1958) and abnormal psychology 
(e. g., Payne, Matussek, and George 1959; Cromwell 1968; 
Frith 1979) it is generally assumed that ordinary con- 
sciousness is characterized by small capacity, intolerance 
of ambiguity, and serial processing (Frith 1979). It is 
also often assumed that the conscious as opposed to pre- 
conscious processing is flexible and that the latter is 
mostly automatic (e. g., Turvey 1974; Erdelyi 1974; 
Eysenck and Frith 1977). However, this latter assumption 
clashes with data from other sources which show that it 
is ordinary waking consciousness, if anything, which is 
automatic (e. g., Deikman 1966,1969a, 1969b; Castaneda 
1970,1974,1975,1976) and that in states of de- 
automatization the phenomena observed are those ascribed 
to preconscious processes. Some of these have been dis- 
cussed earlier in relation to Deikman's work. I shall now 
look at some other research which further illustrates the 
character of preconsciousness. 
The preconscious processes relevant to my discussion 
are of two kinds: those concerned with perceptual inputs 
and those concerned with cognitive-experiential outputs. 
The kind involved in motor outputs (Frith 1979) need not 
concern us here. In respect to the first type it has been 
shown that preconscious input processes have a much 
greater capacity than conscious ones (e. g., Miller 1956; 
Sperling 1960; Atkinson and Shiffrin 1971; Erdelyi 1974), 
they respond to multiple meanings of word stimuli (Marcel 
1976), they are multi-channel processes (Shaffer 1975) as 
opposed to serial conscious processes which can only deal 
with one task at a time (e. g., Broadbent 1958; Posner and 
Klein 1973; Posner and Snyder 1975). Shallice (1972) 
pointed out that in conscious activity there is operant a 
"dominant action system" whose goal is to direct a parti- 
cular course of action at a time while keeping out of 
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conscious awareness irrelevant information and other 
possible courses of action. 
All the above observations also hold true for the 
cognitive-experiential outputs of preconscious processes. 
In addition, this type of preconsciousness contains an 
enormous amount of unconscious material which normally 
remains on the borderline, checked by the current "dom- 
inant action system" of consciousness, but ever ready to 
break through. Under conditions which permit lifting of 
the filter, that is, on those occasions when a LEB takes 
place, preconscious processes come to the fore. The LEB 
diminishes or abolishes discrimination ushering in a loosen- 
ing of conceptual and perceptual boundaries. Thus, objects 
merge into one another and their meanings change, concepts 
lose their sharpness and expand to include other concepts 
remotely related to them or become identified with appar- 
ently entirely unrelated concepts. Under conditions of 
LEB synaesthetic and hallucinatory phenomena come to the 
fore. Goldstone (1962, p. 268) has argued that "hallu- 
cinatory experience can be accounted for in part by incre- 
ased reduction in the conceptual intersensory boundaries", 
that is, by the loosening of distinctions between one 
sensory modality and another. Fisher (1962) proposed that 
confusion of the process of stimulus identification and 
localization results from the person's inability to de- 
marcate his body bounds from what is "out there", 
i. e., it results from loosening of body schema boundaries. 
Similar views to the above have been put forward by 
various workers to account for schizophrenic hallucinations 
(e. g., Hollender 1958; Schilder 1950; Fisher and Cleveland 
1958; Phillips and Rabinovitch 1958; Bleuler 1950; 
Klüver 1942). Bleuler (1950), for instance, viewed schizo- 
phrenic hallucinations as reflecting the patient's con- 
fusion between perceptions and ideas as well as his in- 
ability to distinguish among his senses. In schizophrenia, 
where a LEB takes place, the lifting of the filter can 
also often be seen in the tremendously fast production of 
puns (e. g., Lecours and Vanier-Clement 1976), a phenomenon 
implying a lifting of semantic inhibitions and the 
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flooding of associations across many FsOR. More useful 
products of the LEB have been pointed out in the chapter 
on 'Creativity'. Warren and Gregory (1958) found that 
when a word was repeated again and again it transformed 
itself into other words or sounds. This is very similar 
to Eastern Yoga methods where a koan or mantram is inces- 
santly repeated not only yielding results like those 
reported by Warren and Gregory but purportedly leading 
beyond that point to a total loosening of ego boundaries 
through a series of alterations of these latter. Similar 
effects of de-automatization have been reported by Deikman 
(1966,1969a, 1969b) as having occurred to his experi- 
mental meditation subjects. In hypnagogia these phenomena 
occur spontaneously. 
In Rorschach research investigators appear keen to 
point out that vividness of projection is linked to 
release of ego control (Klopfer 1954). This observation 
is of particular interest in my discussion because of 
the frequently reported association between vividness of 
hypnagogic imagery, lack of ego control, and sense of 
reality. As already noted, in the later stages of hypna- 
gogia when LEB is most advanced, absorbed fascination and 
vivid imagery appear to cancel out, to eliminate the 
ability to test the reality of the situation. The subject 
has moved from a condition of hallucinosis, that is, of 
experiencing vivid imaginary events knowing that the 
latter are not 'real', to a condition where the sense of 
reality has supplanted reality testing, i. e., to hallu- 
cination. In earlier chapters, in discussing the relation- 
ship of hypnagogia to dreams and wakefulness, views were 
presented arguing for the placing of hypnagogia between 
'buffers' (e. g., Vihvelin 1948) thus distinguishing it 
from both sleep and wakefulness. We also saw that Leroy 
(1933) although arguing for a distinction between hypna- 
gogia and dreams he allows that sometimes the former is 
hard to distinguish from either dreams, wakefulness or 
real hallucinations. Notably, he argues that halluci- 
nations need not be realistic in order to involve the 
subject, "what matters is the mental attitude of the 
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subject" (p. 126). In this respect, hypnagogic visions 
which, according to Leroy, are never entirely realistic 
but always "fantastic", somehow manage to engage the 
cognitive processes of the subject to the extent of 
depriving him from the ability to test their reality. 
The subject, he argues, although a spectator, 
he is not really before real events of practical 
life, nor is he quite in the presence of images 
which are stripped of all reality; in other words 
he behaves as if he is in front of something that 
can be real, but real or not, it does not concern 
him directly-what characterizes the hypnagogic 
vision is not the presence or absence of certain 
details, the richness or paucity of certain 
representations, it is the change of everything 
in the state of the subject...; the linking of 
representations is different here from what it 
is in the normal state. 
(Leroy 1933, p. 127) 
It will be recalled that a similar remark about the 
linking of images in hypnagogia was made by Foulkes and 
Vogel (1965) viz., that the continuity of the imagery 
resides more in the subject's "understanding" than in the 
images themselves. Leroy uses the metaphor of the spec- 
tator in the theatre: there, as in hypnagogia, although 
the action unfurls beyond the control of the subject, the 
play takes on a reality of its own as a function of the 
subject's absorbed fascination and empathic investment. 
But the presence of empathy is impossible in the absence 
of LEB. It is in the presence of the latter that empathy 
and fascination can occur, and it is in this way that the 
experience becomes invested with a sense of reality - 
irrespective of whether the experience relates to anything 
'real': reality sense is nonrational. Weisman (1958) jux- 
taposes reality sense and reality testing thus: 
Reality sense deals with whole situations, rather 
than with parts of experiences. It is synthetic 
rather than analytic. Reality tests are intel- 
lectual, rational, and conceptual, while reality 
sense is emotional, intuitive and perceptual. 
For reality sense, objects are complete events in 
themselves, absolute and unequivocal. For reality 
testing, objects are parts of a wider context, 
whose relations must be determined. Its results 
are only approximate and conditional. Reality 
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testing finds its material in the conditions 
of experience, while reality sense functions 
with respect to the experience itself. Reality 
testing deals with shared experience through 
the common meaning of various propositions about 
it. Reality sense is essentially unshared, private, 
and complete in itself; it has no need for confirm- 
ation, since its criterion is the intensity, rather 
than the invariants of experience. 
(Weisman 1958, p. 246) 
In agreement with my earlier arguments in respect to 
the non-rationality of the sense of conviction, Weisman 
remarks that "logical concepts based on observed evidence 
do not, in themselves, carry conviction, and the most 
ardently defended views of life are often without found- 
ation in fact" (p. 228). Further, the passivity-receptivity 
of hypnagogia may play its part in the absence of a reality 
testing attitude if, as Nunberg (1951,1955) argued, the 
basis of reality testing is action. Weiss (1950) proposed 
that the sense of reality invested in external and internal 
phenomena is relative to the degree to which these pheno- 
mena enter the subject's ego boundaries and become 
"egotized" (cf., my argument for 'subjectification' of 
the object). With Psychological field theories in mind 
(see e. g., Lewin 1935,1936) Weisman (1953, p. 233) remarks 
that "reality is rooted in the self, which sees it in its 
own image, regardless of how this is determined. The 
common nucleus of both the ego and its total field is the 
body image, which represents the condensed and fused exper- 
iences of many origins and many modalities". Interestingly, 
James (1890) defines the experience of the self in terms 
of the active "I", as opposed to a passively reacting con- 
sciousness. By contrast, in the passive-receptive mode 
of hypnagogia there is loss of self-consciousness. 
According to James (1890) there is no single 'abstract' 
reality but many "live" hypotheses. Pepper (1948) argued 
that there are no absolute distinctions between real and 
unreal, thoughts and things, the world and the self. 
Reality, according to Cassirer (1953), is dependent upon 
the conceptual correlation of systems of experience so 
that when we speak of something being real we are not so 
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much referring to the object itself as stating our own 
logic and criteria in regards to an experience. Similarly, 
Weisman (1958, p. 255) proposes that "the statement that 
an object is real,... means that it is real with respect 
to certain fixed criteria". On the other hand, Whitehead 
(Johnson 1952) regarded intuition or direct experience 
as the test of knowledge, and both James and Whitehead 
stressed the vivacity of a perception as a criterion of 
reality. 
However, as Weisman (1958, p. 256) correctly points 
out, "if the conceptual reference is altered, previously 
irrelevant features become the invariants of another 
type of reality". Moreover, different modes of thinking, 
as the same writer remarks (p. 231), contribute to the 
development of different kinds of reality. In respect to 
hypnagogia, I will argue that both conceptual reference 
and mode of thinking are different from those of wakeful 
reality. Furthermore, it is debatable whether the same 
criteria characterized by focal attention (Schachtel 1954) 
and logical reasoning (Hart 1946) employed for the veri- 
fication of phenomena pertaining to wakeful reality (-ies) 
can be legimately applied to the experiences of the state of 
hypnagogia where the LEB introduces an entirely different 
logic (receptive vs active, diffuse vs focal, release of 
ego control vs tightening of such controls) thus sugges- 
ting the requirement of a different set of 'verifying' 
criteria. Strong support for my argument is afforded by 
the fact that although the sense of reality (and even 
test of reality: cf., James and Whitehead on the viva- 
city of a perception) in respect to wakeful experience is 
correlated with considerable emotion, and "an experience 
in which we are totally disinterested is also one which 
does not impart a sense of reality" (Weisman 1958, p. 241), 
in hypnagogia the subject may, and often does, experience 
a strong sense of reality coupled with vividness of 
imagery which are, nonetheless, accompanied by flatness of 
affect. 
Thus, the LEB ushers in a state of consciousness 
characterized on the physiological level by 
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parasympathetic, trophotropic and hypometabolic features 
and on the psychological level by regressive-paralogical 
(passive-receptive, autistic, dereistic, egocentric, pre- 
conscious, prelogical) mentation. 
In earlier chapters, the concepts of the subconscious 
and unconscious were also used as more or less equivalent 
terms to stand for mental activities transpiring outside 
consciousness but which, nonetheless, may become conscious 
- at which point they are called preconscious. Although 
I shall avoid entering into an involved discussion as to 
the appropriateness of the use of one term or another I 
would like to discuss briefly another term introduced by 
Prince to explain multiple personality phenomena, namely, 
the term co-consciousness (Sidi, 1912, uses the term sub- 
consciousness to carry the same meaning). Prince (1922, 
p. 167) defines co-conscious visual imagery as "psychical 
images of which the individual is not aware and therefore 
are subconscious". By means of hypnosis and automatic 
writing Prince was able to present data and argue that 
within each individual human being there are psychological 
layers, subsystems, or 'personalities' that could often 
act independently, concurrently, and in ignorance of each 
other. In automatic writing the subject would pick up a 
pen and, without looking at what she was writing, compose 
something intelligible the contents of which were either 
entirely outside her consciousness at the time or rose 
up into her awareness in the form of visual imagery. The 
writing was claimed to be produced by a second personality 
which was unknown to the first (the subject). Similarly, 
through hypnosis a second or third personality would 
emerge. 
interestingly, Prince (1907, p. 70) noted that although 
"in its most highly developed form" automatic writing was 
produced while the writer was fully awake, "often and per- 
haps most frequently the writer falls into a drowsy con- 
dition" which sometimes leads to sleep (but which latter 
apparently does not prevent the writing personality from 
continuing to write and to declare that the subject "has 
gone to sleep"). The emerging imagery is detailed, vivid, 
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and likened to cinema movies, to dreams, crystal visions, 
and hypnagogic imagery (1917, p. 312). When spontaneous, 
it tends to emerge at times when the mind is relaxed and 
"passive", e. g., at night (1922, p. 204). When corres- 
ponding to the content of the script being written at the 
time it is much richer in detail and more concrete than 
the latter and more so than ordinary conscious imagery. 
Imagery known to a second personality (P2) may erupt into 
the consciousness of the first personality (P1 or subject) 
in the form of a hallucination (1917, p. 306). Such 
imagery shifts and changes without apparent connections; 
the latter are only obtained from another personality, P2 
or P3, through the continuity of the script. Inexplicable 
moods which the subject may experience in ordinary waking 
life are explained by a "deeper" personality as the 
effects of subconsciously unfolding imagery, i. e., imagery 
present in the subject's mind but not in her consciousness. 
Moreover, since "more than one subconscious system may 
actually function at one and the same time" (1922, p. 193), 
emerging imagery and moods may be an amalgam whose elements 
come from a number of FsOR and which might be mediately 
and tenuously associated or entirely unrelated to the 
subject's current conscious thoughts. A great deal of 
subconscious imagery, however, may incubate for a very 
long time and may even never emerge into the subject's 
consciousness unless given conducive circumstances. 
The relationship of the above to the phenomenon of 
hypnagogia hardly needs stressing. The concreteness, 
vividness, detail, autonomy and often irrelevancy of the 
imagery, are clearly pointed out. The linking of the 
unassociated images by means of the script has its paral- 
lel in hypnagogia in the continuity forged in the mind 
of the subject (e. g., Foulkes and Vogel 1965). The pre- 
sence of imagery underlying moods was pointed to by van 
Dusen (1972) in respect to hypnagogia and related states. 
The multi-sociative character of hypnagogia has also been 
pointed out. In addition, Prince (1917, p. 311) drew 
indirect attention to the 'regressive' character of 
automatic writing by pointing out that what reaches the 
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consciousness of the subject are only the "sensational 
elements" of thought and ideas that may exist on "deeper" 
levels. 
Partially related to Prince's ideas are Luria's and 
Vinogradova's (1959) "semantic fields or systems" a number 
of which may exist in a person's unconscious and which 
may be independent or even contrary to each other. The 
free emergence of such contrary semantic systems as well 
as the concurrent emergence of Prince's "layers", "strata", 
or "personalities" can be facilitated by hypnagogia through 
the LEE. That is, the LEE may cause the disengagement 
of a dominant system or its relegation to a less dominant 
position while allowing - due to its 'loosening' character 
- for the simultaneous emergence of normally 'filtered- 
out' systems, complexes and multi-aspected phenomena. 
It may thus be said in summary that the whole array 
of hypnagogic experiences is due to the presence of the 
root phenomenon of LEB. This phenomenon leads to, or is 
characterized by, body schema alterations and dissolution, 
"regression" to earlier modes of experiencing exemplified 
by the blurring of the distinction between ego and the 
external and internal environment and by synesthetic, 
kinesthetic and empathic experiences and the primacy of 
reality sense over reality testing (and, therefore, vivid- 
ness of imagery). It also endows the state of hypnagogia 
with the character of preconsciousness, that is, of sens- 
itivity and openness both to external and internal stimuli 
that may lie outside the normal reach of consciousness: 
it lifts the filters imposed on the mind by the conscious- 
ness and logic of the waking state. This allows for the 
emergence of material and FsOR from deeper layers of the 
mind, layers which are normally relegated to the uncon- 
scious. Due to the subject's loosening of strictures 
and to his empathic disposition, the emerging material and 
FsOR tend to cross and fuse with each other giving rise 
to novel entities and concepts, in addition to furnishing 
him with raw elements that might not otherwise have reached 
his consciousness. The occurrence of this phenomenon would, 
thus, explain not only the experiences of hypnagogia but, 
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through the latter, would also shed considerable light 
on the experiences encountered in states and processes 
such as schizophrenia, psi, meditation, and creativity. 
CHAPTER 19 
THE FUNCTION OF HYPNAGOGIA: 
Given that hypnagogia posesses the properties ascri- 
bed to it, what is its function? The obvious answer, 
viz., that it prepares the organism to enter sleep, as 
the term indicates, (see also: Meddis 1977) is not entir- 
ely satisfactory in view of the evidence that it does 
not always or necessarily lead to sleep (e. g., McNish 
1830; Maury 1848,1878; Alexander 1909; Rouques 1946; 
Collard 1953; McKellar and Simpson 1954; Myers 1957; 
Green et al 1970) and that, not infrequently, hypnagogic 
visions occur with open eyes (Müller 1845; Herve de Saint 
Denis 1867; Alexander 1909; Leroy 1933; Rawcliffe 1952; 
McKellar and Simpson 1954; Myers 1957; McKellar 1972). 
The analysis carried out in this paper has shown not only 
that hypnagogia possesses individual features but also 
that its presence in certain states of consciousness may 
carry causal implications. 
As Leroy (1933, p. 94) observed, in hypnagogia there 
is "a special attitude of my whole being notably different 
from the way I feel in wakefulness". Alexander (1909, 
p. 629) spoke of "a curious mingling of sleep and wakeful- 
ness". Trömner (1911), Lhermitte and Sigwald (1941), 
Froeschels (1946) and de Becker (1968) referred to it 
as "a special state of consciousness". The Libersons 
(1966, p. 302) relating it to the more general experiencing 
of "vague types of thinking in the midst of our daily 
activities", suggest that it might have a "biological 
significance", that "it may represent a biological neces- 
sity to turn the environment out of focus, to blur for a 
time the 'here and now', and to allow a less realistic 
relationship to take place between various elements of our 
mental life". Indeed, the Libersons' suggestion may be 
more tightly related to a regularly occurring basic rest- 
activity cycle (BRAC) observed and already related to the 
90 minute nocturnal sleep pattern (see e. g., Maron et al 
1964; Globus 1966; Fisher and Friedman 1967; Kleitman 
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1969; Othmer et al 1969; Oswald et al 1970; Dement et al 
1972; Globus et al 1972), which takes us back to the rela- 
tionship between hypnagogia, sleep, and sleep dreams. In 
what follows I shall take a closer look at these relation- 
ships in the perspective of the BRAC, and further examine 
the possibility that hypnagogia might have a special func- 
tional and evolutionary significance. 
As Sterman (1972, p. 195) remarked, the BRAC is "a 
fundamental aspect of physiology, both functionally and 
in terms of the structural evolution of the CNS. The con- 
trolling mechanism has been localized to the brain stem, 
and in the absence of forebrain integration expresses its 
influence overtly as a periodic modulation of neuronal 
excitability". Kleitman (1967) saw it in terms of man's 
organization of his working day into approximately two-hour 
recurrences of work, feeding, and rest. A suggestion flow- 
ing from the Libersons' (1966) observation and the data 
in the above studies is the existence of a circadian fluc- 
tuation in the neurophysiology underlying the REM dream 
state embracing both sleep and waking periods. More impor- 
tant, from the psychological point of view, is the circad- 
ian presence of the experiential aspects of the state. 
Fiss, Klein and Bokert (1966), Lavie and Giora (1973), 
and Lavie (1974) have shown that there is a "carry over" 
effect from a particular sleep stage into the waking state. 
Unlike previous research which concerned itself with elici- 
ting dream reports from subjects awoken from different 
stages of sleep (e. g., Aserinsky and Kleitman 1953; Dement 
1955; Dement and Kleitman 1957a, 1957b; Wolpert 1960; 
Wolpert and Trosman 1958; Foulkes 1962; Rechtschaffen et 
al 1963; Goodenough et al 1965), Fiss et al concentrated 
on the hypnopompic responses of their subjects to Thematic 
Apperception Tests upon awakenings from REM and NREM sleep. 
Thus, they found that REM awakenings yielded more bizarre 
and "dream like" mentation than their NREM counterparts. 
Lavie and Giora (1973) and Lavie (1974) utilizing the spi- 
ral after effect (SAE) method which relates the persistence 
of visual stimuli to cortical excitability (Holland 1964) 
confirmed Fiss et al's results and were in agreement with 
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Broughton's (1968) findings on differential visual evoked 
responses between REM and NREM awakenings and Costello's 
(1963) results on the similarity of the decrease of the 
SAE during NREM awakenings and CNS depressant cases. 
Such observations tend to suggest that the recurrent 
phenomenon of dreaming might continue "under conditions 
of reduced or impaired arousal which are ordinarily lumped 
within the waking category" (Snyder 1963, p. 383). More- 
over, as Globus (1966) importantly proposes 
the D state [REM state] has essentially nothing to do 
with sleep itself, but rather it is only during sleep 
that the D state can be measured by current techniques. 
Thus the characteristic Stage 1, the REMs, and the 
decreased muscle activity are not the essential pro- 
cess itself, but only signs by which the process can 
be recognized. Because of the ongoing state of the 
waking organism it would be extremely difficult to 
pick up such signs. 
(Globus 1966, p. 657). 
This is in agreement with Snyder's (1963, p. 383) sugg- 
estion that "the condition of typical behavioural sleep 
is not indispensable for dreaming". Indeed, as Snyder fur- 
ther points out, although REM sleep is generally thought 
to be a 'deeper' state than NREM sleep from the point of 
view of arousability, this is not always the case (see 
e. g., Snyder 1960; Williams, H: in Snyder 1963, p. 383) as 
can be seen from evidence suggesting that "we can respond 
to external stimuli during dreaming sleep when sufficiently 
motivated, but that ordinarily we are distracted by the 
internal events of the dream experience" (see also: Chris- 
take 1957; Rowland 1957; Toman et al 1958; Oswald et al 
1960; Granda and Hammack 1961). In fact, in addition to 
the REM state being distinguished from the NREM kind on 
psychological and physiological grounds (e. g., Jouvet 1961, 
1967), accumulating evidence on brain activity during the 
REM state (e. g., Evarts 1962a; Huttenlocher 1961; Mikiten 
et al 1961; Snyder 1965,1966) tends not only to confirm 
that this is a different organismic state from waking and 
sleeping but that "in certain respects it may be the most 
active one" (Snyder 1963, p. 385). 
However, it must be borne in mind, in the perspective 
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of my earlier arguments on dreams and brain activity, that 
imaginal activities correlated with the activities of 
subcortical structures may reflect in the alteration of 
certain parameters which, although appear similar to those 
of wakefulness, they may originate in different brain struc- 
tures and neuronal organization and carry a different mean- 
ing. Thus, to be imaginally active must not be equated 
with being awake. This is clearly demonstrated in the Fiss 
et al (1966) experiments where the subjects awoken from 
REM sleep responded almost as if they were still dreaming. 
Although subjects in a similar situation (Broughton 1968; 
Lavie and Giora 1973; Lavie 1974) showed responses similar 
to wakefulness, in the Fiss et al study the measurements 
were psychological whereas in the other studies they were 
physiological, and, as pointed out above, these latter 
parameters do not necessarily reflect the same internal 
(psychological) organization of the organism in wakeful- 
ness as in dreaming. Thus, although activity in the 
mesencephalic reticular formation during REM states may 
be even higher than that recorded during wakefulness 
(Huttenlocher 1961), it would clearly be a mistake to inter- 
pret this as meaning that the subject in a REM dream is 
more awake than a person in the waking state - although 
he may be more aware imaginally. As Snyder (1963) points 
out, the Jouvet (1961,1962) studies have shown that the 
cerebral tracks involved in the production of REM sleep 
are not those of the ascending reticular formation respon- 
sible for waking arousal: 
Interruption of the reticular formation at the level 
of the mid-brain tegmentum does not interfere with the 
periodic recurrence of rapid [REM] sleep so long as the 
ventral mesencephalon is left intact at the level of 
the interpenduncular nucleus and mammilary bodies. 
(Snyder 1963, p. 386). 
We already know from earlier discussions that neuro- 
logical lesions in the above mentioned nucleus result in 
"peduncular hallucinosis" characterized by visual hallu- 
cinations closely related to hypnagogic visions in form 
and time of occurrence, viz., at sleep onset (see e. g., 
Lhermitte and Sigwald 1941; Rozansky 1959). Also, in 
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respect to my relating hypnagogic experiences to the limbic 
system, the latter was found to be connected with the pon- 
tile reticular formation via a ventral mesencephalic cir- 
cuit (Nauta 1958). Moreover, it has been observed that 
introduction of cholinergic drugs into the ventricular sys- 
tem results in hallucinatory behaviour (McLean 1955; Sher- 
wood et al 1952). The same drugs have been found by Jouvet 
and his collaborators to lengthen the period of REM sleep 
in the cat. This type of sleep was also triggered off by 
electrical stimulation of the pontile reticular formation 
during slow (NREM) sleep. 
Although we continue to speak of REM sleep as an equi- 
valent way of referring to nocturnal dreams, as pointed 
out by both Snyder (1963) and Globus (1966) dreaming may 
have nothing to do with sleep either physiologically or 
psychologically. On the other hand, it is also distin- 
guished psychophysiologically from wakefulness. To refer 
to Snyder once more, there is evidence 
that the function of dreaming is not dependent upon 
sleep, per se, but rather upon the relative absence 
of stimulation - that dreaming tends to supervene with 
regular periodicity throughout the 24-hour cycle, but 
that the extent of its manifestation is inversely rel- 
ated to the level of reticular arousal at any given 
time. 'Daydreaming' may be more than a figure of 
speech! 
(Snyder 1963, p. 384). 
An area that provides information relevant to the fore- 
going arguments is that of narcolepsy. The narcoleptic 
syndrome comprises four characteristic symptoms, namely, 
hypnagogic hallucinations, cataplexy, sleep paralysis, and 
hypersomnolence (Yoss and Daly 1957). Two symptoms of this 
syndrome, hypnagogic hallucinations and sleep paralysis, 
have been pointed out by Liddon (1967) as fitting exactly 
the older descriptions of nightmare (e. g., Waller 1816, 
McNish 1830). Kanner (1957), also, pointed to the hypno- 
pompic nature of children's nightmares. As part of the 
narcoleptic syndrome, hypnagogia has been related physio- 
logically to both the reticular activating system and the 
REM dream (Rechtschaffen et al 1963a; Rechtschaffen and 
Dement: cited by Liddon 1967, pp. 91-92). As already known, 
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the ascending RAS and the rostal parts of the reticular 
system have been linked with arousal and wakefulness, while 
the descending RAS is associated with motor activity (e. g., 
Oswald 1962). It is thought that "a breakdown of the syn- 
ergetic functions of these units in the RAS involving con- 
sciousness and motor activity results in cataplexy, sleep 
paralysis, and hypnagogic hallucinations" (Liddon 1967, 
p. 91). Complex interactions in the ascending RAS are impli- 
cated in the production of the EEG stage 1 forebrain struc- 
tures characteristic of REM sleep. On the descending side 
of the RAS a generalized reduction of muscle tone is obser- 
ved especially round the head and neck accompanied by loss 
of spinal reflexes during REM sleep in normal subjects, 
and in narcoleptics (Hishikawa et al 1965). While cata- 
plexy and sleep paralysis are thus thought to display the 
motor characteristics of REM sleep in a waking state, it 
is hypothesized (Rechtschaffen and Dement: cited by Liddon 
1967, pp. 91-92) that hypnagogic hallucinations constitute 
the dream counterpart of the REM period sleep. Rechtschaffen 
and Dement put forward a theory embracing three relatively 
independent neurophysiological systems: Wakefulness, Sleep 
and a Paradoxical system. The latter's characteristics 
include atonia, reflex inhibition, and dreams. The Para- 
doxical system comes into operation when the other two sys- 
tems relax their inhibitory influence over it. However, 
since these 'paradoxical phenomena' occur in isolation it 
is thought that there are different thresholds for their 
release. 
Thus, on the evidence afforded by a number of studies 
showing a circadian fluctuation of the REM period poten- 
tial not confined to the hours of the night, it is possible 
that the Paradoxical system might break through more easily 
at those times during the day or night when neither of the 
other two systems is in full swing. This way, hypnagogic 
experiences might appear at a time when the REM potential 
is on the increase, and, although it has not yet overtaken 
wakefulness, it has reached over the threshold of hypna- 
gogia. It might, thus, be reasonable to argue, along with 
Liddon, (1967, p. 92), that "hypnagogic hallucinations 
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represent aspects of REM periods occurring during the wak- 
ing state". And since hypnagogia, or at least its earlier 
stage, is characterized by full- or semi-consciousness, 
it would also be reasonable not to expect all the neuro- 
physiological correlates of the REM period to be present 
(e. g., REMs, penile erection). Further, although sleep 
paralysis and hypnagogic hallucinations are observed to 
occur together mostly in narcoleptics (see also chapter 
on 'Psi'), a lighter paralytic state is not infrequently 
present during hypnagogic experiences. Leroy (1933, p. 115) 
describing this aspect of hypnagogia, writes: "After an 
undeterminate period it happens that I always lie on my 
back and feeling myself awake I want to open my eyes... 
Impossible! But I do feel (I observe this) that my eyelids 
are stuck together, as they might be for certain persons 
on awakening, but I cannot raise them". Commenting on this 
Sartre (1978) says that it is "a unique condition which 
may be described as paralysis by auto-suggestion", and that 
it is clearly 
[not] a simple sensation of peripheral origin, like 
the relaxing of muscle tone.... To the pure and sim- 
ple muscular sensation (impression, or distention, 
repose, abandon) there is added the sui generis cons- 
ciousness that it is impossible to will these move- 
ments, we no longer feel capable of animating our 
body. This is a condition of very slight auto-sugges- 
tion, distantly related to hysterical pythiatism and 
to certain frenzies of influence. We ourselves forged 
this unbreakable chain. Let a disturbing noise resound 
and we are at once on the alert. But so long as we 
remain undisturbed we are muscularly relaxed and ins- 
tead of simply and purely constituting the hypnosis, 
consciousness permits itself to be charmed, in the 
strict sense of the word, that is, consciousness does 
not constitute the hypnosis but sanctions it. 
(Sartre 1978, pp. 46-47). 
Under normal circumstances, hypnagogia can only take 
place when the subject is relaxed both physically and men- 
tally, that is, when no anxiety is present. Conversely, 
when the subject is deprived of sleep, especially the REM 
kind (e. g., Luce and Segal 1966) the hypnagogic threshold 
becomes much more readily reached during those hours of 
the day and night when the REM potential is normally on 
its circadian increase. The subject then experiences peaks 
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of vivid hypnagogic imagery ("microsleeps" and "dreamlets") 
preceded and accompanied by known hypnagogic features (see 
section on 'sleep deprivation' in chapter 14). As McKellar 
(1977, p. 104) remarked, "hypnagogic imagery is testimony 
of the readiness of dream life to invade wakefulness". 
These observations are in agreement with Fiss et al's (1966) 
argument that the "spill over" dream-like phenomenon obs- 
erved in their subjects' TAT responses when interrupted 
from REM sleep constituted a result of slight REM depriv- 
ation. Evidence of hypnagogic-hypnopompic "spill over" 
is also afforded by the reports of patients who began to 
have hypnagogic-hypnopompic hallucinations as a result of 
treatment with antidepressant drugs (Lehman et al 1958; 
Klein 1965; Schlauch 1979; Hemmingsen and Rafaelsen 1980). 
Antidepressant drugs such as imipramine are known to inc- 
rease NREM sleep and the phenomena associated with it (e. g. 
Flemenbaum 1976; Huapaya 1976). Conversely, they deprive 
the patient of REM sleep (e. g., Vogel 1975,1977). Thus 
hypnagogic-hypnopompic experiences in these cases may be 
considered as spill overs of REM dream deprivation. 
Now, in view of arguments supporting the notion that 
dreaming is an activity independent of wakefulness and 
sleep, and since the only kind of naturally occuring dream 
in the absence of sleep is the hypnagogic dream - seen as 
a circadian phenomenon occurring independently of REM sleep 
deprivation - it seen reasonable to propose that hypnago- 
gic experiences may constitute that kind of human need and 
type of mentation which demonstrates itself as the REM syn- 
drome during sleep and as a fantasy or hallucination during 
wakefulness. This view would accommodate both Fiss et al's 
(1966, p. 550) argument that waking fantasies may take the 
place of aborted dreams, and the arguments of depth psycho- 
logists that (REM) dreams may facilitate the gratification 
of wakeful fantasies - and this, without necessarily rest- 
ricting hypnagogia to such functions. 
Thus, hypnagogic-hypnopompic experiences may constitute 
the dream component of life's triptych: dreaming, sleeping, 
wakefulness. In this guise, i. e., as dreams, I will also 
argue that they are both phylogenetically and ontogeneti- 
cally older than sleep and wakefulness. Meddis (1977, 
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p. 136) has argued that active (REM) sleep, that is, sleep 
during which dream activity takes place in humans "is a 
state analogous to and descended from reptilian sleep". 
Jouvet, Valatx, and Jouvet (1961) found that in newborn 
kittens there is only an alternation between active sleep 
and waking, the other kind of sleep (slow, quiet) develo- 
ping later. Likewise Sterman (1972, p. 194) argued that 
"sleep does not exist in the newborn infant". He remarked 
that other investigators (e. g., Kleitman 1963,1969; Emde 
and Metcalf 1970) made similar observations noting that 
although the state of quiescence in the infant does not 
properly qualify for the term quiet sleep as applied to 
adults, "the REMs state is clearly present in the newborn. 
This state recurs regularly and without interruption 
throughout the first weeks of life, regardless of whether 
the infant is quiet or engaged in such activities as suck- 
ing, crying or fussing" (p. 177). 
The view of hypnagogia as constituting the exemplifi- 
cation of a circadian organismic system gains more credence 
when seen as having a survival function. Evidence comes 
from various studies on hypothalamic stimulation and physi- 
ological measurements during sleep onset. Hess' (1931, 
1932,1957) discovery of the trophotropic response in the 
cat described as "a protective mechanism against overstress 
belonging to the trophotropic system and promoting restor- 
ative processes", points to the existence of a neurophys- 
ical and biochemical network closely linked to the para- 
sympathetic system and functioning in opposing terms to 
that of Cannon's "fight-or-flight" or "defence-alarm" reac- 
tion which is linked to the sympathetic system and marked 
by increased breath rate, heart rate, blood pressure, blood 
flow to the muscles, oxygen consumption, and body metabol- 
ism. By contrast, hypnagogia is characterized by lowered 
oxygen consumption, and decrease in heart rate and respir- 
ation. In addition, with reference to evidence that the 
presence of increased blood lactate levels is instrumental 
in producing anxiety (Petts and McLure 1967), we may infer 
that this substance is decreased during hypnagogia. This 
inference is not based only on the fact that lack of 
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anxiety is a necessary feature of the induction of hypna- 
gogia but also because blood lactate is produced by the 
metabolism of skeletal muscles which must be relaxed during 
sleep onset. Thus, in hypnagogia there is a shift from 
sympathetic to parasympathetic predominance involving the 
relaxation of striate muscles and the reduction of prop- 
rioceptive input which, according to Gellhorn (1964), cause 
a resetting of hypothalamic balance. Indeed, hypnagogia 
may constitute a protection from certain harmful effects 
of both wakefulness and REM sleep. In respect to the for- 
mer, the beta EEG activity characteristic of this state 
has also been associated with anxiety (Hill: in Hill and 
Parr 1950) and various psychiatric disorders (Finley 1944). 
On the other hand, the REM sleep has been found to exacer- 
bate stomach ulcers and heart problems (Meddis 1977, p. 137). 
It transpires, then, that hypnagogia has a hypometa- 
bolic function in that it acts as an anxiety reducer perio- 
dically drawing the organism away from the tension-producing 
activity of the sympathetic system. It might be objected, 
however, that hypnagogia (sleep onset) sometimes displays 
myoclonic spasms and terrifying visual images that are far 
from being conducive to either physical relaxation or reduc- 
tion of anxiety. Nonetheless, both of these phenomena 
occur against a background of initial physical and mental 
relaxation and, in normal subjects, eventually subside and 
disappear as the state deepens. In this respect, hypna- 
gogia may be related to various therapeutic techniques 
based on induced relaxation such as Progressive Relaxation 
(Jacobson 1929), Sentic Cycles (Clynes 1970), and Schultz's 
Autogenic Training. A common psychological factor in these 
methods and states is a turning away from the realities 
of the immediate environment. More specifically, there 
are clear similarities between the early stages of hypna- 
gogia and autogenic training (Schultz and Luthe 1959), the 
latter emphasizing "passive concentration" in contrast to 
"active concentration". The technique aims at the "auto- 
genic shift", or Umschaltung, characterized by muscle rel- 
axation, increased skin temperature, slowed respiration 
and heart rate, i. e., a shift to parasympathetic 
484 
predominance. Reports by subjects of flowing warmth and a 
light quality in the retinal field while their eyes are 
closed (Eigenlicht? ) coupled with Luthe's remark that the 
autogenic shift is not characterized by drowsiness, show 
it to be very similar, if not identical, to an early hypna- 
gogic stage. 
In view of the foregoing arguments it would be inap- 
propriate to say that there are REM potentials during the 
24 hour day, but rather that there are potential periods of 
Oneirosis and that REM dreams form one expression of this 
potential. I shall designate Oneirosis as that psycho- 
physical syndrome which includes dreams and dreamlike 
phenomena such as hallucinations and quasi-hallucinations, 
it is characterized by the organism's LEB, and, when spon- 
taneous, it is circadian following a basic rest-activity 
cycle (BRAC). In this scheme, hypnagogia would constitute 
the exemplification of Oneirosis. It has all the advantages 
of REM dreaming and none of its disadvantages. It may ren- 
der us the same service as REM dreams do but without the 
necessity always to surrender consciousness as completely 
as we do for the emergence of REM dreams. As Marc (1840) 
once put it, it enables us "to dream without sleeping" 
(quoted by Baillarger 1846). According to Archer (1935), 
it constitutes "waking dreams" (p. 41) or "dream-activity 
proceeding under the observation of the waking mind" (p. 44). 
As a progressive state hypnagogia stretches from a 
slight dissociation from the surrounding reality to a more 
complete dissociation wherein the subject is deeply invol- 
ved in his imagery but still aware of his surroundings 
(double consciousness), to a complete loss of reality tes- 
ting (dreaming), then back to an awareness of the surroun- 
dings but still involved in the 'dream' state (double con- 
sciousness), then waking but retaining double conscious- 
ness ('hypnopompic'), then back to wakefulness. Viewed 
in this perspective, sleep-dreams become simply a sequence 
of the hypnagogic-hypnopompic state of Oneirosis, sleep- 
dreams being only one among a variety of types of dream 
(incidentally, sleep, or REM, dreams are probably the main, 
if not the only, kind of dream psychoanalysis appears to 
be generally concerned with). Indeed, there are no 
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compelling theoretical or experiential reasons why a per- 
son could not, with appropriate training (e. g., by means 
of biofeedback), remain 'awake' during sleep experiencing 
a deep Oneirosis instead of having partial or complete loss 
of consciousness. As West (1962, pp. 285-6) pointed out 
in his general theory of hallucinations and dreams, some 
people are capable of achieving hallucinations by gaining 
control of their own dissociative mechanisms . 
Such achievement would most likely place an individual 
in a position of contact with many aspects or layers or 
systems of his personality. As we saw, in relating hypna- 
gogia to various states of consciousness, this is indeed 
the case. I am thus in full agreement with Sherwood who 
pointed out that hypnagogic experiences 
reveal to us even more clearly than the ordinary dream 
the construction of our mental activity in its usual 
forms and if we observe them attentively we may gather 
conclusive evidence of the many levels of awareness 
which combine to form our ordinary consciousness. 
This half-way state performs for us the difficult ope- 
ration of separating the modes of consciousness and 
giving us glimpses of their independent activity -a 
feat impossible to achieve voluntarily while in full 
possession of the blended mode. 
(Sherwood 1965, p. 94) 
It is interesting to note in this respect that as far 
back as the tenth century A. D. a Tantric text advised the 
aspiring yogi that in order to acquire continuity of con- 
sciousness unaffected by sleep "he must hold himself at 
the junction of all the states, i. e., in the half-sleep 
state, the link between waking and sleeping" (Esnoul: quo- 
ted by de Becker 1968, p. 154). Significantly, this state 
is designated by the exponents of the above tradition as 
the Fourth State, the other three being sleeping, dreaming 
and waking. In this state, as a hypnagogic subject obser- 
ved, "one has attained, while awake, the concentration 
which exists during dreaming" (J. S. P. R. July 1898, p. 269). 
Thus, since in hypnagogia there is the possibility of 
holding a "dialogue with the unconscious" (de Becker 1968, 
p. 163; see also van Dusen 1972) and dreaming without losing 
consciousness, the induction of this state may not be cons- 
idered as a mere "regression" to the evolutionally old 
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dreaming state but perhaps more of a 'return' with the added 
advantages of an enriched consciousness. In this way, 
the oneirosis of hypnagogia, encompassing as it does num- 
erous states of consciousness, may indeed be spoken of as 
an altered state of consciousness accompanied by changes 
of thought organization which, as in Deikman's (1971, p. 
488) receptive mode, are arranged "in terms of a different 
logic in pursuit of aims located along different dimensions 
of reality than those to which we ordinarily address our- 
selves". 
The logic of hypnagogia points both to the evolutional 
seniority of oneiric life and to the survival value of hyp- 
nagogia itself. In respect to the first point, it is clear 
that, if oneiric life preceded the appearance of wakefulness 
and sleep, then, prior to the appearance of these latter two 
states the organism must have existed in a continuous state 
of dreaming. This would imply that, inter alia, the logic 
of wakefulness was absent and that a different logic, that 
of empathy, fusion, a strong feeling of being inseparably 
part of a whole, lack of distinction between inside and out- 
side, and lack of self-consciousness must have been the qua- 
lities of that early life. Later, gradually, appears what 
we now call wakefulness. We saw in earlier arguments that 
this is indeed the case with human infants - their lives 
alternate between dreaming and waking. But, significantly, 
the quality of the early oneiric experiences also implies 
that there was no feeling or need to fight for survival. The lat- 
ter must have arrived on the scene with the appearance of the waking 
state and the direction of attention (which gradually acquires an 
'active' cxxmponent) to sensations, perceptions and, generally, to the 
external reality. Thus also emerge a dim self-consciousness and the need 
to survive as a separate entity. This is where, I believe, 
sleep as a separate state also makes its presence obvious: 
the emergence of the waking state has not obliterated the 
need to dream but merely subdued it periodically; however, 
organismic life has begun to become individualized and the 
need to survive as an individual entity now utilizes the mechanism 
of sleep for the safe emergence of full oneiric activity. 
This line of argument suggests that one function of sleep 
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must have been, and still is, to provide the conditions 
necessary for the occurrence of dreaming and at the same 
time secure the organism's safety during that most vulner- 
able period when its attention is withdrawn from its imme- 
diate physical surroundings. The organism's safety is 
secured by the induction of drowsiness which sends it look- 
ing for a safe place where to retire and give itself up 
to dream activity (cf. Meddis 1977). 
The second point raises the question that, if physical 
survival were a primary concern of evolution, should we 
not by now have developed into non-sleeping beings adjust- 
ing the functions of sleep to some form of waking state 
thus ensuring against our vulnerability during the regularly 
occurring abandonment in sleep? Also, if apart from pro- 
viding the necessary conditions for the emergence of onei- 
ric activities, sleep has otherphysiologicalfunctions, 
e. g., physical recuperation and tissue repair, could these 
latter functions not be fulfilled without the organism 
having to always abandon consciousness to the degree it 
does during sleep? 
Now, a careful study of hypnagogia shows it to be the 
state most perfectly fulfilling both the functions of sleep 
and dreaming. Discussions throughout this paper (see espe- 
cially chapter on 'Dreams') have shown hypnagogia to be, 
at times, indistinguishable physiologically and behaviour- 
ally from sleep. It has also been shown to be a dream 
state. Although it has often been stressed in this paper 
that the subject in hypnagogia is psychologically withdrawn 
and fascinatedly involved in imaginal activities, it has 
also been noted that many subjects can retain awareness 
of their external environment and hold conversations or 
have other th ghtsunrelated to their concurrent hypnagogic ima- 
gery (see e. g., Maury 1878, p. 60; Leroy 1933, pp. 59-60; 
Oliver 1976; McKellar 1979b, p. 101). It has been sugges- 
ted that this is an ability that can be cultivated with 
the appropriate training involving the manipulation of 
one's attentional state(s) (e. g., Green and Green 1978). 
For instance, at the early stages of hypnagogia when atten- 
tion is still to a great extent concerned with the external 
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reality, hypnagogic experiences, e. g., imagery, tend to 
be brief and faint. As psychophysical relaxation increases 
and attention becomes more internalized imagery becomes 
more vivid and less fleeting. At this point one may become 
more 'awake' (e. g., Maury 1878; Leroy 1933) and achieve 
double-consciousness providing he remains cool and unemo- 
tional (Leroy 1933, pp. 59-60), slightly biasing his recep- 
tive attention towards the imagery. 
In this latter state one appears to be dreaming during 
wakefulness (Stoyva 1973, p. 399). One obvious advantage 
this state has over sleep dreaming is that it facilitates 
'dream interpretation' through immediate introspection (see 
e. g., Slight 1924; Kubie 1943; Silberer 1965; McKellar 
1979b). Such interpretations need not restrict themselves 
to the psychoanalytic variety. Not infrequently, hypnag- 
ogic experiences convey 'anagogic' meanings, that is, they 
refer to future resolutions of problems (see, e. g., Leroy 
1933, p. 120), or they may contain symbolic references to 
the subject's current state of physical and psychological 
health (van Dusen 1972). 
Thus hypnagogia's conferring of double-consciousness 
on the subject, i. e., the ability to retain consciousness 
of one's surroundings while dreaming, is a definite evolu- 
tionary advance over sleep dreaming: it enables a person 
to retain control over his external environment while inves- 
tigating his internal terrain. An individual may, then, 
learn to oscillate in and out of hypnagogia to any desired 
degree. He may, for instance, return to the full waking 
state in order to attend to conditions requiring the employ- 
ment of the waking mode, or move further into an oneiric 
state and become more deeply involved in internal imaginal 
activities. Of great importance here is the observation 
that in order to acquire double-consciousness in hypnagogia 
the subject must learn to relax physically, emotionally 
and intellectually (see e. g., Green and Green 1978). 
Interestingly these are precisely the conditions required 
for the induction of hypnagogia, in the first place. In 
other words, learning to balance oneself in hypnagogia lies 
along evolutionally normal and natural directions. This 
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is also borne out strongly by the advantages conferred on 
the subject in the production of hypnagogia. 
First, as noted earlier, physical relaxation in hypna- 
gogia is bound up with a shift to hypometabolism and con- 
servation of energy. Physical relaxation alone has been 
shown to raise one's threshold of excitability and diminish 
the apparent unpleasantness of painful stimuli (Miller 
1926), that is, a person becomes more tolerant of physical 
pain and reacts less violently against stimuli. The less- 
ening of excitability points to the second observation, 
namely that of emotional relaxation. Many hypnagogic rep- 
orts stress the lack of affect and the detachment exper- 
ienced by the subject. This has two advantages. One, it 
combats anxiety whose presence in high levels is often 
associated with disproportioned and exaggerated apprecia- 
tion of one's circumstances - in this respect, it also com- 
bats the appearance and/or exacerbation of ulcerations. 
Two, it equips the subject with the necessary 'coolness', 
of attitude that enables him to deal detachedly with both 
experiences pertaining to internal phenomena and those con- 
cerned with the external world. Indeed, the very induction 
of hypnagogia and the subject's participation in his hyp- 
nagogic experiences seem to be primarily dependent on his 
'detached involvement'. Third, intellectual relaxation 
implies the "removal of constraining mental sets and con- 
trols" (Hollingworth 1911). This renders the subject more 
tolerant and accepting both of his own nature and of the 
views, attitudes and personalities of other people. 
Confirming the above observations are the findings of 
a number of investigators whose works have been referred 
to elsewhere in this paper in respect to the therapeutic 
value of hypnagogia and to the view that proficient hypna- 
gogists are characterized by psychological health and expan- 
sive and creative traits (e. g., Foulkes et al 1966; Green 
et al 1970,1971,1971a; Budzynski 1972,1977; van Dusen 
1972; Stoyva 1973; Green and Green 1978). For instance, 
Green and his collaborators found that biofeedback train- 
ing for the attainment of consciousness and facility in 
hypnagogia was associated with physical and psychological 
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well-being, e. g., increased energy and "integrative exper- 
iences" such as gaining of self-confidence, improvement of 
interpersonal relationships, tolerance and understanding of 
others, healing and regeneration. They also noted an inc- 
reased facilitation in the solving of personal and abstract 
problems, and the emergence of psi phenomena such as ESP. 
Notably, their biofeedback programme aims at training sub- 
jects in the production of theta rhythms in the EEG which 
are found to be "associated with a deeply internalized state 
and with a quieting of the body, emotions, and thoughts, 
thus allowing usually 'unheard or unseen things' to come to 
consciousness in the form of hypnagogic imagery" 
(Green and 
Green 1978, p. 143). 
Germane to the discussion of the function of hypnagogia 
are data and arguments presented in the chapter on 'Creativ- 
ity' where it was pointed out that, due to its character of 
LEB, hypnagogia facilitates creativity both in terms of all- 
owing unconscious material to surface, cross, fuse, etc., 
and in terms of its possessing the very same features believed 
to be characteristic of the creative personality, viz., spontaneity and 
effortlessness, expressiveness and innocence, lack of fear for the 
uncertain, ambiguous or unknown, ability to tolerate bipolarity 
and ability to bring together and integrate opposites. 
The function and evolutionary value of hypnagogia may, 
thus, be summarized as follows: Hypnagogia constitutes the 
dream component of life's triptych: dreaming, sleeping and 
wakefulness. Although evolutionally older than sleep and 
wakefulness, it possesses features that allow it to straddle 
both, and even dispense altogether with the former. More- 
over, it points to an evolutionally more advantageous state 
wherein the functions of both sleeping and dreaming may be 
served without the necessity to abandon consciousness as 
extremely as one does in sleep. In this state, the indi- 
vidual may remain aware of his surroundings while attending 
to dream activity which he interprets by immediate intro- 
spection and which may furnish him with solutions to per- 
sonal and abstract problems as well as indicate the con- 
ditions of his physical and psychological health. Fur- 
ther hypnagogia has a hypometabolic function 
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which is related to the diurnal BRAC, thus periodically 
drawing the individual away from the stresses of full wak- 
ing state and restoring and energizing him by a shift to 
parasympathetic activity. On the physical level, it raises 
his threshold of excitability and diminishes the apparent 
unpleasantness of painful stimuli by means of relaxation. 
The latter's emotional component reduces and nullifies 
anxiety thus both protecting the individual from the dele- 
terious effects of excessive internal secretions and end- 
owing him with the ability to become 'detachedly involved' 
in both external and internal, imaginal activities. On 
the intellectual level, the hypnagogic subject undergoes 
a removal of constraining sets and controls and becomes 
open to integrative experiences characteristic of the crea- 
tive personality. 
CHAPTER '20 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HYPNAGOGIA: 
In this last chapter I shall pick out and discuss 
in brief what I consider to be important points arising 
from earlier discussions in this paper, draw general con- 
clusions and point out implications flowing from them. 
I began this paper by listing the phenomena encoun- 
tered in hypnagogia and took a brief look at the methods 
employed to study the conditions for their emergence and 
their presence in the general population. In later dis- 
cussions, in comparing hypnagogia to other mental states, 
I often argued for the presence of hypnagogic mentation 
and imagery in these states and not the other way round. 
This might be objected to by some psychologists who rele- 
gate to the hypnagogic imagery a much less important role 
(e. g., Richardson 1969; Horowitz 1973). Even where it is 
given some prominence, this is immediately taken away 
from it by its being placed in a general context in which 
other types of imagery are also present. Richardson 
(1969), for instance, offers the following classification 
of imagery: after imagery, eidetic imagery, memory imagery, 
dream imagery, imagination imagery. The latter type 
includes: perceptual isolation imagery, sleep deprivation 
imagery, hallucinogenic drug imagery, photic stimulation 
imagery, pulse current imagery, meditation imagery, 
hypnagogic imagery. Richardson argues that the main 
difference between the various forms of imagination imagery 
"is in the antecedent conditions that arouse them and 
not in the phenomenal attributes that appear in the sub- 
ject's reports" (p. 93). Although I would not entirely 
disagree with his observation I will, nonetheless, point 
to another observation made in this paper, namely, that 
the phenomena he groups as "imagination imagery" share 
a measure of hypnagogia, that is, they emerge in a 
general climate of dreaminess or may themselves become 
hypnagogic. Moreover, as already argued, dream imagery 
is a species of hypnagogic imagery, sleep dreams often 
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occurring in hypnagogia. We have also seen that hypna- 
gogia contains eidetic imagery in the form of "exact 
reproductions", that after-imagery of mental images is 
not infrequent at the hypnopompic end of the state, and 
that memory sequences are "by far the simplest line of 
thought to maintain" in hypnagogia (Singer 1976, p. 44) - 
indeed, Maury (1857, p. 164; 1378, pp. 85,90-92) argued 
that in hypnagogia memories are much clearer, richer in 
detail, and may contain sequences entirely outside the 
range of wakeful remembering. 
Thus, it could be argued that not only is Richardson's 
"imagination imagery" tinged with hypnagogic dreaminess 
but also that his other groups are not entirely untouched 
by it: e. g., not all cases of eidetic imagery are devoid 
of a mixture of imagination, and memory imagery at its 
strongest and most vivid is indistinguishable from hypna- 
gogic remembering. The possible exception night come 
from a specific type of after-imagery, namely, that pro- 
duced by strong perceptions in wakefulness and experienced 
by the subject while still in the full waking state. 
Such arguments strongly rise from methods of studying 
and inducing the state of hypnagogia, and are, therefore, 
closely linked with its definition. If we look back at 
the relevant sections in the first part of this paper we 
shall see that the only 'pure' kind of hypnagogic imagery 
is that found in spontaneous cases in which it emerges 
as a feature of sleep onset and is allowed to take its 
natural course as consciousness gradually wanes. But, 
as noted, Maury (1848,1878) himself was the first to 
observe that hypnagogic imagery may not necessarily lead 
to sleep but, on the contrary, it may delay its arrival 
when attended to. Other workers have noted that hypna- 
gogic imagery has nothing to do with sleep and that it 
can take place while the subject is engaged in other acti- 
vities. Rouques (1946, p. 372), for instance, noted that 
he could think of past events and make complicated calcu- 
lations while the images unfolded, and that the only reason 
he had for considering them "premonitory of sleep" was 
not any correlation with drowsiness, which was not present 
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when he experienced them, but the mere fact of their 
regularly occurring before sleep. Various investigators 
have also noted the relative ease with which they could 
conjure up imagery in hypnagogia as opposed to other 
times during the day when they were fully awake. 
Arguments along these lines have led to the widening 
of the concept of hypnagogia and to the inclusion in it, 
or its identification with, a number of other states 
and conditions of the human entity. This, in turn, has 
shown hypnagogia to be not only a state in its own right 
but also capable of shedding light on the nature and 
psychological and physical mechanisms of other states, 
processes, phenomena and experiences. Careful analysis 
of data has shown that the only necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the occurrence of the state are physical 
and psychological relaxation and an inward turning of 
passive-receptive attention or psychological withdrawal 
from the environment. I proposed that the degree to 
which these factors are involved would constitute a stage 
in the hypnagogic process. I pointed out that the exist- 
ence of stages has indeed been reported in the literature, 
and I suggested a three stage or layer system as a rough 
working framework for the studying of the state. More- 
over, varied combinations of the above components would 
give rise to one or the other of those mental states 
we found related to hypnagogia. For instance, in a combi- 
nation where the ranking of the components in terms of 
the importance placed on them was passive-receptive atten- 
tion, psychological, and physical relaxation, such arrange- 
ment might favour meditation and psi states. The same 
ranking with a slight stress on active attention may 
favour creativity (when the latter is sought consciously 
in the full waking state). 
The presence of the above components, I pointed out, 
ushers in the core phenomenon of LEB. I further argued 
for the correlation of this phenomenon, and its attendant 
phenomenology, with activities of subcortical struc- 
tures, i. e., for a switch to oldbrain predominance 
characterized by a constellation of psychological features 
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and accompanied by parasympathetic prominence. I have also 
argued that the occurrence of hypnagogia, and its attend- 
ant LEB, is not temporally confined to sleep onset but that 
it takes place periodically throughout the 24 hour day. 
As Tart (1969, p. 74) also noted: "The hypnagogic state is 
by no means confined to the beginnings of nocturnal sleep: 
I would speculate that there are many times when we believe 
we are just 'thinking deeply' or 'concentrating' in which 
we momentarily slip into a hypnagogic state". Thus, the 
term 'hypnagogic' turns out to be a misnomer, unless by 
using it we mean to refer merely to one temporally defined 
occurrence of it in the 24 hour cycle. But its being mostly 
noticeable at that particular part of the day is only due 
to the fact that the psychophysical conditions preceding the 
onset of sleep happen to be the same as those required for 
the occurrence of Oneirosis, that is, sleep onset is highly 
conducive to the LEB and the pronounced appearance of the 
'dreaming' state. 
Because of its character of LEB and oneiric nature, 
hypnagogia not only contains all manner of dreams besides 
the REM type but also allows preconscious material to emerge 
and become registered in a wakeful or semi-wakeful consci- 
ousness. This observation has a number of important implic- 
ations. To begin with, it gives us an insight into the nat- 
ure and occurrence of hallucinations. As a colleague of 
Caldwell pointed out to him (Caldwell 1968, p. 109; cited by 
Schacter 1976, p. 464), experiencing hypnagogic imagery is 
the best way of hallucinating without LSD. More signific- 
antly, hypnagogia sheds light on the hallucinations occur- 
ring in schizophrenia and the type of mentation involved in 
their production. 
Further, the manner in which preconscious material 
emerges as well as its form and content may tell us a great 
deal not only about the particular individual but also 
about the workings of the human mind in general. I have 
argued that the surfacing and fusing of a number of FsOR, 
apart from shedding light on both schizophrenic and 
creative mentation, it suggests a presence of a 
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more general 'paralogic' attitude of mind which may be 
active in a subdued manner all the time but surfaces 
during hypnagogia when the logic of wakefulness itself 
is subdued. At such times, as Alexander (1909, pp. 615- 
616) noted, may appear "forms of mentation that are never 
'in' consciousness" but which, according to Leaning 
(1925, pp. 390-391), "originate in the penumbra of being 
which surrounds the limited field of consciousness". 
These may be "unnoticed impressions" or material that 
"struck the mind without its knowledge" (Maury 1878, 
pp. 69 and 96). They may surface by some form of mediate 
association and thus appear unrelated to the subject's 
current line of thought. We may remind ourselves here 
of Maury's (1957, pp. 165-6) example in which he responded 
to the speaker's question by the irrelevant coirment 
"there is no tobacco in this place". As Maury explains, 
although neither the lecturer's question nor his own 
conscious thoughts had anything to do with tobacco, a 
grain of tobacco snuff irritating his nasal tissues had 
given rise to a train of unconscious thinking which resul- 
ted in his puzzling verbal response. 
Germane to the above are Prince's (e. g., 1922) find- 
ings and arguments supporting the view that there is not 
one single unitary unconscious but rather numerous sub- 
conscious "systems" (lb., pp. 189-190). McKellar (1979b, 
p. 100) proposes that "the hypnagogic imager... functions 
as two systems. One part of him observes what the other 
part chooses to show him on his personal cinema screen". 
He, further, compares hypnagogia to the listening to a 
nunber of radio programmes at once: this, as we saw in 
the chapter on 'Creativity', may result in the crossing 
and fusing of a number of FsOR thus yielding remote and 
original associations. McKellar also makes reference to 
Hart's (1939) view of dissociation as "an affair of 
gearing, the various elements of mental machinery being 
organized into different functional systems by throwing 
in of the appropriate gear" (quoted by McKellar 1979b, 
p. 101). The latter remark accords well with my argument 
that the LEB in hypnagogia is correlated with a 
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predominance of subcortical activity. That is, there is 
a change of "gear" from that of wakeful cortical logic 
to subcortical paralogical mentation. In this "special 
state of consciousness" (Lhermitte and Sigwald 1941) both 
the experiences and the logic employed are state-bound 
(e. g., Maury 1878, p. 96; Prince 1898, p. 545; McKellar 1979b, 
p. 133), i. e., they are peculiar to hypnagogia, and they 
require the presence of the latter in order to emerge. 
The peculiarity, and perhaps, singularity, of the 
hypnagogic logic has been pointed out on numerous 
occasions in this paper (see, e. g., chapters 12 and 13). 
Moreover, as a primarily dreaming state hypnagogia will 
also draw remarks specifically directed to sleep dreams 
in respect to the peculiarity of dream logic. Van Eeden 
(1969, pp. 146-7) defined dreaming as "that state wherein 
bodily sensations, be they visceral, internal or peri- 
pheral, cannot penetrate to the mind directly, but only 
in the physical, nonspatial form of a symbol or an image". 
In reference to hypnagogia, Walter (1953, p. 166) spoke 
of "a weakening of the significance" of the signals 
reaching consciousness. It was noted in earlier chapters 
that in hypnagogia sensory 'signals' tend to become trans- 
formed into images and that both images and their signi- 
ficance are related. to stages of the state. Moreover, 
as various investigators pointed out, there is "a special 
facilitatory influence" (Ornitz et al 1967) in hypnagogia, 
that is, the latter is more sensitive to incoming stimuli 
than the waking state. In Prince's (1906) study of 
multiple personality, 'Sally' stated that a dreaming per- 
son "hears every sound". Green et al (1971a, p. 6) 
reported that their yogi subject was accurately aware of 
the workers' activities in the EEG laboratory, in which 
he was being tested, while in deep sleep (his EEG was that 
of 4 cps rhythm). 
Such data point, once more, both to the need to dis- 
tinguish between sleeping and dreaming, taking a fresh 
look at whatever 'causal' relationship might exist between 
them, and to the need to view more carefully the atten- 
tional state of the individual in dreaming states. It 
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has already been argued that it is not the case that the 
function of dreams, whatever it turns out to be, is to pro- 
tect sleep, but rather that the presence of sleep and sleepy 
states provides ideal conditions for the emergence into con- 
sciousness of dream material. Whether the individual con- 
cerned then experiences sleep dreams or conscious dreams 
this appears to be, to a considerable extent, a function 
of his ability to manipulate his own attentional state. 
The relationship between sleep and dreaming expressed 
above, and supported by previous arguments, clearly argues 
against Freud's (1943, p. 118) contention that "the func- 
tion of dreams is to protect sleep", and shows that the 
relationship should be viewed in a reversed perspective. 
Further supporting my view, and strengthening my arguments 
for a switch to a different 'logic', is Bliss and Clark's 
(1962, p. 106) conclusion that "the mental organization of 
dreams can best be seen as the way the ... mind works, 
under environmental and neurophysiological conditions diff- 
erent from the waking state, rather than as a means to pro- 
tect sleep". This wise, the Freudian "censor" is also 
slain (! ). That is, the presence of the censor implies the 
application of waking logic, the censor is logical - other- 
wise what would be the point of resorting to complex, reg- 
ressive mentation to evade him: the censor does not under- 
stand oneiric 'logic', he functions only in terms of waking 
logic. But, if oneiric mentation is, as has been argued, 
older evolutionally than waking cortical mentation, then, 
as has also been argued, the former is always present un- 
consciously, becoming preconscious and registering in 
consciousness when the original conditions of absence or 
diminution of cortical consciousness are fulfilled, viz., 
during states of Oneirosis, e. g., hypnagogia, sleep dreams. 
It may, of course, make some sense to speak of the pre- 
sence of a censor in wakefulness, but then it will sim- 
ply be another way of saying that one is using logic, rea- 
son, or common sense. The point is that in a state of 
499 
Oneirosis a different type of mentation emerges which, 
in some form or another, pre-existed the appearance of any 
logical censor whose presence can only properly relate 
to waking logic. 
This is not to deny, of course, that dream activity 
can ever be wish-fulfilling or that some dreams may con- 
stitute the mind's reaction in sleep to the experiences 
of the previous day, as Freudian psychoanalysis holds. 
However, wish-fulfilling dreams and those involved with 
the experiences of the previous day may constitute only 
one or two species of the wider genus of Oneirosis. As 
hypnagogia so clearly shows, dream imagery may refer to 
the present psychophysical state and mental preoccupations 
of a person (autosymbolic), contain solutions to problems, 
or point to future resolutions of present conflicts 
(anagogic). 
Further, controlled manipulation of one's attentional 
state in hypnagogia may constitute the conscious turning 
of a hypnagogic experience into a full-blown dream in 
which the subject participates while retaining conscious- 
ness of the fact that he is dreaming (see, e. g., Herve 
de St. Denis, 1867, p. 257; Green and Green 1978, pp. 132-3). 
In this state one's body is asleep while his mind is kept 
awake. Similar states of consciousness appear to be aimed 
at by Desoille (cited by de Becker 1968, pp. 160-1) in 
his "waking dream" practices in which he guides his sub- 
ject-patients into an ever deepening reverie. Desoille 
argues that not only is the psychological phenomenology of 
"waking dreams" very similar to that present in nocturnal 
dreams but also the physiology of the former strongly 
resembles that of the latter: he found, for instance, that, 
as with nocturnal dreams, his subjects showed lowering of 
rectal temperature, slowing down of respiration, and lower- 
ing of respiratory metabolism. 
As we saw in the chapter on 'Psi', conditions of 
bodily sleep accompanied by dream awareness are often 
deliberately induced by occultists who wish to achieve 
conscious OOBEs (e. g., Fox 1962, pp. 126,138). 
Warcollier (1938, p. 50) referred to telepathic images as 
500 
"dream images" and to the telepathic state as "conscious 
sleep" (ib. p. 101). Occultists also appear to make use 
of incomplete hypnopompic awakenings for the purpose of 
acquiring consciousness in sleep. But this practice, as 
we have seen, is not strictly confined to this class of 
people. Descartes (de Becker 1968), for instance, appears 
to have made accidental but profound use of it. It occ- 
urred to him in 1619, when Descartes was 23 years old, 
during one night when, in a series of three dreams inter- 
rupted by wakings, he conceived his greatest discovery, 
namely, the unity of all the human sciences. As his biogra- 
pher records, at the end of the third dream, but still 
asleep, Descartes, "wondering whether what he had seen was 
dream or vision, he not only decided while sleeping that 
it was a dream, but also interpreted it before sleep left 
him". Soon, however, "doubting whether he dreamt or med- 
itated, he woke up without emotion and continued the inter- 
pretation of his dream on the same lines with his eyes 
open" (quoted by de Becker 1968, p. 99: from Baillet 1901). 
In regards to my relating hypnagogia to meditation, 
Bagchi and Wenger (1959, p. 136) have remarked that the 
yogis they investigated seemed to be using the "attention- 
phenomenon" "to merge into and stabilize at a different 
level the 'indeterminate' awareness of the deep subcortical 
mechanism, the highest level of neural integration - the 
centrencephalon". In other words, these people were trying 
to achieve a sleepless state of wakeful dreaming. In the 
same vein, I argued earlier in this chapter that hypnagogia 
is a special state of consciousness and that its particular 
manipulation may, indeed, lead to retaining consciousness 
throughout sleep. Relevant to this is Maury's (1857, pp. 
174-5) distinction of three forms of intelligence: instinc- 
tive, reflective, and automative-reflective. The last one 
he relates to dream mentation and points out that, like 
the first, it is characterized by a great measure of auton- 
omy. It is relevant to the present discussion because it 
draws attention to the evolutionary potentialities of hyp- 
nagogia. Mentation in the latter has been repeatedly ref- 
erred to as regressive. However, as I pointed out, this 
is better viewed not merely as regressive but as the return 
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of an adult to an ontogenetically older state with the 
added advantages of acquired psychological structures and 
experiences. It has also been argued above, and earlier 
in this paper, that one may learn to balance himself in 
hypnagogia thus becoming capable of accepting and enjoying 
experiences which emerge from substrata governed by diff- 
erent logics: one may learn to be rational and nonrational 
at the same time, i. e., learn to be simultaneously awake 
and dreaming. 
This, as we saw in the chapter on 'Creativity', has 
implications in the facilitation of the creative process 
in as much as the latter "involves openness to preconscious 
elements" and the establishment of "an intuitive relation- 
ship with the preconscious" (Gowan 1975, p. 313). Heard 
(Weil et al 1971, p. 9) also noted that "to have truly ori- 
ginal thought the mind must throw off its critical guard, 
its filtering censor. It must put itself in a state of 
depersonalization". An early form of depersonalization 
in hypnagogia is the loss of body schema. As Walter (1953, 
p. 166) noted, "it is as though the whole body were being 
shut from mental view". Notably, Alexander (1909, p. 636) 
remarked that the less the body awareness the greater the 
feeling of consciousness - but not self-consciousness which 
in fact diminishes to the point of dissolution (see e. g., 
van Dusen 1972) as the result of the LEB. 
Thus, in hypnagogia one may straddle both sleep and 
wakefulness through wakeful dreaming. Such a state ful- 
fills the functions both of sleep and dreaming. Facility 
in achieving this state implies, among other things, that 
the individual is capable of handling, to a considerable 
degree, those of his own mental processes which are gener- 
ally thought to spring into action only in sleep (REM) 
dream for the purpose of releasing repressions (see Foulkes 
and Vogel 1965). It also implies that he is capable of 
distinguishing between his internal, imaginal world and 
his external, perceptual world - the reality status he ascri- 
bes to his imaginal world, however, during the unfolding 
of the events or at any other time is dependent both on 
his attentional state at that time and on his general 
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beliefs concerning the realms of imagination. 
Furthermore, as argued in the previous chapter, hypna- 
gogia acts as an anxiety reducer both for the stresses of 
wakefulness and sleep dreams. Besides its hypometabolic 
activities invoked to explain its anxiety reducing function, 
this latter is also achieved through the lack of mental and 
emotional conflict due to the occurrence of fascination. In 
a state of fascination there can be no conflict because 
monoideism prevails. The latter may take place under one or 
the other of two conditions: (a) the mind is engaged- 
absorbed in one idea to the exclusion of all others, (b) the 
mind is in such a receptive attitude that any idea (in an 
innumerable series) may engage its total interest. Natural 
hypnagogia is of the latter case, experimental psi and medi- 
tation are mostly of the former. However, in non-experimen- 
tal, i. e., spontaneous, psi and meditation (meditative mood, 
brown study, etc. ) as well as in experimental cases where 
monoideism is not deliberately sought but rather receptivity 
and blankness of mind (non-analytic attitude), monoideism 
occurs as a result of the second condition. From a study of 
cases of monoideism becomes clear that conflict is a species 
of activity that belongs to the genus of 'logic', 'analy- 
sis', and subject-object differentiation and that unconflic- 
tedness is an aspect of fascination: analysis and logical 
activity may be carried out in a state of fascination but 
this is always of the monoidetic kind, that is, it does not 
allow of the possibility of 'alternatives', it is a kind of 
cognition encountered in inspiration and intuition. It is 
also found in states of ecstasy and during intense emo- 
tional arousal. The latter may appear to argue against the 
evidence that the hypnagogic state of fascination is chara- 
cterized by lack of affect. This contradiction may resolve 
itself if viewed in terms of West's (1962) theory of hall- 
ucinations and dreams in which it is argued that a halluc- 
ination (in our present terminology, fascination) occurs 
either under conditions of very low arousal and psycho- 
logical withdrawal or by "jamming the circuit". The 
latter may also explain the presence of 7cps rhythm in the EEG of 
both hypnagogists and people in rage (Walter 1953; Watson 1978, pp. 150-5). 
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Before closing I would like to draw attention to two 
more observations. The first concerns the type of hypna- 
gogic image called 'perseverative' (McKellar 1957). This, 
as noted, is not an exact reproduction of a perception but 
rather a combination of many. It is, in a real sense, an 
abstract-general type of image resulting from a number of 
particulars, yet being represented by a particular image. 
Its further investigation in hypnagogia may throw light 
on the process of concept formation in general. As noted 
in the chapter on 'Creativity', usually when speaking of 
generic concepts we have a vague abstract notion of these 
'entities' but when we are hard pressed for precision we 
may resort to a representative image. As Richardson (1969, 
p. 124) noted, "it is not merely a physical object that can 
be represented in visual imagery but almost any subtlety 
of logical relationships". Could it be that perseverative 
hypnagogic imagery is an exemplification of the normal pro- 
cess of concept formation in general? 
The second point relates to memory. It has been noted 
by various workers (e. g., Maury 1857,1878; Lhermitte and 
Sigwald 1941; Kubie 1943; Warcollier 1948; Muldoon and 
Carrington 1965; Budzynski 1977; Green and Green 1978) that 
hypnagogia is highly conducive to the emergence of memories. 
Kubie (1943) made use of this fact to help his patients 
recover long-forgotten childhood memories. On the other 
hand, we are repeatedly reminded that hypnagogic experi- 
ences themselves are often difficult to remember, being 
fleeting and having no points d'appui (Alexander 1909). 
Typically, Oliver (1976, pp. 2-3) remarks that "I do not 
remember later most of the dream-like hallucinated experi- 
ences even if I have reported them verbally". Moreover, 
as Ellis (1897), Slight (1924) and others noted, in hypna- 
gogia are encountered various forms of paramnesia, e. g., 
de3a vu, jamais vu. On other occasions, as in "dream 
scintillations", one's memory may be severely blocked. 
Although I have not attempted a detailed analysis of these 
phenomena, I suggest that they are severally related to 
stages of hypnagogia, the middle stage being perhaps more 
conducive to remembering as it is characterized both by 
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a considerable degree of relaxation that would facilitate 
the surfacing of memories and a degree of wakefulness nece- 
ssary for their conscious registering. As sleep approaches 
and the type of mentation alters more dramatically the 
rising of memory phenomena takes place in an atmosphere 
of an altered state of consciousness and their appearance 
carries an altered significance. This is not to deny that 
with training, as argued above, one could not learn to 
dredge to the surface long-forgotten, or even "unnoticed" 
memories while behaviourally and physiologically asleep. 
One main problem here is to learn to distinguish between 
the language of Oneirosis and the language of wakefulness. 
The question of memory in hypnagogia is closely conn- 
ected with the states of sleeping, waking and dreaming. 
If, as argued, with training a subject could put himself 
to sleep physiologically while remaining psychologically 
'awake', either by retaining some form of reality testing 
or by achieving continuity of consciousness from waking 
to dreaming, i. e., by achieving a pronounced kind of double- 
consciousness, then it is more than likely that memory 
performance would be greatly enhanced both in respect to 
registering hypnagogic-dream events and to recovering long- 
forgotten experiences. Moroever, the achieving of such 
continuity of memory and double-awareness would act as 
criteria for the claim that one may be physiologically 
asleep while remaining psychologically awake. This hypo- 
thesis might appear closer to fact than speculation if one 
recalls what has been said about the relationship of slee- 
ping to dreaming, namely, that the former merely provides 
the ideal conditions for the emergence of the latter and 
that these conditions can be provided by the state of hyp- 
nagogia (deep psychophysical relaxation, LEB, parasympath- 
etic predominance, etc. ) while the subject is still awake. 
As argued, hypnagogia can fulfill the roles of both slee- 
ping and dreaming; in addition, its manipulation may pro- 
vide the conditions both for attaining continuity of con- 
sciousness and memory as the subject moves from wakefulness 
to dreaming, and for the recovery of forgotten or "unnot- 
iced" events. 
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In conclusion, three forms of implication may be poin- 
ted out as flowing from the discussions in this paper. 
The first type of implication, from which in fact flow the 
other two, rises out of my arguments identifying hypnagogic 
mentation as both 'old' and as a 'new' kind of logic. This 
view argues, in effect, that mind is not co-extensive with 
consciousness, the latter often being identified with self- 
consciousness, and rational, logical, or 'cortical' think- 
ing. It has been shown in this paper that forms of com- 
plex mentation exist outside focal consciousness and that 
they can be brought to the attention of the individual 
during hypnagogia, when, as Poincare (1978, p. 8B) put it 
in respect to his hypnagogic-creative experiences, "one 
is present at his own unconscious work". Thus, to para- 
phrase Descartes' cogito, one does not need to assert him- 
self as a self-conscious entity in order to be able to say 
that he exists as mind. The undercurrent of unconscious- 
nonrational mental activity which can be brought to the 
surface in hypnagogia reveals psychological dimensions 
which need not, and perhaps should not, always be made to 
fit the evolutionally current mode of mentation encountered 
in the waking state, i. e., they should not always be inter- 
preted according to cortical logic. As we have seen, these 
are more appropriately viewed from within their own frame- 
work without the assertive interference of the logic of 
wakefulness, a task ideally accomplished in hypnagogia 
which allows a person to be 'awake' enough to register the 
experience and yet confers on him the ability to both app- 
reciate the phenomena in their own dimension and also see 
them, when applicable, as pertaining to the solution of 
problems or as references to his own state of mind and body. 
This position, then, views hypnagogia not merely as a 
regressive state but rather as a progressive one in which 
the bipolarity of conscious-nonconscious, rational-non- 
rational are brought to a synergetic relationship. This 
view I consider to be the main implication flowing from 
the evidence presented in this paper. From it flow the 
other two kinds of implication, namely those relating to 
the practical application of hypnagogia and those pointing 
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to future research. 
Hypnagogia may be put to practical use in a variety 
of areas such as those of therapy in the physical, psycho- 
somatic, and purely psychological fields, solving personal 
or abstract problems, gaining insight into one's psycho- 
logical states. Specifically, because of its triple dimen- 
sion of relaxation (physical, emotional, intellectual) it 
may be used with particular stress on one or the other of 
these components. For instance, it may be employed to com- 
bat high blood pressure and excessive secretions in the 
stomach that might cause or exacerbate ulcers: businessmen 
prone to such complaints may learn to take short hypnagogic 
'naps' during the day. Psychosomatic illnesses, in gene- 
ral, may be treated in this way, and so can anxiety and 
neurotic and emotional disturbances. These can be effected 
either by combining hypnagogic relaxation with guided ima- 
gery and autogenic practices or by the use of the former 
on its own. That is, a person first learns to recognize 
the relaxed state of hypnagogia either by attending to it 
when it occurs naturally at sleep onset at night or by pro- 
ducing it by means of biofeedback training. Then, he 
recalls and reproduces at will during the day the feelings 
of emotional calm (lack of affect) abandonment, tolerance, 
acceptation and lack of anxiety invariably experienced 
during hypnagogia. The advantage this method has over sim- 
ilar ones already in clinical application is that one does 
not have to learn to do anything which he does not already 
know and practise: we all practise hypnagogia naturally 
and instinctively every day. All one needs to do is abs- 
tract hypnagogia from its nocturnal setting. A further 
application of this state would be to make use of its auto- 
suggestive element to bring about character changes and 
effect somatic, psychosomatic and psychological healing. 
On another level, hypnagogia may be used to bring about 
intellectual disinhibition for the purposes of creativity 
and psychological growth. In respect to creativity, a per- 
son may learn to 'hypnagogize' thus allowing the emergence 
of new FsOR and their fusing into new combinations for the 
purpose of solving problems or arriving at new inventions. 
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On the other hand, hypnagogia opens up great vistas for 
internal exploration ranging from taking 'trips' for sheer 
enjoyment (they may be fantastic, outlandish and most ori- 
ginal shows - and they certainly burn no holes in one's 
pocket! ) to exploring one's internal space and psychologi- 
cal structures in soul-searching quests. Such journeys 
of interior familiarization should inevitably bring about 
psychological integration and growth. A further psycho- 
logical gain, or perhaps a corollary of the process, might 
be the achieving of insights into the nature of, and rela- 
tionships between, the internal 'psychological' and the 
external 'physical' realms - these might be mystical, phil- 
osophical, or scientific insights depending on the person- 
ality inclinations and training of a person. One other 
area in which hypnagogia might be put to practical use is 
that of education. Too much stress for too long has been 
placed on the converging 'blinkering' and 'filtering' kind 
of thinking. It would certainly be of psychological and 
intellectual benefit if school and college curricula inclu- 
ded periods of guided hypnagogia for the express purpose 
of achieving the aims outlined in this paragraph, and for 
counter-balancing the restrictive effects of strictly ratio- 
nal, 'cortical', mentation. 
The third kind of implication referred to above con- 
cerns future research directions. As with the second imp- 
lication, that of practical applications of hypnagogia, 
the list of research possibilities to be pointed out below 
should not be taken as exhaustive, but only as what I con- 
sider to be direct and important implications of my argu- 
ments. To begin with, all the practical applications of 
hypnagogia noted above could constitute experimental con- 
firmation or disconfirmation of aspects of my arguments. 
For instance, hypnagogia could be experimentally tested 
for its conduciveness to the production of scientific and 
artistic insights and the facilitation of personal problem 
solving. In fact, this particular argument has already 
been partially confirmed in experimental settings by, e. g., 
Green et al (1970,1071a, 1971b, 1973,1978) and Budzynski 
(1972,1977). Another field that may constitute for hypna- 
gogia an area for practical application and experimental 
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confirmation is that of hypnopaedia or sleep-learning. 
Positive results in this area would further confirm and 
strengthen the view that hypnagogia is characterized by 
psychological sensitivity and openness. A further area 
of research might be that of recovering long forgotten data 
and remembering material that never entered the focal con- 
sciousness of the subject. Although this is an area in 
which hypnosis is already being applied, it would be of 
extra benefit to the subject if carried out in hypnagogia 
both because in the latter the subject need not lose con- 
sciousness of the situation and also because its practice 
would most likely increase the facilitation and access to 
similar material. 
This closely relates to another area of research, 
namely, that of retaining consciousness and memory through- 
out hypnagogia and in particular hypnagogic dreams. This, 
in fact, is one of the most important research implications 
of my arguments. Extending the existing evidence, future 
research may direct itself to finding more individuals 
who can demonstrate that they can put themselves to sleep 
(physiologically, that is) but remain psychologically 
'awake' while participating in a dream, i. e. be aware that 
they are dreaming and retain the capacity to respond to 
their environment. This would, then, be further streng- 
thened by controlled experiments in which subjects are 
trained to enter hypnagogia and turn it into a dream state 
without relinquishing consciousness of the situation and 
awareness that they are dreaming. Important observations 
to be made in these experiments would be in their effects 
on the subjects' sleeping and dreaming habits as a whole, 
and in particular whether the length of their customary 
sleep and dreams is shortened and whether their experi- 
mental training affects the nature of their spontaneous 
sleeping and dreaming, i. e., whether the latter turn into 
conscious experiences, and whether such effects are 
lasting. 
Finally, to encapsulate the study programme of this 
paper, my task has been four-fold: First to carry out an 
analysis of the subject's cognitive-experiential state 
during hypnagogia. Second, to provide a comprehensive 
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conceptual framework for the varied phenomena of hypnagogia. 
Third, to carry out systematic analyses of the relation- 
ships between hypnagogia and other states, processes and 
experiences. Fourth, to investigate the function(s) of 
hypnagogia and gain understanding of its evolutionary sig- 
nificance. Without arrogantly asserting that I have com- 
pletely fulfilled this task, I hope my efforts have gone 
some way to achieving it and that the paper as a whole 
has both contributed to human knowledge and has opened up 
avenues for further research. 
P. PPENDI X 
This appended section is essentially an explanatory note 
concerning certain incidental observations I made in 
respect to the nature of hypnagogia and its relation- 
ship to psi and meditation, while I was investigating 
and experimenting with techniques relating to changes 
of consciousness. The relevant observations to be 
reported below form part of three wider collections of 
data gathered by means of three different methods. The 
first collection comprises interviews with psychics, the 
second consists of observations made at 'psychic develop- 
ment circles', and the third is made up of observations 
of, and reports from, two groups of people I instructed 
in progressive relaxation and self-reporting of 
subjective phenomena. It must be clearly pointed out at 
the outset that in many of these cases it was not 
specifically my intention at the time of collecting the 
data to investigate their occurrence in relation to 
hypnagogic phenomenology. Indeed, a great deal of data 
had been gathered before I began my research into hypna- 
gogia. 
In respect to my interviews with psychics these have been 
carried out over a period of several years: they range 
from informal talks to more formalized tape-recorded 
interviews guided by a pre-set questionnaire, and include 
responses of established mediums as well as of budding 
psychics. My purpose at the time was to gather infor- 
mation on the modus operandi of individuals said to be 
functioning in paranormal states of consciousness. When, 
however, I came eventually to relate this information to 
the phenomenology of hypnagogia I found many striking 
similarites. These are very much the same as those 
discussed in the chapter on 'Psi. ' 
Invariably, the psychics I spoke to referred to their 
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psi mental states as a 'switching off' of the analytic 
mind and a switching into a different channel or reality. 
As a rule they experience their physical surroundings as 
fading into the background, while the 'psychic' world 
becomes prominent. In the words of Northage : "I switch 
off entirely. I forget 'me' entirely. I cease to exist. 
I'm not there, only as a point of relaying. Physically 
I, as me, cease to exist. Psychologically too, I am not 
concerned with myself ... I can see people in the 
audience whom I know quite well, and fail to recognise 
them. I sort of lose that [the physical] into this [the 
psychic], you see. They are not exactly invisible but 
they don't register ... Everything physical, you see, 
becomes'secondary". The medium appears to be functioning 
primarily in a psychic reality wherein he/she tends to 
lose body schema identification, but not sensation. As 
another medium, Joan McCleod, put it : "You lose 
consciousness of your body but your senses become 
sharper". McCleod, like all the other psychics I spoke to, 
stressed the brightness of colours in her psi imagery and 
the sense of reality experienced in a psi state. Likewise, 
she pointed out that in such states she becomes highly 
absorbed and yet detached, she enters what I would call a 
state 
de-egotization 
wherein the current psychic activity 
presents itself with a force of reality and engages her 
interest, but her interest, although deep, is clearly 
impersonal. In the case of trance this absorbed-yet- 
detached attitude is particularly pronounced. Northage 
likened the state of trance to 'having gas at the 
dentistfs: ltI don't think you are wholly conscious with gas. 
You know what's going on, but you are not taking any part 
in it at all". Northage further reported that when having 
an OOBE she experiences 'images' and 'convictions' which 
are related to herself, as opposed to those appearing 
during a demonstration, which are always related to other 
people. She recounted to me three hypnopompic experiences 
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which she clearly considered paranormal, one of which 
seems to constitute a form of 'reversed' auto-symbolism, 
that is, an experience containing a verbal explanation of 
its contents : "I woke up feeling very refreshed and I 
was thinking to myself, 'Oh, what a lovely night I've 
had, ' and was sort of slipping back into consciousness 
when a man's voice said : 'Death is as simple as that' - 
as if he were answering and explaining the lovely state I 
was in". 
In regards to the phenomena reported in 'development 
circles' these are practically impossible to distinguish 
from the phenomena of hypnagogia. As in the case of my 
interviews with psychics, my attending numerous 'develop- 
ment circles' was connected with my interest in gaining 
information - and, in this case, first hand experience - 
of the way one operates in a psi state. A psychic 
'development circle' is made up of a group of people - 
ranging in number from half a dozen to two dozen - 
meeting regularly - usually once a week - under the 
leadership of a psychic, who instructs them on how to 
enter and function in a psi state. The instructions and 
exercises vary from one circle to another and from one 
leader to the next. Basically, however, the members of the 
group are asked to sit relaxedly in a semi-darkened room 
and 'let go' or 'open up'. Although one is not asked 
specifically to close one's eyes, this is nearly always 
done as a means of aiding psychophysical withdrawal. Thus, 
in the early stages of psychic development, a person sits 
comfortably in a darkened room, lets go of his hold on the 
surrounding reality, turns inward, and waits. In 
spiritualist 'development circles' the 'waiting' is 
specifically characterized as the period during which the 
developing psychic is gradually making contact with the 
'spirit world', that is, by relaxing and 'letting go' 
(becoming passive-receptive) he places himself in a 
psychological state conducive to affecting communication 
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with entities believed to inhabit a spiritual world. Thus 
phenomena experienced in this state are often interpreted 
as'messages' from spirits. 
Now, as already pointed out in the main body of this paper 
if a person sits comfortably in a darkened room, closes 
his eyes and lets go, the chances are he will fall asleep. 
This is particularly the case when he is instructed to 
'blank' his mind, that is, to stop thinking, analysing, 
worrying, or concerning himself with everyday claptrap. In 
such circumstances all the known hypnagogic phenomena are 
abundantly demonstrated. My notes abound with reports of 
body schema alterations (shrinking, expanding, floating, 
numbness, facial distortions), total body schema loss, 
sensations of cold and heat, the hearing of names, 
isolated words, apparently irrelevant sentences, 
intuitions, solutions to one's own or someone else's 
problems. The visions include the seeing of isolated 
symbolic figures and signs, seascapes, landscapes, faces, 
fragmented or complete scenes - indeed practically all the 
hypnagogic sensori-motor phenomena discussed in the main 
body of this paper. However, given the psychological set 
of developing psychics and the setting in which such 
experiences transpire, the latter are invariably 
interpreted either as signs that the psychic is making 
progress in his development or as messages from spirit 
communicators. This is not to deny that meaningful and 
significant psi results are never obtained in these 
circumstances, but merely to note the occurrence of 
certain phenomena irrespective of set and setting. 
In parallel with my research above I began holding my own 
two-hour weekly evening group meetings which were not 
spiritualistic in character and included meditation and 
visualization exercises. They were held at London's 
Flolloway and Islington Adult Education institutes and were 
designed to experiment with techniques of consciousness 
expansion and introspection. Although these classes ran 
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for four academic years - with mostly different people 
every year - data have been collected methodically from 
only two 30 week academic periods with two different 
groups of twenty persons each. 
In these meetings all exercises and experiments were 
invariably preceded by psychophysical relaxation. This was 
carried out in semi-darkness with the members of the 
group sitting relaxedly on chairs or lying on the floor 
and listening to my instructions on relaxation delivered 
against a background of specially composed music. The 
relaxation period was then followed by either opening-up 
or concentrative meditation. Opening-up meditation 
consists basically of relaxing, letting go, and attending 
diffusedly to one's external or internal space. 
Concentrative meditation goes a step further than the 
previous kind in that attention is concentrated (in the 
diffused manner already discussed in this paper) on a 
particular external object, sensation or mental image. 
Traditionally, the opening-up meditation is employed 
either as a 'blanking' technique for its own sake, ie. as a 
means of allowing one's inner, intuitive nature to come to 
the fore, or as a pre-condition to the exercise of 
concentrative meditation. In my classes these two forms of 
meditation were practised separately. 
The instructions in respect to the opening-up meditation 
were to the effect of relaxing, letting go of one's 
concerns, ceasing to calculate and analyse, turning 
inwards, and becoming effortlessly aware of any subjective 
psychophysical occurrences, e. g. physical sensations, images 
quality of thought, intuitions. It can be readily seen 
that these instructions, if followed dilligently, would 
lead into a state identical to that aimed at in 
'development circles', the only characteristic 
distinguishing the two states being that of set and 
setting. Moreover, it can also be seen that psycho- 
physical relaxation (muscular, emotional, and 
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intellectual), letting go, turning inwards (psycho- 
logically withdrawing), are symptoms of spontaneously 
occurring hypnagogia - small wonder that I heard snoring 
on occasion, both in my own classes and in 'development 
circles'! Subjective phenomena reported as occurring in 
this type of meditation fell well within the phenomen- 
ological span of hypnagogia and, allowing for the absence 
of a spiritualist setting, they were indistinguishable 
from those reported in 'development circles', 
In respect to concentrative meditation this took the form 
of concentrating one's non-analytic attention either on a 
sensation (eg. listening to the meditation music as if the 
latter were being played in the centre of one's head) or a 
mental image (visual, auditory, kinesthetic, tactile, 
olfactory). Some relevant observations reported in this 
area include the following : On centring the hearing of 
music in one's head (internalising, subjectifying) the 
sense of hearing became extremely - almost painfully - 
acute; the musical notes were felt somatically, as if the 
music were literally played in one's head or body. 
Concentrating on a mental image, eg. an open red rose, 
often gave rise to visually related images, e.. a rosebud, 
a withered rose, a row of flowering plants on a windowsill. 
This did not seem to be the result of mental association 
but either grew out of the initial association, ie. the open 
red rose, as though organically, or sprang forth directly 
and in vivid form from the very attempt to visualize an 
open red rose. Concentrative meditation facilitated intro- 
spection in two ways. First, it enhanced a person's 
familiarization with his internal space, and second, it 
enhanced his ability to control and manipulate not only 
his mental imagery but also his attentional state itself. 
These benefits reflected, within a few weeks of practice, 
in the reports of experiences during opening-up 
meditation. That is, opening-up meditation became richer in 
imagery (or, rather, one became aware of more imagery in 
this state), and one's ability at attaining and prolonging 
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the state was enhanced. 
Now, given the conditions and phenomenology of the 
opening-up meditation, the only criteria for 
distinguishing it from the spontaneously occurring hypna- 
gogia are its deliberate induction and its prevention 
from leading to sleep - but these criteria, as argued in 
the main body of this paper, cannot be invoked to 
distinguish the experimentally induced hypnagogia from a 
number of adjacent states including meditation. Thus, in 
the exercises carried out in the evening classes, the 
opening-up meditation turned out to be a sustained 
hypnagogia in which a subject learned to balance himself 
between waking and sleeping and, in time, acquired the 
ability to report his experiences while the latter were 
in progress. This simultaneous reporting proved to have 
two advantages over the earlier routine of reporting 
after the experience had taken place, that is, at the 
conclusion of the exercise. First, it secured against 
forgetting the experiences themselves which was observed 
to be sometimes the case with the earlier routine, due 
mainly to the fascination and absorption experienced by 
subjects that prevented them from registering and 
remembering the experiences. Second, it secured against 
loss of awareness of surroundings and thus prevented a 
subject from falling asleep. Although this form of 
hypnagogic introspection initially led to a diminution 
in reported imagery frequency and vividness, as some 
subjects gradually became proficient in retaining double- 
consciousness (always remaining receptive and favouring 
the imaginal as opposed to the physical), their imaginal 
activities increased in amount, frequency and vividness, 
their relaxation deepened, and their ability to register 
hypnagogic phenomena was enhanced. Also noteworthy were 
the observations that the greater the amount and the 
more vivid the experiences one had, the more refreshed 
and invigorated one felt and the deeper one's relaxation. 
i 
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Thus, psychophysical relaxation was found to be not only 
a pre-condition for the occurrence of hypnagogia but also 
to be directly affected by the latter in a positive way, 
i. e. hypnagogic experiences deepened one's relaxation. These 
observations bear strongly on my arguments in respect to 
the hypometabolic or anabolic function of hypnagogia and 
the employment of this state as a means of generation 
and immediate interpretation of dream imagery while the 
subject retains awareness of his physical surroundings. 
Finally, some reports of members of these groups appear 
to raise certain ontological and epistemological 
questions. It is true that my approach in this paper has 
been a naturalistic one which has led me to first argue 
that many phenomena reported in a number of states are 
essentially hypnagogic and second that hypnagogic 
phenomena are correlated with activities of 
subcortical structures. Thus, I have argued that many 
so-called paranormal experiences are natural imaginal 
phenomena coloured by set and setting and that when they 
are reported as occurring in hypnagogia, they may be 
explained in terms of the operation of unconscious layers 
of one's mind and that hypnagogia is capable of 'catching' 
these operations and their effects because of its pre- 
conscious nature. This, however, does not explain why a 
person's hypnagogic experiences should sometimes 
constitute meaningful references to unknown, and 
unknowable by means of inference, aspects of the lives of 
other people. For instance, in the light of my experience 
with the phenomena of 'development circles' I asked my 
subjects in opening-up meditation to pose certain mental 
questions to themselves while experiencing hypnagogic 
imagery : they were to ask questions such as 'What does 
this image mean? ', 'Who is it for? ' Conversely they were 
asked to concentrate diffusedly on one or other member of 
the group while drifting into hypnagogia. Some results 
were striking examples of clairvoyance and telepathy. This 
518 
at least raises the question as to whether some 
seemingly 'irrelevant' hypnagogic images might not be 
meaningful phenomena belonging to the unconscious layers 
of another mind. Since, however, these reports were not 
properly quantified, I shall leave them as pointers and 
possible future research orientations. 
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